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ABSTRACT
This work is a study of Russell's neutral monism with special 
emphasis on the stages of its development# Two distinct phases 
are recognised; these are called 'partial neutralism' and 'complete 
neutral monism'* The first is advocated in 'The Analysis of Mind' 
and the second in his later works#
The work is mainly interpretative# This involves comparison 
and criticism of the views expressed at different stages and the 
interpretations given by critics and commentators and Russell's 
replies to them, as also clearing up certain ambiguities and 
misunderstandings. In this respect it is a critical exposition 
of Russell's theory.
The discussions begin with a historical sketch of the 
development of neutral monism in general with brief reproduction 
of the views of its early propounders (Chapter I)*
Russell's theory is discussed in several chapters. First, 
a preliminary account is given showing how he comes to adopt it 
at first partially and then completely from the position of 
logical atomism (Chapter II). The theories of the neutral 
stuff, matter, and mind are then discussed separately in some 
detail indicating in each case the important changes made at 
different stages (Chapters III, IV, V)# Finally, some questions 
concerning body, mind and person are considered, and reference is 
made to the modern 'Identity Hypothesis* and Strawson's views 
on persons (Chapter VI)•
The final version of Russell's theory seems to attain a 
sort of theoretical completeness and to avoid certain difficulties 
involved in the earlier theory of partial neutralism. The 
Identity Hypothesis is found to be originally Russell's idea, 
and to be tenable as an aspect of neutral monism rather than in 
its present physicalist form. Strawson's arguments for the 
'primitiveness' of the concept of a person seem unsatisfactory; 
Russell's theory may be wrong, but Strawson's position does not 
prove that it is so.
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INTRODUCTION
Bertrand Russell in his long career as a philosopher 
has produced a large number of works covering a wide variety of 
subjects.. He has made important contributions to various fields, 
has developed many new ideas and has suggested instructive 
hypotheses. His influence on contemporary philosophy, especially 
in logic, logical analysis, the philosophy of science, epistemo- 
logy and metaphysics, cannot perhaps be exaggerated. There are 
few books written on philosophy during the last few decades, 
which do not in some way refer to Russell's works or make use of 
some of his ideas. This is perhaps the reason why Allan Wood 
remarked a few years ago that "there is little of importance in 
present-day philosophizing which is not derived from him. The 
post-Russellians are all propter-Russellians."
In the course of the development of his thought, 
Russell's views on many topics have undergone changes, sometimes 
resulting in opposite ideas at different stages. In spite of 
this, there is throughout a unity of purpose and constancy of 
method. The purpose has always been to attain as much certainty 
in knowledge as possible, a passionate search for truth. The 
method is that of logical analysis, developed in his mathematical
1. My Philosophical Development, p.237.
2. M.Weitÿ, 'Analysis and the Unity of Russell's Philosophy*, 
The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, pp.35ff.
8logic and employed in every branch, of philosophy. For him, every 
philosophical problem is a problem of analysis, and the business 
of philosophy is essentially that of logical analysis followed by 
logical synthesis.
Truth, Russell believes, can only be obtained from the
understanding of the world as a whole, not simply the little world
of human mind and experience. He has often complained against
philosophers of "cosmic impiety" , of being too much concerned
with this petty planet and with "the different ways in which silly
people can say silly things"^, and not trying to understand the.
world. He finds little satisfaction "in contemplating the human
4
race and its follies". He says, "Those who attempt to make a 
religion of humanism which recognises nothing greater than man, 
do not satisfy my emotions. And yet I am unable to believe that, 
in the world as known, there is anything that I can value outside
human beings This conflict shows the attitude he has taken
to philosophy in general. He has tried to obtain a philosophy of 
the world in which man and other things are seen in their proper 
places.His attempts, like those of any other philosopher, have 
been a failure in the sense that he has not been able to get the
1. 'Philosophical Importance of Mathematical Logic', Monist, 
October, 1913; Logic and Knowledge, p.341.
2. History of Western Philosophy, p.yBzONew Edition,1961).
3. My Philosophical Development, p.230.
4. Ibid., p.131.
3 . 'My Mental Development', The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, 
pp. 19-20.
certain impersonal truth which he set out to find.^ But they 
are also a success in the sense that he has been able to show 
that such impersonal absolute truth is not attainable, at any 
rate on purely empirical grounds. And in his search for truth 
he has developed a philosophical method which gives valuable 
knowledge, though not absolute certainty, and which enables the 
philosophers employing it to argue and concur in respect of
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exact hypotheses, all compatible with the existing evidence.
The philosophical study of the world involves a vast 
range of topics, and Russell's works cover them generally. The 
wide variety of his philosophical interests makes it difficult 
to obtain, with justice to them all, a systematic account of 
his philosophy within a short space. It is, however, possible 
to recognise some aspects which have engaged his attention more 
or less permanently, and to produce an account of the relevant 
issues with special reference to the development of his ideas 
about them. One of such aspects concerns the metaphysical 
problem of the ultimate nature of the reality of the world with 
the question of the relation of mind and matter as an important 
aspect of it. This problem is in some sense basic in philosophy, 
and any system of philosophy must offer some explanation of it. 
As in many other cases, Russell's views on this particular 
subject have undergone changes; but we find that in his later
1. Russell recognises this in retrospect ; see 'My Mental 
Development', The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, pp.19-20.
2. Ibid, p.20.
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writings he has constantly maintained a theory called 'neutral 
monism'. According to it, mind and matter are not the ultimate 
realities of the world; the world consists of something more 
primitive and fundamental; and mind and matter are composed of 
the primitive 'stuff arranged in different ways. Thus, the theory 
holds that there is no fundamental dualism between mind and 
matter, but only a difference of arrangement, relation or context.
Neutral monism had been maintained by some philoso­
phers before Russell. He accepted it in 1919 and has since then 
advocated it continuously. This theory has been his metaphysical 
faith for nearly half a century now, a period which has witnessed 
some of the results of his maturer philosophical thought. It is 
therefore important to understand his theory of neutral monism 
both because the theory itself is important and instructive, 
and because a study of it is a valuable help in gaining an 
insight into his philosophy in general.
While maintaining the fundamental thesis of neutral 
monism throughout this period, Russell has made important 
changes in the details of it at different stages of his philo­
sophy. Accordingly, there is a history of the development of 
his neutral monism. In developing this theory as also his 
philosophy in general, he has not claimed that his solutions 
are the final truth. He is a philosopher who is an example of 
self-criticism. As he has considered his philosophy, he has at
11
any subsequent stage criticised his earlier views; each advance 
he has made constitutes a criticism of his previous position*
So, his philosophy leaves little scope for criticism on orthodox 
lines. What is needed, therefore, is not so much to criticise 
him as to understand him.
However, Russell's philosophy in general, and his 
neutral monism in particular, have not gone unopposed. There are 
a good number of reviews, articles and short references here and 
there in which his neutral monism has been criticised, and 
sometimes rather severely. There are two things that one finds 
about these criticisms. First, there is in some cases a lack of 
recognition of the different stages of the development of the 
theory with the result that attacks have been directed to a 
position which Russell had already criticised and abandoned. 
Secondly, criticisms have sometimes been made on the basis of 
some interpretations of some his ideas, which he would not 
perhaps recognise as adequate interpretations at all. The latter 
has arisen from two things. On the one hand, Russell himself 
has not always been as precise and unambiguous as one might 
wish, thus leaving room for alternative interpretations to suit 
a commentator's special bias. On the other hand, interpretations 
have sometimes been made out by considering some of his state­
ments taken out from the proper context and without regard to
1. Of. Allan Wood's remarks. My Philosophical Development, p.238,
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other relevant statements.
Now, besides criticising his own earlier positions at
subsequent stages, Russell hsis also tried to clarify his position
in defensive articles and replies. We have, therefore, a complex
situation about his theory of neutral monism: he has developed it
in different phases by making important changes at different times,
a
and thus his views are to be found in,^number of books and articles; 
his critics and commentators have represented him in ways which 
he often disapproves (and sometimes rightly) and which are mostly 
psirtial; and there are his own replies and clarifications. A 
proper understanding of his theory will now require a considera­
tion of these various developments. There is, however, no single 
book either of Russell himself or of anyone else, which offers a
brief account of the theory, --- an account that shows the
development of the theory in its different phases and contains 
references to these various sources.
It is clear that there is a case for a study of Russell's 
neutral monism in the manner indicated above, and that this would 
be a valuable contribution to the understanding not only of his 
metaphysical position, but also of ,his philosophy in general to 
some extent * At present the study is also important from another 
point of view. Since long Russell has maintained as an aspect of 
his neutrsuL monism a theory of the relation of mind and body 
(brain in particular) which in a somewhat modified form is much 
in vogue now-a-days. In recent years it has been called the
13
'mind-body identity theory’, which is sometimes maintained 
without proper recognition of its original form or source. But 
it is useful to know it in its original form and original context. 
A study of the development of Russell's neutral monism will 
reveal that the identity theory owes its origin to his neutral 
monistic construction of mind and brain.
But the proposed study is not an easy and simple 
task; the very complexity of the situation speaks for this. 
Volumes may be necessaxy to make it exhaustive. Yet it is not 
impossible to take it up in a limited scale and make a worthwhile 
contribution to the subject. The present work is such a limited 
attempt at producing a brief historical account of Russell's 
neutral monism with special reference to the stages of its deve­
lopment. The purpose is mainly interpretative. But in a situation 
as this, interpretation must involve a good deal of criticism 
and comparison of both Russell's views of different stages and 
the interpretations and comments of his critics. In this sense 
the present work may be called a critical exposition of Russell's 
neutral monism.
The limitations of the present work should perhaps 
be made a little more precise. Neutral monism is a metaphysical 
theory. But as Russell presents it, it is not kept separate from 
problems which are not strictly metaphysical. In his works, 
various logical and epistemological problems are discussed 
elaborately side by side with his metaphysics. These problems
x*t
are not discuesed here except to the extent it is absolutely 
necessary for understanding the metaphysical position. Again, 
this work is mainly concerned with the development of Russell's 
ideas in his own philosophy, and not with the continuation of 
them by other philosophers with one or two exceptions. One such 
exception is the identity theory about which something is said 
in the sequel.
The scope of the work can perhaps also be understood 
from its plan which is as follows. As neutral monism was held by 
other philosophers before Russell, some knowledge of the earlier 
versions of the theory would certainly facilitate the understand­
ing of Russell's position. So, our discussions begin with a 
brief representation of these earlier views. This forms the 
subject-matter of Chapter I.
The consideration of Russell's theory is divided into 
several chapters. First, the question of the development of his 
neutral monism out of his earlier positions is taken up. Two 
distinct phases of his neutral monism are recognised. These are 
called 'partial neutralism' and 'complete neutral monism'. The 
first is the theory advocated in 'The Analysis of Mind', and the 
second in his later works. Attempts are also made to give a short 
account of the relation of his logical atomism and neutral monism. 
All these constitute the contents of Chapter II.
Neutral monism may be said to have three main parts, namely 
those dealing respectively with the neutral stuff, matter, and 
mind. These three parts are considered separately in this order
15
in three different chapters, namely chapters III, IV and V.
In each of these chapters the relevant subject is discussed with r 
reference to the development of Russell's views and the changes 
he makes at different stages. Finally, some questions concerning 
the mind-body relation and the concept cf a p^rson are discussed 
in a separate chapter (Chapter VI). In this connection, reference 
is made to two recent developments. One is the modern 'Identity 
Hypothesis* which is a continuation of an aspect of Russell's 
theory in a modified form. The other is P.F. Strawson's views 
on the concept of a person, which may be said to oppose not only 
Russell's views, but also any kind of analytic conception of a 
person.
The final version of Russell's complete neutral monism turns 
out to be a kind of 'emergent* neutralism. It attains a sort of 
theoretical completeness and avoids certain difficulties involved 
in his earlier theory of partial neutralism. The Identity Hypo­
thesis is found to be originally Russell's idea, and to be as old 
as his complete neutral monism. It is argued to some extent that 
in its present physicàlist form this hypothesis seems untenable, 
and that it has a better chance of being true as an aspect of 
neutral monism, such as is found in Russell's philosophy. Strawson's 
claim that the concept of a person is a 'primitive' concept seems 
hnsatisfhotbry ' and as such cannot be said necessarily to invali­
date Russell's position. Russell's theory may be wrong, but 
Strawson's arguments do not prove that it is so.
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CHAPTER I
ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEUTRAL MONISM
1# Neutral Monism in General
Neutral monism is the theory that things commonly 
regarded as mental and things commonly regarded as physical do 
not differ in respect of any intrinsic property possessed by the 
one set and not by the other, but differ only in respect of
arrangement and context. Mind and matter, according to this theory,
axe not two radically different kinds of entities, but are cons­
tructed out of the same 'stuff*. It is admitted that there is some 
difference between the mental and the physical, since to deny 
this would be an absurdity. But the difference is not one of 'stuff, 
but of relations, arrangements, and contexts. There is only one 
kind of 'stuff out of which the world is made; the stuff is 
called mental in one arrangement, and physical in another, Russell 
illustrates this theory by comparison with a postal directory in 
which the names appear twice over, once in alphabetical and once
in geographical order. We may compare the alphabetical order
with the material and the geographical order with the mental 
phenomenon. The affinities of a given thing are quite different 
in the two orders, and its causes and effects may obey different 
laws. Just as every man in the directory has two kinds of
1. Logic and Knowledge, p. 139,* Portraits from Memory, p.l48.
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neighbours, so every object will be at the intersection of two 
causal series, namely the mental series and the physical series.
Thus the neutral entities that make the world may be 
arranged in two different ways. A group of neutral entities arranged 
in one way will constitute a piece of matter or physicial object; and 
the same neutral entities arranged in the other way will constitute 
a mind or a series of mental events. Considered by themselves and 
apart from either of the arrangements, the neutral entities are 
neither mental nor physical. That is why they are called neutral# 
Mind and matter are both complexes derived from the same primitive 
stuff, the neutral entities.
This theory is monist in the sense that the world, 
according to it, is composed of only one kind of stuff, namely the 
neutral entities; but it is also pluralist in the sense that a 
multiplicity of entities make up the neutral stuff of the world.
Any theory of neutral monism must contain three parts:
(1) A theory of the neutral stuff: This must tell us 
what kind of entities the neutral entities are.
(2) A theory of matter: This must show how matter is 
constructed out of neutral entities. It has to explain what kind of 
relations hold between a set of neutral entities when they constitute 
a material object; it has to show what exactly the arrangement of a 
set of neutral entities is when that set constitutes; a piece of 
matter.
1. W^T.,Stace, 'Russell's Neutral Monism', The Philosophy of Bertrand 
Russell, p.354#
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(3) A theory of mind: The main question to be answered 
here is about how a mind is constructed out of neutral entities. This 
part of the theory has to show what kind of relations hold between a 
set of neutral entities when they constitute a mind; it has to 
explain what exactly the arrangement of a set of neutral entities is 
when that set makes up a mind or a mental phenomenon.
Different versions of neutral monism formulate these three 
parts of the theory differently. All answer the same questions; but 
they differ just in the answers they give to these questions.
Neutral monism has to be distinguished from other types
of monism, that is from both idealistic and materialistic monism.
According to the former, "mind alone is real and matter is an
illusion"; and according to the latter, "matter alone is real and
1mind is an illusion". Idealism or mentalism denies the reality of 
the external world and explains everything in terms of our 'ideas* 
or 'mental states'. Materialism, on the other hand, takes the 
opposite view and declares matter to be the only reality, and mind 
as only a function of matter, an epiphenomenon, having no reality 
of its own. Neutral monism avoids the one-sidedness of both these 
theories; as regards mind and matter, it does not reduce the one 
into the other or, in other words, it does not derive the one from 
the other ; but it derives both mind and matter from the same 
primitive stuff that is neutral between them.
The motives that has inspired neutral monism are mainly
1# An Outline of Philosophy, p.303.
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1two* The first motive is to get rid of the psycho-physical dualism 
and the second motive is empiricism* Ever since Descartes intro­
duced in his philosophy a complete "bifurcation of nature"^into 
mind and matter, philosophers have found it difficult to explain 
their relation, particularly their interaction. Descartes defined 
mind, as the thinking substance and matter as the extended substance. 
Thinking and extension were conceived by him as mutually exclu­
sive. Thus a gulf was created between mind and matter, there being 
nothing common between them. Gilbert Ryle describes this position 
as "Descartes' Myth"^, which has caused a lot of troubles in 
philosophy for more than two centuries. Throughout the history 
of modern philosophy attempts have been made to avoid this gulf 
by upholding one and consequently suppressing the other of the- 
'substances'. The results have been idealism or materialism 
according as mind or matter hajs been taken as 'the' reality.
Neutral monism is an attempt to get rid of the psycho-physical 
dualism without falling into idealism or materialism which hitherto 
seemed the only alternatives. It tries to bridge the gulf between 
mind and matter by showing them both to be complexes derived
from the same neutral stuff.
The second important motive of neutral monism is to give 
pn account of the world in terms of empirically verifia.ble entities.
1. W.T.Stace, op. cit., p.304.
2. A.N.Whitehead, The Concept of Nature, p.26.
3. G.Ryle, The Concept of Mind, p.13.
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The stuff of the neutral monists is never any kind of hidden 
mysterious substance or thing-in—itself* The notion of substance as 
something unknown and unknowable- behind the phenomenal world was. 
rejected by Hume;, and since then it has always been doubted# The 
neutral monists are avowedly opposed to the notion of Cartesian 
substance or Kantian 'Ding-an-sich'* Neutral monism is an attempt 
to construct mind and matter out of entities that are empirically 
verifiable.
Historically, neutral monism is of comparatively recent 
growth# It was originated by Ernst Mach in 1886 and was developed 
by William James, the American New Realists and Bertrand Russell.
The word 'neutral' was not used by Mach and James# It was invented by
-1
H^M.Sheffer ; and following his suggestion, the new realists used 
the term 'neutral entities' and 'neutral stuff'# Russell used the 
name 'Neutral Monism' for his own theory as also for the theories 
of Mach,, James and the new realists# We shall present below in bare 
outline the theories of neutral monism as were developed by these 
predecessors of Russell.
2# Ernst Mach
Neutral monism owes its origin to Ernst Mach. He developed 
the theory in 'The Analysis of Sensations' which was first published
1. Cf. E.B.Holt, The Concept of Consciousness, Preface, p.XIV#
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in 1886 and in English translation in I897,—  s book described by
"among the classics of modern realism".^ Mach's 
views are based on an analysis of 'observation*, that is, of what 
we observe in the world#
The world we observe is populated by various sorts of 
objects, animate and inanimate, human and non-human, body and ego# 
These things are relatively permanent constituents of the world.^ 
But close inspection reveals to us that each of these objects is 
continually changing, and yet is regarded as the same object. He 
says;.
'My table is now brightly,, now dimly lighted. It may receive 
an ink stain# One of its legs may be broken. It may be 
repaired, polished, and replaced part by part# But for me, 
amid all its changes, it remains the table at which I 
daily write#' ^
The same is true of or 'ego'# There are changes in
me, and yet enough durable features remain to identify the ego. This
is possible because all the features of an object do not change at
a time, because more features remain apparently unchanged than are
obviously changed. So, the relative permanence of the object is due
to the fact that it is a complex of large number of features,
properties or elements# Thus "the component parts of the complex
4
are first exhibited as its properties". We also observe that
1#R#B#Perry,. The Present Philosophical Tendencies, p.310.
2. E#Mach, The Analysis of Sensations, pp.2-3.,
3. Ibid., p.2.
4. Ibid., pp.3-4.
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objects have common properties or elements which are
particular colours, shapes, textures, tastes, particular experiences
and so on. Not only the sensible qualities of external objects are
elements, but also particular experiences; in fact, any experience
is an element of some complex. Thus observation reveals to us that
objects are complexes of elements which are their component parts#
These elements are ultimate in the sense that they are not further
2
analysable. They are simple or atomic.
Mach thus arrives at the notion of elements as the
constituents of objects# He then calls the elements 'sensations*.
Elements are sensations because we discover them only through
sense-experience. He says:
* A color-^ is a physical object so long as we consider its 
dependence upon its luminous source, upon other colors, upon 
heat, upon space and so forth. Regarding, however, its 
dependence upon the retina ... ... it becomes a psycho­
logical object, a sensation.'3
A bare colour is neither physical nor psychical; it is, we may say,
neutral. Colours, tones, pressures, pains, desires, hopes and fears
are, so far as our experience goes, are something that occur in us,.—
sensations which we combine to form ideas which we call 'external
4
objects', or our 'body' or 'mind'.
The world, according to Mach, consists only of sensations, 
Properly speaking, the world is not composed of 'things as its 
elements, but of colours, tones, pressures,in short what we usually
1. E# Mach, op. cit., p.5*
2# P.Alexander, Sensationalism and Scientific Explanation, p#7# 
3- E.Mach, op. cit., p.l4*
4. P#Alexander, op. cit., p#12.
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call individual sensations. These include not only our own sensations 
but also those of others. Mach admits other people and their minds 
on the basis of an argumeht from analogy.^ These again are complexes
as our own bodies and minds are.
Mach feels that it is improper to call the elements 
sensations. He says:
•Usually, these elements are caJLled sensations. But as vestiges 
of a onesided theory inhere in that term, we prefer to speak
simply of elements.. The aim of all research is to ascertain
the mode of connexion of these elements.
The elements are\the only stuff,— the neutral stuff,— of
the world, which is just a mass of these elements. Mind and matter,
body and ego, are only ideal shorthand names of groups of such
elements* Mach says :
•The primary fact is not the I, the ego, but the elements 
Csensations) * The elements constitute the I# I have the 
sensation green, signifies that the elements green occurs 
in a given complex of other elements (sensations, memories)#
When I cease to have the sensation green, when I die, then 
the elements no longer occur in their ordinary, familiar 
way of association. That is all. Only an ideal mental- 
economical unity, not a real unity, has ceased to exist.*3
As regards bodies, Mach says that they do not produce 
sensations, but complexes of sensations or elements make them
4
Bodies are only "thought-symbols for complexes of sensations".
Thus Mach rejects the idea of the world as consisting of mysterious
1. E.Mach, op. cit. , pp.33ff*
2. Ibid., p.l8.
3e Ibid., pp.19-20.
4. Ibid., p.22.
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entities or substances acting upon one another and thus producing 
sensations. The world, for him, is composed of elements which are 
in themselves neutral entities.
3# William James
Mach arrived at neutral monism through physics. James, 
whose opinions are fundamentally the same, arrived at them through 
psychology. These were first published in an article, 'Does 
Consciousness Exist?*, in 1904. This and other essays containing 
the same views are collected in the posthumous book 'Essays in 
Radical Empiricism'.
There seems to be a confusion as to whether James
'I
developed his neutral monism independently of Mach. Russell thinks
that as James in his articles on the subject does not refer to Mach
he must have reached his conclusions independently. This is also the
opinion of Morris Weitz. On the other hand, Passmore in discussing
James' views suggests that he must have learnt much from Macl?# James
says in his essay of 1904 that he had mistrusted 'consciousness'
for the previous twenty years and suggested its non-existence to his
4
students for the past seven or eight years. This seems to support
1.. Logic and Knowledge, p.l40 foot-note.
2. M..Weitz, op# cit., p.70#
3. J..Passmore, A Hundred Years of Philosophy, p.109 foot-note.
4. W..James, Essays in Radical Empiricism, p.3«:
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Russell's remarks. But the time James mentions is just about the 
time that elapsed between the publications of their views. 
Moreover, as R.B.Perry points out, James was in regular corres­
pondence with Mach whose works he read carefully.^ Perry also 
points out that when 'The Analysis of Sensations' was about to 
be published Mach wrote to James about it, and that James in a
letter to Stumpf (January, I886) said: "1 am thirsty to read 
2
it”. In Perry's opinion Mach's book was a precursor of James' 
doctrine of pure experience.^ In view of all these , it seems 
natural to suppose, without minimising James' originality of 
approach and arguments, that he had known Mach's views and 
benefited by them.
James feels that philosophers including himself had not 
been radical enough to follow strictly the empirical principle 
that they must not admit into their constructions any element 
that is not directly experienced, nor exclude any element that 
is directly experienced. Radical empiricism must adopt this 
principle, which he calls 'the principle of pure experience',
ij.
'a methodical postulate'. For such radical philosophy, "the 
relations that connect experiences must themselves be experienced 
relations, and any kind of relation experienced must be accounted 
as 'real' as anything else in the system".^ This is the central
1. R.B.Perry, The Thought and Character of William James, vol. II,
p.4 63.
2. Ibid., vol.II, p.65. 3 . Ibid., vol. I, pp.588-9.
4. W..James. Essays in Radical Empiricism, pp.42, 159, 241.
5. Ibid., p.42.
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doctrine of radical empiricism, which makes it possible to escape
the vicious disjunctions that have hitherto baffled philosophy,— .
disjunctions such as between consciousness and physical nature,
between thought and its object* The disjunctions need not be
overcome by calling in any 'trans-empirical connective support';
they may now be got rid of by regarding them as only "differences
1of empirical relationship among common empirical terms"*
James comes to the view that the world is only the world 
of 'experience'; things and thoughts are no more than points of 
emphasis within that world. Consciousness, James declares, is 
not an entity:
'It is the name of a non-entity, and has no right to a
place among first principles* Those who still cling to
. it are clinging to a mere echo, a faint rumour left behind,
by the disappearing 'soul' upon the air of philosophy*'^
While thus denying the existence of consciousness as an 
entity, James admits that the word stands for a function. He says 
that there is no aboriginal stuff or quality of being, contrasted 
with that of which material objects are made, out of which our 
thoughts of them are made. But he thinks that there is a function 
in experience which thoughts perform. This function is 'knowing'.^ 
He says:
'My thesis is that if we start with the supposition that 
there is only one primal stuff or material in the world, 
a stuff of which everything is composed, and if we call 
that stuff "pure experience", then knowing can be explained 
as a particular sort of relation towards one another into 
which portions of pure experience may enter. The relation
1. W.Jaimes, op. cit., p.XI (Preface by R.B.Perry).
2. Ibid., p.4. 3. Ibia., pp.4-5.
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itself is a part of pure experience; one of its terms 
becomes the subject or bearer of the knowledge, the knower, 
the other becomes the object known.'^
James rejects the view that experience contains an
essential opposition of subject and object. He believes that
experience has no such 'inner duplicity', and that the separation
of it into 'consciousness' and 'content' comes, not by way of
subtraction, but by way of addition, to a given concrete bit of
it, of other sets of experiences. In connection with these other
sets severally, the function or use of the given bit of experience
2
may be of two different kinds. A given individual portion of 
experience, taken in one context of associates, plays the part 
of a knower, of a state of mind, and in a different context, 
plays the part of a thing known, of an objective content. In 
short, the same piece of experience figures in one group as a 
thought, and in another group as a thing.
The same experience can thus stand at once as a member 
of two groups just as "one identical point can be on two lines''.^ 
It can be counted twice over and spoken of as 'existing in two 
places', although it remains all the time numerically a single 
thing.
Thus, for James, consciousness does not denote a special 
stuff or way of being; it stands for a kind of external relation. 
The stuff of the world is 'pure experience'. "The peculiarity
1. W.James, op. cit., p.4.
2. Ibid., pp.9-10* 3" Ibid., p.12. 4. Ibid., p.12.
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of our experiences, that they not only are, hut are known, which 
their 'conscious* quality is invoked to explain, is better 
explained by their relations —  these relations themselves being 
experiences — . to one another."^ Thus we do not need to presume 
either 'things' or 'consciousness', considered as entities, in 
order to give an account of knowledge.
The discrimination, as we ordinarily make, between some 
of our experiences as existing 'only in the mind' and others as 
'real' or 'objective' is only because they stand in different 
relationship to our other experiences. Jeunes writes:
'Mental fire is what won't burn real stick Mental
knives may be sharp, but they won't cut real wood .....
With "real" objects, on the contrary, consequences always 
accrue; and thus the real experiences get sifted from the 
mental ones, the things from our thoughts of them, fanciful 
or true, and precipitated together as the stable part of 
the whole experience-chaos, under the name of the physical 
world.'2
James declares that the central point of his 'pure- 
experience theory' is that 'outer' and 'inner' are names for two 
groups into which we sort experiences according to the way in 
which they act upon their neighbours.^ These two groups we call 
physical and mental respectively. Both are composed of pure- 
experience, the neutral primal stuff of the world.
1. W.James, op. cit., p.25*
2. Ibid., p.33.
3. Ibid., p.139.
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4# The New Realists
The new realists worked out their neutral monism under 
the influence of Mach and James. However, not all the six philoso­
phers who in collaboration produced 'The New Realism' were advocates 
of neutral monism. Only Perry and Holt turned out neutral monists; 
others, Montague especially, were highly critical of this theory.^ 
The fundamental points in which they all agreed are their insistence 
on the dependence of philosophy on logic, particularly Russellian 
mathematical logic, their defence of the validity of 'analysis' 
against the doctrines of idealism, and their emphasis on the theory 
that all relations, including knowledge relation, are external. In 
knowledge, the known is not constituted by its relation to the 
knower, or the knower by its relation to the known, or either of 
them by the fact of its being a term in the knowledge relation.
The new realistic theory of neutral monism is to be 
found in Perry's 'Present Philosophical Tendencies' and Holt's 
'Concept of Consciousness', both published in 1912. Their articles 
in 'The New Realism' contain some approach to the subject, though 
the theory is not directly advocated in them.
The Holt-Perry version of neutral monism is "an out-
2
radicalising of James's radical empiricism". James had rejected 
'consciousness' as an entity. There are only 'experiences', and 
knowing is a relation between portions of pure experience. To this
1. J..Passmore, op. cit., p.265.
2. Ibid., p.263.
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it is objected that 'experience* can only be defined as that of 
which a conscious being is aware, that to talk of experience is 
to presume the reaility of consciousness. Holt and Perry try to 
meet the objection by defining experience without making any 
reference, explicit or implicit, to consciousness.
These thinkers feel that James' views contribute only
a 'preliminary induction'. These views emphasise the fact that
'mental content' is distinguished, not by the stuff of which it
is composed, but by the way in which it is composed, that is, by
the composing relation. They afford "unmistakable evidence of a
special and important grouping of objects; but they do not reveal
-1
the principle which defines the group". Perry and Holt propose 
to investigate this principle, that is, the relation that composes 
the group.
For this purpose, they turn upon an aspect of James' 
earlier philosophy and combine it with the theory of perception 
Bergson had propounded in 'Matter and Memory'. In an essay called 
'Spencer's Definition of Mind'(18?8), James had emphasised that a 
human being is an organism which has to adapt itself to its environ­
ment for its survivaûL. Bergson had argued that a mind's content 
consists of that part of its environment to which its attention 
is momentarily directed. Holt and Perry conclude that mind is 'an 
interested response of an organism'. Perry says:
'Content of mind must be defined as that portion of the 
surrounding environment which is taken account of by the 
organism in serving its interests ...... As mind appears
1.R.B.Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p.2?8.
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in nature and society, it consists primarily in interested 
behavior '
Consciousness is not involved here, not even in "the form of a 
’mental content’.
These thinkers discard the notion of 'private content’ of 
particular minds. Perry declares that to argue that because something 
is in one mind it cannot be in another mind, is to commit what he 
calls "the fallacy of exclusive particularity". Every content is 
public, because we can know each other's mind. If different minds 
could not know each other, if contents of different minds could not 
intersect, inter-human communication would be impossible. It is, of 
course, true that one person may at times find it difficult to 
ascertain what is going on in another's mind; but this difficulty 
never amounts to an impossibility.^ All sorts of mental contents, 
that is, contents of perception, memory, thought, desire, etc., thus 
turn out in ultimate analysis to be 'public'. They all coincide 
with other manifolds, namely nature, history and other minds. Just 
as numbers and logical concepts are in our minds and also inhere in 
physical nature, so also all other mental contents. Perry says:
'The contents of my mind exhibit no generic character.......The
elements of the introspective manifold are in themselves 
neither peculiarly mental nor peculiarly mine; they are 
neutral and interchangeable.
1^ R.B,Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p.300; cf. also 
E.B.Holt, The Concept of Consciousness, p.338#
2. R.B.Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p.286.
3. Ibid., pp.286ff.
4. Ibid., p.277#
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Holt writes:
'Contents of our mind are not "mental" in their nature, 
these contents are all neutral entities, are all of 
such a stuff as logical and mathematical manifolds are 
made of.'^
According to these philosophers, not only does mind 
resolve into neutral elements, but also matter or physical objecta, 
Material objects, like mental objects, are composed of a neutral
stuff. "The elements of the physical world are neutral entities--
terms and propositions —  with no residual substance to be called 
'matter'.
The world, therefore, is composed of neutral entities. 
Nothing exists except the neutral stuff, the objective elements. 
Knowing is a relation between such elements; the only peculiarity 
about it is that at least one of its terms must be an organic 
process.
These thinkers thus oppose both idealism and materialism. 
As Holt says,.
'The idealistic doctrine that all being is idea is no more
tenable than the derided materialistic doctrine that all
being is matter ........ The simple entities, of which in
the last analysis all things are composed, have no 
substance....... they are a c l a s s . '3
This class includes all the actual and possible objects of thought,
real and unreal, —  sensations, primary and secondary qualities,
terms and propositions, logical and mathematical entities. While
1 » E..B..Holt, op. cit., p. 114.
2. Ibid., p.131*
3 . Ibid., p.133«
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some of them are not real, that is, do not exist, all alike subsist; 
they all have a timeless eternal 'being' in the all-inclusive 
universe of neutral entities.
The difference between the 'real* and the 'unreal* is an 
arbitrary convention. We set up a system of connected perceptions 
which we dignify with the name of reality; we call a perception
real if it has a place in that system, and unreal if we wish to deny
it the right of entrance to this exclusive society.. Thus the Holt-
Perry version of neutral monism amounts to a sort of logical
realism.
Now, there are real difficulties in this version of 
neutral monism. In fact, the doctrine of the 'very nearly Platonic* 
eternal beings, the distinction of 'being' and 'reality', and the 
consequent conception of the 'unreal* —  error, illusion, hallu­
cination —  were, in particular, severely criticised. At one time 
Russell himself produced a criticism of the neutral monism of 
Mach, James and the new realists. VJe shall shortly come to this.
It is because of the difficulties which he felt in the theories 
of these thinkers, that he was rather slow in accepting neutral 
monism. He adopted the theory when he found good reasons of his 
own to convince himself of the adequacy of the fundamental thesis 
of the theory as an explanation oi the world, only when he thought 
that neutral monism could be maintained without falling into the
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errors of its early propounders."*
1. The history of neutral monism includes another reputed' 
philosopher. He is Rudolf Carnap. In his book, The Logical 
Structure of the World* (English translation by R.- A* ^eorge of
*Der Logische Aufbau Der Welt'), Carnap has produced a version of 
neutral monism by adopting the basic thesis of the earlier advocates 
especially that of 'The Analysis of Mind* by Russell, and by 
rigorously applying to it the latter*s logic. He accepts Russell's 
method of logical construction and tries to establish a 'cons­
tructional system of objects or concepts' out of some basic 
elements which, for him, are total moments of experience called 
'elementary experiences'. By utilising Russell's theories of 
relations and types, he attempts to represent all objects or 
concepts including mind and matter in one *apistemic—logical 
system of concepts or objects' by arranging them into a hierarchy 
of cdmceptual levels.
As we are not so. much concerned with the continuation 
of Russell's ideas by other philosophers, we are not producing 
here an account of Carnap's neutral monism. This may be seen in 
his work referred to above. Carnap has, however, given up neutral 
monism in favour of physicalism; but Russell, who, accepted the 
theory before Carnap and whom the latter followed, still holds it 
today. It is his version of the theory which we shall consider in 
the following chapters.
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CHAPTER II 
DEVELOPMENT OF RUSSELL'S NEUTRAL MONISM
1 » An Outline of the Development
Russell had been under the influence of Hegelian 
idealism until 1898 when, with encouragement from GrE,Moore,, he. 
threw over the doctrines of Hegel. He came to believe in "the 
bizarre multiplicity of the world". He then accepted the common— 
sense pluralism which assumes the existence of external objects, of 
minds, and of universals. In his early works he adopted without 
question the beliefs that all these things exist and that we know 
them directly. In 'The Problems of Philosophy* (1912) he expresses 
a definite change of views. He now asks if physical objects can be 
said to exist in the sense in which common-sense supposes them to 
do; he asks if we directly know them. In this book, these objects 
still exist, but now we can only know them indirectly through our 
sensations (or sense-data). Thus here was the beginning of a process 
of modification of the common-sense picture of the world. Russell 
carried on this process of modification in his later works and thus 
arrived at his theory of neutral monism.
p
One way of. tracing the development of Russell's neutral 
monism is to begin by recognising three different stages relating to
1. Portraits from Memory, po40.
2. W.T.Stace, op. cit., pp.354ff.
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his three important books, namely 'The Problems of Philosophy',
'Our Knowledge of the External World'(1914), and 'The Analysis of
Mind'(1921). The successive stages may be regarded as the result
of successive application of 'Occam's Razor', one of Russell's
supreme methodological principles of philosophising, which he had
already found very successful in solving logical and mathematical
problems* Russell had accepted Meinong's view that in sensation 
are
there^three elements, namely act, content and object.^ In 'The 
Problems of Philosophy', the mental act of being aware and that of 
which one is awaire are called after the fashion of Moore 'sensation' 
and 'sense-datum' respectively. The physical object is not the
1. There is a further stage, shortly to be discussed, that relates 
to Russell's works published after 'The Analysis of Mind'. This 
stage is that of 'The Analysis of Matter' and 'An Outline of 
Philosophy' and the subsequent works, and has to be distinguished 
from that of 'The Analysis of Mind'. Accordingly, we shall have
to recognise two stages or phases of his neutral monism.
As to the development of Russell's philosophy in general, a 
few good accounts are already available. We need not therefore 
produce one here. Russell has published a masterly philosophical 
autobiography called 'My Philosophical Development'. He has also 
given brief accents of the development of his thought in 'My 
Mental Development' in Schilpp's collection, in 'Logical Atomism' 
in Contemporary British Philosophy, first series (reprinted in 
Logic and Knowledge), and in Portraits from Memory. There are 
some discussions in Morris Weitz's article in Schilpp's 
collection, and in Charles Fritz's 'Bertrand Russell's 
construction of the External World*.
2. In 'The Analysis of Mind'(p.l6) Russell ascribes the three- 
factor theory of presentation to Meinong, and in 'My Philosophical 
Development'(p. 154) he ascribesj^o Brentano. As far as I^  can see 
the former is correct, but the latter is not. For, this theory 
was in fact produced by Meinong and not by Brentano. Cf. J.R. 
Findlay, Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values, pp.6f., and
J.Passmore, A Hundred Tears of Philosophy, pp.179, 182.
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sense-datum, but the cause of it, VJe are directly acquainted with 
sense-data as also the mental facts, but the physical object is never 
directly perceived. We know the physical object as that to which a 
certain description applies; it is only by inference, not by direct 
perception, that we know that there is such a thing#
To transform the ideas of 'The Problems of Philosophy* 
into neutral monism two major changes are necessary. First, the 
physical object conceived as the cause of sense-data must be got rid 
of. This can be done if the physical object or piece of matter is 
declared to be nothing but the sum-total of the sense-data. The 
second change required concerns the theory of mind. Consciousness 
as an entity has to be repudiated; mental act as distinguished from 
sense-datum has to be abandoned. Hfnd and the mental have then to 
be identified with some arrangement or grouping of sense-data (or 
sensations). Both mind and matter will thus be shown to be composed 
of sense-data which are to be regarded as neutral between them.
Russell did not make both the changes at once. In 'Our 
Knowledge of the External World* he still retains the psycho-physical 
dualism of sensation and sense-datum. But there now appears for the 
first time the. constructional theory of matter which was later 
incorporated into his neutral monism developed in 'The Analysis- of
Mind * and modified later on.
I-t may be said, in short, that Russell began with three 
factors of sensation in 'The Problems of Philosophy», reduced them 
to two in 'Our Knowledge of the External World', and arrived at one 
in 'The Analysis of Mind.' in which he produced his neutral
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1
monism. We should not, however,, think that at the earlier stages 
Russell had already in mind neutral monism as the objective, or a 
tentative objective, to be achieved by the successive application 
of Occam's razor* In his discussions of Russell's: neutral monism, 
W.T.Stace remarks that "one half of his neutral monism, namely the 
theory of matter, was thought out first, and the second half, namely 
the theory of mind, came seven years later".^ He, of course, mentions 
in the next sentence that in 1914 Russell was not yet a neutral 
monist; but yet the remark in itself is misleading. For, the theory 
of matter in the first edition of 'Our Knowledge of the External 
World', to which Stace refers, was developed certainly not as "one 
half of his neutral monism"; it was formulated as an independent 
theory, and it could fit into neutral monism only when a very 
fundamental aspect of the theory was abandoned, this aspect being 
the concept of sensation as essentially a relational occurrence in 
which a subject is aware of an object, a concept that had to be got 
rid of in order to effect neutral monism. This is the reason why 
Russell, in order to adjust the doctrines of 'Our Knowledge of the 
External World' to neutral monism, brought out a revised edition 
of that book in 1929 in which he eliminated all references to the 
distinction of sensation and sense-datum which had appeared in the 
first edition.
1* This is only an approximate statement. Russell, in fact,
accepted neutral-monism in 1919 ir a paper called 'On Propositions: 
What They Are and How They Mean'; 'The Analysis of Mind' contains 
the first book—long exposition of the theory,
2. W.T.-Stace, op. cit«, p*337#
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In 1914, Russell had no intention of giving up the psycho­
physical dualism. At this stage, he not only did not accept the 
abolition of dualism as had been done by Mach, James and the new 
realists, but on the contrary he opposed it. In a paper called 'On 
the Nature of Acquaintance' published in The Monist in 1914, he 
criticised the views of these thinkers and rejected neutral monism,
He first expressed some doubt in dualism, particularly in 'subject' 
or mental, act, in his lectures on 'logical atomism' delivered in 
1918 and published in The Monist during 1918-9# He was not 
convinced of the rightness of neutral monism and was still urging 
some of the objections he had raised in 19l4, But as he himself sgiys, 
"soon after I gave these lectures I became convinced that William
1
James was right in denying the relational character of sensation".
It is in 1919 that Russell acknowledged for the first time his 
acceptance of neutral monism in a paper read before the Aristotelian 
Society and called 'On Propositions: What They Are and How They Mean*. 
In it he stated his new theory in a rudimentary form, the fuller 
exposition of which came out in 1921 in 'The Analysis of Mind*. He 
then modified and completed his theory of neutral monism in 'The 
Analysis of Matter'(192?) and 'An Outline of Philosophy'C192?), and 
continued to maintain it in subsequent works.
But when Russell thus arrived at neutral monism, he had 
to abandon a fundamental part of his "fighting faith in refuting
a,
Berkeley and ridiculing Bergson". This is the distinction of
1. My Philosophical Development, p.134.
2. A.Wood, Bertrand Russellt the Passionate Sceptic, p.104.
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sensation and sense-datum the faith in which had earlier enabled
him to accuse the idealists of muddling up subject and object
and to remark about Bergson that "only one who has never clearly
distinguished subject and object can accept Bergson's 'intui—
tionism'." But he had to abandon this distinction now in order to
effect neutral monism. So, we can understand what Russell means
when he says that he made great endeavours to believe in James'
2views.
Of course, Russell's writings before the publication of 
his neutral monism are of great interest to us since they reveal
3how he developed the theory from his earlier positions; but it is 
not correct that his earlier views were developed as parts of 
neutral monism or that his earlier views indicate anything of the 
sort of a possibility of development into neutral monism. In fact, 
Russell rejected neutral monism at the earlier stage. We shall 
presently consider the objections he raised against neutral monism 
in 1914. He- then thought that these difficulties could not be 
overcome in any theory of neutral monism. It will, therefore, be 
a point for us in our discussion of various aspects of Russell's 
neutral, monism to see how he manages these difficulties therein.
1. The Philosophy of Bergson, p.33»
2. Logic and Knowledge, p.299*;
3. Cf. W.T.Stace, op. cit., p.33&.
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2. Russell's Earlier Objections to Neutral Monism
'On the Nature of Acquaintance' is a long paper consisting 
of three sections. The second section bears the title 'Neutral 
Monism'. In it Russell considers the theories of Mach and James 
generally and some aspects of the theories of the new realists.
He first offers a few quotations from Mach and James in order to 
give an idea of what their neutral monism is, and then raises a 
number of objections. In the third section in which he explains 
the nature of acquaintance as essentially relational, he raises 
a further objection to neutral monism, which he emphasised even 
in later days, that is in 1918.
Although Russell here rejects neutral monism, he does
not hesitate to recognise certain favourable aspects of it. The
first and foremost of these is what he calls "the very notable
2
simplification which it introduces". He says that a fundamental 
dualism in experience is far less satisfactory to our intellectual 
desires than an apparent and artificial one, that Occam's razor 
prescribes neutral monism as preferable to dualism if it could be 
made to account for facts. He refers to a modern scientific hypo­
thesis about matter under the influence of which it has become a 
'remote supersensuous construction'. He saiys, "What is immediately 
present in sense, though obviously in some way presupposed in
1. Reprinted in Logic and Knowledge, pp.127ff#
2. Logic aoid Knowledge, p.l45.
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physics, is studied rather in psychology than in physics. Thus we
seem to have here, in sense, a neutral ground ..." He even quotes
in a foot-note, as an illustration of neutrality as regards
sensation in orthodox philosophy, from Stout's 'Manual of
Psychology' and observes that there seems to be here an acceptance
as regards sensation of the doctrine of neutral monism, which
2
Stout would, of course, be far from accepting generally. We may 
note that when later on Russell accepts neutral monism, these 
considerations form part of the grounds for his doing so.
A large part of the argument in favour of neutral monism, 
Russell points out, consists in a polemic against the view that 
we know the external world through the medium of 'ideas' which 
are mental. He is in complete agreement with neutral monism in 
this respect. He does not think that, when an object is known to 
us, there is in our mind an 'idea' of the object, the possession 
of which constitutes our knowledge of the object."But when this is 
granted", says Russell, "neutral monism by no means follows. On 
the contrary, it is just at this point that neutral monism finds 
itself in agreement with idealism in making an assumption which 
I believe to be wholly false. The assumption is that, if anything 
is present to me, that thing must be part of my mind."^ He points 
out that the idealists infer from this assumption that only ideas, 
not physical objects, can be immediately present to us; and that
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.l46.
2. Ibid., p.l46 foot-note. 3* Ibid., p.l4?.
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the neutral monists, finding rightly that constituents of the 
physical world can be immediately present to us, infer that the 
mental and the physical are composed of the same stuff. He remarks 
that as the assumption is false, both these opposing theories are 
false.
In refuting neutral monism Russell raises a number of 
objections. Firstly, he says that there is an initial difficulty 
in the neutral monistic view that there is nothing cognitive in the 
mere presence of an object to the mind. James argued that knowledge 
consists in the experienced relations of one content to other 
contents of experience. It is here that Russell feels 'an 
insuperable difficulty'. For him at this stage, a single presen­
tation is certainly knowledge. He cannot think that the difference 
between seeing the patch of red and the patch of red being there 
unseen, consists in the presence or absence of relations between 
the patch of red and other objects of the same kind. "It seems 
possible to imagine a mind existing for only a fraction of a 
second, seeing the red, and ceasing to exist before having any
other experience. But such a supposition ought, on James's theory,
2
to be not merely improbable but meaningless."
Russell is here arguing as a dualist. He is assuming mind 
as an entity which is there as the subject, and to which some­
thing is present as an object. But when he later accepts neutral 
monism, he does so by rejecting the subject, and on being
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.14?.
2. Ibid., p.148.
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convinced that mere presentation or sensation is non-cognitive. We 
shall also find that the way in which he then explains mind leaves 
no room for the supposition of a mind having a single sensation.
The second difficulty that Russell mentions is as to the 
nature of judgement or belief, more particularly erroneous belief#
He maintains that belief differs from sensation in regard to the 
nature of what is before the mind, that the matter of belief is 
always different in kind from the matter of sensation. Error is in 
no way analogous to hallucination; a hallucination is a fact, but 
not an error# When we believe 'that today is Wednesday* though in 
fact today is Tuesday, 'that today is Wednesday* is not a fact. He 
says, "VJhat idealists have said about the creative activity of mind, 
about relations being due to our relating synthesis, and so on, 
seems to me to be true in the case of error; to me, at least, it is 
impossible to account for the occurrence of the false belief that 
to-day is Wednesday, except by invoking something not to be found 
in the physical world."
To illustrate the argument Russell examines W.P. 
Montague's views as given in 'A Realistic Theory of Truth and Error*, 
his part of the contribution in 'The New Realism*. Russell suffis up 
these views in three statements: (a) every reality is a proposition, 
(b) false propositions subsist as well as true ones, and (c) the 
unreal is the class of false propositions*. There are difficulties 
about Montague's position. Russell comments that for Montague and 
the new realists generally the typical error is the so-called
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.l49.
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'illusion of sense' which, according to Russell, is no more illusory 
than normal sensation; that they force all familiar kinds of error, 
such as mistaking a day of the week or a date of a historical event, 
into the mould of illusion of sense "at the expense of supposing 
the world to be full of such entities as 'the discovery of America 
in 1066' —  or in any year that the ignorance of schoolboys may 
suppose possible".
Now, Russell's examination of Montague's views on error
seems rather confusing as it seems to suggest that Montague was a
2
neutral monist. But we have said that Montague did not accept, and 
was in fact critical of, neutral monism. Accordingly, Russell's 
criticism here might be said to be misdirected. But his point as. 
against neutral monism is not wholly irrelevant; and the relevance 
of his criticism consists in that the views, —  that the true and 
the false are respectively the real and the unreal, and that both 
the real and the unreal, both true and false propositions, subsist
as entities forming part of the stuff of the world, --- were held
not only by Montague but also by other new realists including those 
who were neutral monists. Russell seems right in holding that the 
earlier neutral monists were not able to account for the occurrence 
of error.
The third objection that Russell makes concerns the 
thought of 'non-temporal* entities, and memory. As regards non­
temporal entities,— —  for example *2 + 2 = 4*(sometimes thought of
1.. Logic and Knowledge, p.130.
2. See above, p. 29.
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and sometimes not), —  Russell says that if we adopt the view 
that there is no 'specifically mental element* in the universe, 
we shall have to hold that * 2 + 2 = 4 '  is an entity which exista 
at those moments of time when some one is believing it, but not at 
other times. He says that it is very difficult to conceive of an 
abstract fact of this sort actually existing at some moments only.
This argument seems a bit obscure. It is not clear if 
Russell urges it against all the earlier neutral monists or only 
some of them. It is not also clear how the assumption of some 
* specifically mental element* would account for the existence of 
the * non-temporal entities* at moments when some one is not belie­
ving, or thinking of, them. Moreover, according to some neutral 
monists, especially the new realists, not only such entities as, 
for example, * 2 + 2 = 4 ' ,  but all entities are timeless, having 
eternal subsistence, which is not affected by their being believed 
or thought of. It is difficult to see how Russell's point here is 
really a criticism of such a position.
Russell thinks that memory raises a similar difficulty. 
When I remember something that happened an hour ago, my present 
remembering cannot be numerically identical with the event of an 
hour ago. "If, then, my present experience involves nothing but the 
object experienced, the event I am said to remember cannot itself
be the object experienced when I remember. The object experienced
be 2
must be something which might/called an * idea* of the past event."
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.131 *
2. Ibid., p.131.
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But this, he thinks, would invite all the objections that are there 
to the doctrine that all our contacts with the external world occur 
through the medium of ideas —  a doctrine against which neutral 
monism has arisen as a protest. If the past can never be directly 
experienced in memory, it becomes difficult to know how the present 
abject of memory is at all similar to the past object, "If what is 
remembered actually exists in the remembering mind, its position in 
the time-series becomes ambiguous, and the essential pastness of the 
remembered object disappears,"
Hussell is here emphasising what he calls 'the essential 
pastness of the remembered object'; he now thinks that the earlier 
neutral monists could not account for it. But as we shall see later, 
when he accepts neutral monism, he dispenses with this conception 
and develops a theory according to which it is not logically 
necessary for memory that the remembered event should have occnrràd 
or that the past should have existed at all.
The fourth objection that Russell urges is the question; 
'How is the group of my present experiences distinguished from other 
things ?' It is undeniable, he says, that at any given moment some 
of the things of the world, but not all, are somehow collected 
together into a bundle consisting of what now lies within my imme­
diate experience. He thinks that neutral mpnism could, not give a 
"tenable, account of the bond which unites the parts of this bundle, 
and the difference which marks them out from the rest of the things
1 » Logic and Knowledge, p.139.
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in the world",.^ In this connection he considers Perry's discussion 
2
of the problem but his explanation of it by reference to the relation 
of the experienced objects with the nervous system does not satisfy 
Russell, He thereforeComments that to know what things lie within 
one's experience it is not necessary to know anything about one's 
nervous system, that people who are ignorant of physiology and of 
the nervous system are quite competent to know what comes within 
their experience. So much, Russell thinks, is clear to inspection, 
"But if so, then neutral monism cannot be true, for it is obliged 
to have recourse to extraneous considerations, such as the nervous 
system, in order to explain the difference between what I experience 
and what I do not experience, and this difference is too immediate 
for any explanation that neutral monism can give."^
This is an important objection. It remains for us to see 
how Russell tackles the problem in his neutral monism.
In the third section of the paper, Russell raises a fifth 
objection which relates to the explanation of 'this' and 'I' and 
'now' —  the 'emphatic particulars' as. he calls them. After 
explaining the nature of acquaintance as essentially relational, in 
which a subject attends to an object, he gives an explanation of 
these emphatic particulars in terms of this relation. The object to; 
which the subject attends is given the name 'this' in absence of 
any other; the subject attending to 'this' is called 'I', and the
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.133.
2,- R,B.Perry,Present Philosophical Tendencies, Chapter -XII,
3.. Logic and Knowledge, pp#137-8.
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time of the things which have to *1* the relation of presence is
called the present time,
Russell then retorts on neutral monism with the demand
that it should produce an account of 'this* and 'I' and 'now*. He
thinks that it is impossible to explain the emphatic particulars
without 'the selectiveness of mind'. He therefore concludes that
the consideration of emphatic particulars affords a new refutation,
2
and 'the most conclusive one*, of neutral monism.
In 1918, when in 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism* 
Russell expresses doubt about his earlier criticism of neutral monism, 
he still places 'most reliance' on the argument about emphatic 
particulars. He still thinks that it is extremely difficult to 
explain the emphatic particulars on the basis of neutral monism. He 
does not however lay it down dogmatically, only he does'not see how 
it can be done'
It may be noticed that among the above objections, all 
except the fourth are based on a fundamental abjection, namely that 
neutral monism could not explain the difference between the subject 
and the object of experience, and for Russell at this stage this 
difference is a fundamental one. The fourth objection is another 
fundamental reason for Russell's rejection of neutral monism;, and 
this, is that this theory could not account for the fact that each 
person's: experience is partial and not inclusive of all reality.
1, Logic and Knowledge, p,l68, 
2» Ibid., p.169.
3, Ibid., p.222.
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Now, notwithstanding his criticism of neutral monism, 
Russell even in 1914 recognised the attractive aspects of the theory. 
In 1918, he expressed for the first time some doubt in the 'subject* 
as an essential factor in sensation and showed himself as more 
favourably inclined to neutral monism than before. He now doubts the 
validity of his earlier criticism of the theory and says that "the 
difficulties that occur in regard to it are all of the sort that 
may be solved by ingenuity". He says that he does not yet know 
whether neutral monism is true or not, but he hopes that in course 
of time he may be able to find its truth or falsehood. And in course 
of time, in fact in the course of one year, he comes to accept 
neutral monism as true. But when he does so, it remains for us to 
see how his ingenuity has enabled him to solve the difficulties 
which he once thought to be insoluble on the basis of neutral 
monism. In the discussions that follow we shall see that Russell's 
answers to the two fundamental objections mentioned in the preceding 
paragraph consist respectively in his abolition of the distinction 
of sensation and sense-datum and in his two- ways of classifying or 
grouping of neutral particulars into mind and matter. We shall 
consider in due course these and other answers that he offers to 
the objections mentioned in the above pages. Meanwhile it may be 
well to say something about two different forms or phases of 
Russell's neutral monism corresponding to two different stages of 
its development.
1 Logic and Knowledge, p.2?9o
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Two Phases of Bussell's Neutralism
Russell accepted neutralism in 1919» and since then 
has continued to advocate it in all his works. He did not,
however, admit at once all the basic doctrines of "orthodox
'\
neutral monism" , that is the theory as propounded by Mach,
James and the new realists. At first he accepted them only 
partially* His theory in its first book-long exposition in 'The 
Analysis of Mind' (1921) is a 'partial neutralism'. It is only 
from 1924 onwards that he has maintained a theory of 'complete 
neutral monism', the full exposition of which appeared in 'The 
Analysis of Matter* and 'An Outline of Philosophy', both published 
in 1927# In all his later works he has held the latter form of 
the theory. Of course, in these later works, particularly 'An 
Inquiry into Meaning and Truth* and 'Human Knowledge', he has 
almost entirely been occupied with the consideration of epistemo- 
logical problems. But he has not said in them anything that 
contradicts his metaphysical theory of neutral monism; on the 
contrary the metaphysics he has incidentally developed, or 
referred to, in them is the theory of neutral monism as produced 
in the earlier works. In his latest books, such as 'Portraits 
from Memory'^  and 'My Philosophical Development*, he retains the 
same theory and advocates it at some length.
1. M.Weitz, op. cit., p.72.
2. The chapter on 'Mind and Matter*.
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lu his neutral monism, Russell tries to harmonise two 
different tendencies, one in psychology and the other in physics, 
with which he finds himself in sympathy. Modern psychologists, 
particularly the behaviourists, have adopted a materialistic 
position, making psychology more and more dependent on physiology 
and external observation. They think that all mental phenomena can 
be explained in terms of the observed behaviour of the individual 
under various circumstances, without the supposition of 'conscious­
ness* as an entity or a fundamental characteristic of mental 
phenomena. They take matter as more 'solid and indubitable'than 
mind, and physics as the most fundamental science now in existence. 
On the other hand, the physicists, especially Einstein and other 
relativity-theorists, have divested the so-called 'matter' of the 
quality of substance. "Their world consists of 'events', from 
which 'matter' is derived as a logical construction." Thus Russell 
points out that under the influence of modern psychology mind has
become less mental, and that under the influence of modern physics
2
matter has become less material.
The materialistic tendency of psychology and the non- 
materialistic tendency of physics close up the gap between mind 
and matter. This opens, Russell thinks, a way for bringing mind 
and matter together under a common head, for reconciling psycho­
logy and physics, not by subsuming one under the other as is done 
by the idealists and the materialists, but by finding a common
1. The Analysis of Mind, p.5»
2. Ibid., p.5; The Analysis of Matter, p.7.
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subject-matter for both the sciences. He finds that the view which 
reconciles these tendencies is the theory of neutral monism as 
suggested by Mach, James and others. Following them, he declares 
that the dualism of mind and matter is not metaphysically valid, 
that the stuff of which the world is composed is neither mind nor 
matter, but something which is more primitive than both and thus 
neutral between them. Both mind and matter are composite, and "the 
stuff of which they are compounded lies in a sense between them, 
in a sense above them both, like a common ancestor".
Although Russell's neutral monism is thus primarily 
concerned with a reconciliation of physics and psychology, it is, 
in fact, the result of a synthesis of four different sciences,
2
namely physics, physiology, psychology and mathematical logic. 
Mathematical logic is used to replace the so-called, permanent 
substances by creating 'logical structures' out of particulars 
obtained from an analysis of data taken from the other sciences.^ 
The world thus conceived by Russell does not consist of any 
mysterious entity, like the *thing-in-itself* or some unknown and 
unknowable substance. The stuff of which the world is composed 
consists of verifiable particulars. Mind and matter are not single 
simple existing things;, they are complexes constructed out of the 
neutral particulars.
We have said that Russell did not at first accept all
1. The Analysis of Mind, pp.10-11.
2. My Philosophical Development, p.l6. 
3# Ibid., p.l6.
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the basic doctrines of 'orthodox neutral monism'; His neutral monism 
has two distinct phases, an early phase of 'partial neutralism' and 
a later phase of 'complete neutral monism'. We have seen that a 
theory of neutral monism contains three main parts relating to the 
conception of the neutral stuff, of matter, and of mind respectively, 
As the constructions of matter and mind are bound to be coloured 
by the conception of the nature of the stuff out of which they are 
constructed, the difference in the conception of the stuff of the 
world may be taken as a good ground for a classification of the 
theories of neutral monism. On this basis it seems possible to 
distinguish two kinds, of the theory, namely partial and complete 
neutralism, 'Partial neutralism' would state that the stuff of the 
world is partly neutral, and partly mental or partly physical or 
both. The neutral part of the stuff would equally go into the 
construction of both mind and matter. Mind would consist partly of 
neutral entities and partly of mental entities; and matter would 
consist partly of neutral entities and partly of physical entities, 
'Complete neutral monism', on the other hand, would state that the 
whole of the stuff of the world is neutral, mind and matter both 
being composed entirely of the neutral stuff.
This classification of neutralism as partial and complete 
is peculiarly necessary for an understanding of the development and 
contents of Russell's theory; for his views expressed at different 
stages exemplify the forms. In 'The Analysis of Mind', his theory 
is only a 'partial neutralism', whereas in the later works, his 
theory is a 'complete neutral monism'.
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The 'orthodox neutral monism' may be summed up in three
basic doctrines: (1) that the stuff of the world is neither mental
every
nor physical, but neutral; (2) that^^iay- neutral entity can be a 
member of either of the groups forming mind and matter, that is, 
can be treated by both psychology and physics; (3 ) that the dualism 
in the world is not of entities, but of causal laws. It would be 
clear from the discussions below that Russell accepts (5) from the 
beginning. So far as (1) is concerned, he at first accepts it only 
partially, and then at a later stage completely. This is the reason 
for our assertion that his theory has been developed in two phases 
exemplifying the two forms of neutralism as indicated above. As to 
(2), Russell has never admitted it as such ;  the reason for this
'I
will appear in the next chapter.
In 'The Analysis of Mind' Russell declares that the
dualism of mind and matter "cannot be allowed as metaphysically
valid", although there is a certain dualism, not ultimate and "not
2
primarily as to the stuff of the world, but as to causal laws".
This shows his acceptance of the third doctrine of the orthodox
theory, which relates to dualism of causal laws. But as regards the
first doctrine, Russell states :
'My own belief ......  is that James is right in rejecting
consciousness as an entity, and that the American realists 
are partly right, though not wholly, in considering that 
both mind and matter are composed of a neutral-stuff which, 
in isolation, is neither mental, nor material. I should 
admit this view as regards sensations: what is heard or 
seen belongs equally to psychology and to physics. But I
1, See below, pp.97-8.
2. The Analysis of Mind, p.137;
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should say that images belong only to the mental world, 
while those occurrences (if any) which do not form part 
of any "experience" belong only to the physical world.
There are ...... different kinds of causal laws, one
belonging to physics and the other to psychology 
...Sensations are subject to both kinds of laws and are
therefore truly "neutral" ...... But entities subject
only to physical laws, or only to psychological laws, 
are not neutral, and may be called respectively purely 
material and purely mental.*1
Here Russell's attitude is quite clear. He recognises 
three kinds of stuff, namely sensations, images and "those occurren­
ces which do not form part of any experience".. He agrees with the 
new realists only in admitting the neutrality of sensations, while 
he is quite emphatic in his disagreement with them as regards the 
neutrality of images and the occurrences noÿ forming part of any 
experience. Moreover, in this book he draws a distinction between
'active' and 'passive' places of particulars and makes it a basis
2
for distinguishing the physical from the mental. He says, "Some
particulars, such as images, have no active place, and therefore
3
belong exclusively to psychology."
It follows, therefore, that at this stage Russell admits 
the first doctrine of the orthodox theory only partially. For him 
now, only a part of the stuff of the world,namely sensations, 
are neutral , whereas images and some other occurrences which are 
part of the stuff of the world are not neutral. Accordingly, the 
theory of 'The Analysis of Mind^ is only a 'partial neutralism'.
The Analysis mf Mind, pp.25-6. For similar statements see also 
'On Propositions', Logic and Knowledge, pp.299, 306.
2. See below, pp. 1^ 5, 19 .^
3. The Analysis of Mind, p.301.
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Here I am in complete agreement with Stace who in considering
the theory of 'The Analysis of Mind' says that "the statement
that Russell's theory is not pure neutral monism is not in any
sense a criticism of it. It is mere description. Russell simply
1thinks that neutral monism is partly right and partly wrong."
The truth of this is evident from the fact that Russell in his 
reply to Stace does not object to the above remarks.
Russell's position in 'The Analysis of Mind' is then 
only partially neutral monistic. But it is also partially dualistic, 
though not in the Cartesian sense of dualism of substance. There 
is still something which is purely mental, and something which is 
purely physical. Such an admixture of monistic and dualistic 
elements might well be true; but it will not be proper to call it 
'monism'. The name 'partial neutral monism' would thus be mis­
leading. In order to avoid this, we have called it 'partial 
neutralism'.
Russell's views as expressed at this stage involve some 
difficulties in respect of their different aspects. We shall 
consider them in due course. We may now simply note that Russell 
soon realised some of these difficulties amd therefore modified 
his views. He also came to believe that all entities forming 
the stuff of the world are neutral ; and thus he accepted the 
first doctrine of the orthodox theory wholly. This new belief 
was first expressed in 1924 in an article called 'Logical Atomism' 
and was later fully developed in 'The Analysis of Matter*(1927)and
1. W.T.Stace, op. cit., p.365*
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'An Outline of Philosophy'(192?)» and retained in all subsequent 
works »
The theory of neutral monism as Eussell holds at this 
later stage states that entities forming the ultimate stuff are all 
neutral. They are sensations (or 'percepts' as they are now called), 
images and unperceived particulars. All of them are now declared to 
be neutral; and thus the theory comes to take the form of 'complete 
neutral monism' in the sense as indicated above# Russell generally 
calls all neutral entities 'events'; so his theory has sometimes 
been called 'eventism'.
It should be noted here that when Russell arrives at 
'complete neutral monism' he does not do so by wholly rejecting the 
earlier partial theory but by adding to the neutral part of the 
earlier theory the neutrality of other parts along with certain other 
modifications of the earlier position.Of Course, these other modifi­
cations in some cases are of such fundamental nature that these 
themselves may be taken as sufficient grounds for distinguishing 
Russell's earlier and later theories of neutral monism. Russell's 
conception of neutral particulars as events and their classification, 
his acceptance of the causal theory of perception, the concept of 
the unperceived events and the corresponding changes in his construc­
tion of matter and mind are some of the important modifications 
that characterise his theory of 'complete neutral monism'. In view,
1. M.Weitz,op. cit.,p.73'
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of this,it seems clear that we must anyhow recognise two distinct 
phases of Russell's neutral monism; and the distinction of his 
theory as partial and complete is only one convenient way of 
bringing out this point.
The importance of making this distinction does not lie 
only in that it shows how Russell has gradually developed the theory 
stage by stage, that is, how his philosophic mind has been at work 
in respect of the theory at different times. This in itself is 
indeed very important for an understanding of his theory. But there 
is another important thing about it. The failure to recognise the 
two stages and forms of Russell's theory has sometimes misled his 
critics.This has happened in at least two ways. Firstly,the later 
form of the theory which we have called 'complete neutral monism' 
has been declared to be not a theory of neutral monism at all.
Stace,for one, has done this in his article already referred to ; 
and Russell himself has objected to this way of treating his theory
of neutral monism. Russell has very emphatically stated in 'The
2 3
Analysis of Matter' and 'An Outline of Philosophy' that the theory
he advocates in them is neutral monism.Théré seems to be no reason
why the theories of these later books should not be considered as
neutral monistic ; on the contrary, these are the books that in
fact contain the final version of Russell's neutral monism.
1.The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell,p.70?
2. Op. citjpp.lO, 382ff.
3. Op. cit.,pp.2l4ff, 293, 303.
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The second way in which the failure to recognise the two 
forms of Russell's theory has misled critics may be stated as 
follows. If our analysis of the two forms is correct, it is clear 
that for the purpose of rejecting Russell's neutral monism criti­
cism should properly be directed against the later form of the 
theory, and not against the earlier theory of 'partial neutralism'; 
for a criticism of the earlier theory may not be a criticism of 
the later theory at all, unless, of course, the criticism is about 
a point clearly shown to be common in the two forms. It follows 
that the rejection of Russell's neutral monism as a whole on the 
basis of a critique of 'any' aspect of the earlier theory may be 
entirely mistaken. Such a mistake is to be found in A. Quinton's 
rejection of neutral monism in general and Russell's theory in
'I
particular. Quinton rejects Russell's neutral monism on the basis
of his criticism of the theory of 'The Analysis of Mind'. But we
2
shall see later on that the objections he raises do not in any 
way affect Russell's later position of complete neutral monism, 
and that accordingly his criticism entirely fails to serve its 
purpose. The important thing, therefore, to note here is that if 
the stages of the development of Russell's neutral monism along 
with the corresponding forms of the theory were properly recog­
nised and kept in mind while criticising it, some criticisms 
would not have been made at all.
1. A.Quinton, 'Mind and Matter', Brain and Mind (J.R.Smythies ed.),
pp.216-7•
2. See below, f>p. 19'4^ »-%r4
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4. Logical Atomism and Neutral Monism
In 1924 Eussell wrote:
‘The philosophy which I advocate is generally regarded as a 
species of realism. ..... I do not regard the issue between
realists and their opponents as a fundamental one ......  I
hold that logic is what is fundamental in philosophy, and 
that schools should be characterised rather by their logic 
than by their metaphysic. My own logic is atomic, and it is 
this aspect upon which I should wish to lay stress. Therefore 
I prefer to describe my philosophy as ‘logical atomism' 
rather than as 'realism', whether with or without some 
prefixed adjectives.'1
These statements appear in the opening paragraph of an 
article called 'Logical Atomism' which contains the first brief 
exposition of Russell's 'complete neutral monism', fully developed in 
'The Analysis of Matter', 'An Outline of Philosophy' and other works. 
The general characterisation of his philosophy as indicated in these 
remarks has been repeatedly stressed by him. This shows how we should 
understand the relation of his metaphysics with his philosophy. 
Logical atomism is the 'logical' name of his philosophy in general 
whereas neutral monism is the ontological name of the atomistic 
metaphysics which he ultimately came to develop#.:- In fact, neutral 
monism is the metaphysical theory which he finally produced from 
the position of logical atomism.
Russell describes his logical atomism as a "certain kind 
of logical doctrine, and on the basis of this a certain kind of 
metaphysic".^ It is a philosophy of logic ; it is 'atomistic' because 
Russell believes that the world is composed of many separate things.
1. Logic and knowledge, p.323.
2. Ibid.,p.178.
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and'logical' because "the atoms that I wish to arrive at as the 
sort of last residue in analysis are logical atoms and not physical 
atoms". The atoms are not obtained by physical analysis or 
partition, but by logical analysis. Thus Russell's logical atomism 
is his philosophy of logical analysis.
Ever since Russell successfully applied his method of
analysis in logic and mathematics, he has been gradually applying
it in dealing with more and more problems of philosophy, and this
has finally resulted in the production of his logical atomism. It
is therefore natural to find some aspects of the atomistic doctrines
2
in his philosophy from the beginning; but these were systematically 
developed first in a series of lectures under the title 'The 
Philosophy of Logical Atomism'(1918), and then in almost every 
subsequent work. Here again as in the case of many aspects of his 
philosophy, his views have undergone modifications at various stages, 
The comparatively simple form of the theories of I918 has gradually 
been abandoned, and logical atomism as advocated in later works, 
such as 'An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth' and 'Human Knowledge', 
has taken a complex form.
The doctrines of Russell's logical atomism (together with
1. Logic and Knowledge, pp.178-9.
2. Russell says that he adopted logical atomism in the years 
1899-1900. He says that this "was a revolution; subsequent 
changes have been of the nature of an evolution."—  My 
Philosophical Development, p.11.
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those of Wittgenstein ) represent a very influential step in the 
development of contemporary philosophy. These doctrines with the 
stages of their development and modifications should therefore
p
make an interesting and profitable subject of study and research. 
The purpose of the present work would not, however, allow such an 
undertaking here. I shall therefore content myself with merely 
indicating very briefly (and perhaps quite insufficiently) how 
Russell has developed his neutral monism from the position of 
his early logical atomism.
From experience in logic and mathematics, Russell found 
that many things, hitherto supposed to be simple entities with 
neat logical properties, can be replaced by logical structures 
composed of entities which have not such neat properties. The 
supposed entities are always inferred; and Russell found that pro­
positions in which they occur can be interpreted without making the
inference, that the ground for the inference thus fails and the 
the
body of/propositions is secured against the need of a doubtful 
step.^This is a case of the principle of economy known as Occam's
1. Wittgenstein developed his logical atomism in 'Tractatus Logico* 
Philosophicus', to which Russell wrote an introduction. The 
relation of the two philosophers is one of mutual influence; 
consequently there are some similarities between their theories 
of logical atomism. Some comparative references may be found in 
Russell's introduction to the 'Tractatus' and 'My Philosophical 
Development'; also in, D.F.Pears, Bertrand Russell and the 
British Tradition in Philosophy; G.E.M.Anscombe, Introduction to 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus; M.Black, A Companion to Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus; J.Griffin, Wittgenstein's Logical Atomiam; etc.
2. D.F.Pears' book mentioned above is an admirable account of the 
early development of Russell's logical atomism during 1905-1919, 
with comparative references to Hume, Bradley and Wittgenstein.
3. Logic and Knowledge, p.326.
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razor. In a general sense the principle means that as few entities 
as possible are to be assumed in explaining the facts of the world; 
replacing inferred entities by logical structures is only a special 
use of it. Russell states the special form of the principle as this: 
"Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known entities 
for inferences to unknown entities." He adopts generally the method 
of "constructions versus inferences" as a maxim of interpretation 
in philosophy. He conceives the business of philosophy as being 
"essentially that of logical analysis, followed by logical synthesis". 
But analysis and construction require materials. VHiere are we to look 
for the materials or data for our philosophy ? It is an important 
methodological principle with Russell that we should take the data 
from science, for he thinks that science is more likely to be true 
than common-sense and philosophy.^ Russell, however, thinks that the 
question of the materials of analysis and construction "requires 
as a preliminary a discussion of logic and language and their 
relation to what they try to represent". This is because "the 
influence of language on philosophy has been profound and almost
4 5unrecognised" throughout ages.
The purpose of the discussion of language is twofold : 
first, to free philosophy from the bad influences of logical defects
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.326. For a clarification of this statement, 
see below, pp.130ff.
2. Ibid., p.341. 3- Ibid., p.339.
4. Ibid., p.330.
3. The emphasis in contemporary philosophy on linguistic analysis is 
very largely due to the influence of Russell's philosophy of 
language.
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of ordinary language; and secondly, to suggest, by inquiring the 
requirements of a logically perfect language, "what sort of a
'I
structure we may reasonably suppose the world to have". As to the 
bad influence of ordinary language, Russell emphasises that syntax 
and vocabulary provokes erroneous metaphysical beliefs. Syntax 
induces the subject-predicate logic, with substance-attribute 
metaphysics, while vocabulary, by promoting the assumption of pseudo­
entities, encourages "a kind of platonic pluralism of things and 
2
ideas", Russell's analysis of language is an attempt at remedying 
the defects that arise out of our "giving metaphysical importance 
to the accidents of our language".^
One of the remedies for the logical defects of language
if
is provided by Russell's 'theory of types*. This theory is a cure 
for the puzzles and contradictions that arise out of the use of 
symbols or words of different types in the same context. It was 
first produced for solving logical and mathematical paradoxes, and 
then extended to ordinary language. It puts a sort of restriction 
upon the kind of symbols or words that we may use in a given context, 
Symbols that can be inserted into some one context are said to 
belong to the same logical type. There arises thus a sort offseparation entities into a 'logical hierarchy of types *, whose
A
members are individuals, functions of individuals, functions of
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.538*
2. Ibid., p.331* 3* The Analysis of Mind, p.192.
This theory was first produced as an appendix to The Principles 
of Mathematics in 1903,and was then reproduced in Principia 
Mathematica, The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, and other works.
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functions of individuals, and so on; similar extensional hierarchies 
are there in respect of classes and relations as well. The following 
passage shows what Russell means by a logical type :
’The definition of a logical type is as follows: A and B are 
of the same logical type if, and only if, given any fact 
of which A is a constituent, there is a corresponding fact 
which has B as a constituent, which either results by 
substituting B for A, or is the negation of what so results*
To take an illustration, Bocrates and Aristotle are of the 
same type, because "Socrates was a philosopher" and "Aristotle 
was a philosopher" are both facts; Socrates and Caligula 
are of the same type, because "Socrates was a philosopher" 
and "Caligula was not a philosopher" are both facts. To 
love and to kill are of the same type, because "Plato loved 
Socrates" and "Plato did not kill Socrates" are both facts.*2
The theory of types asserts that sentences often become
nonsensical because of the substitution in the same context words
of different logical types;^ that "a word or symbol may form part
of a significant proposition, and in this sense have meaning,
without being always able to be substituted for another word or
symbol in the same or some other proposition without producing 
4
nonsense". Thus 'Brutus killed Caesar' is significant, but 'Killed 
killed Caesar' is nonsense. We cannot substitute 'killed' for 
'Brutus', and therefore they are of different logical types. Some 
important cases of difference of types are those of substance and 
attribute, terms and relations, and simples and complexes. Thus,
1. The theory of types in its form specifically as a hierarchy of 
classes is not being discussed here.For this Russell's works 
may be consulted.
2. Logic and Knowledge, p.332.
3. Gilbert Ryle's concept of 'category-mistake' is essentially 
connected with Russell's concept of logical types; cf. The 
Concept of Mind, pp.1?ff.(Penguin edition).
4. Logic and Knowledge, p.334.
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for example, 'There are simples’ and 'There are complexes’ must use 
the words ’there are’ in different senses. But if we use the words 
’there are’ in the sense which they have in the statement ’There are 
simples', the form of words ' there s.re ( or are not) complexes' is 
neither true nor false, but meaningless.
The theory of types cannot, however, cure all the philo­
sophical difficulties that arise out of the logical defects of 
ordinary language. One important instance of such difficulty concerns 
what Russell calls 'definite descriptions' i.e. phrases of the form 
' the so and so', such as ' the author of Waver^', ' the present king 
of France', and the like. There has always been difficulty in inter­
preting propositions containing definite descriptions, such as 'Scott
e
is the author of Waverly' or 'The present king of France does not
2
exist'. Russell's theory of descriptions is designed to meet this.
Russell points out that the difficulty arises through
e
supposing that 'the author of Waverly' or 'the present king of 
France' is a name,, and refers to an entity which is the subject of 
the proposition and has some sort of 'being'or existence. 'Scott is
e
the author of Waverly' asserts an identity. But 'the author of
ê
Waver^' is not a name, and we cannot substitute for it a proper
name without making the proposition a tautology. Thus if we substi-
Ç
tute Scott for 'the author of Waver!^', we get 'Scott is Scott', 
which is tautology and is a different proposition from the original
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.337.
2. First produced in 'On Denoting'(1903)— reprinted in Logic and 
Knowledge — , elaborated in Principia Mathematica, and reproduced 
in a modified form in Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, 
and The Philosophy of Logical Atomism.
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one. This becomes clear from the fact that we can ask whether Scott
C
is the author of Waver^, but we cannot significantly ask whether 
Scott is Scott, It follows that in the original proposition, the 
phrase 'the author of Waver]^' is not a name and cannot be replaced 
by a name.
Moreover, 'The golden mountain exists' and 'The round
square does not exist* are not the same statement, but different
statements.This seems to suggest that the golden mountain is one
thing and the round square is another thing, although neither exists,
Again, of the two propositions, 'The golden mountain exists' and
'The golden mountain does not exist', one must be true according to
the law of excluded middle, and yet there is no such thing as the
golden mountain. These puzzles have led many philosophers to invent
a whole realm of 'unreal'entities having the objective status of 
2
'being'. Russell's theory of descriptions solves the puzzles by 
showing that when a proposition containing a phrase of the form 
'the so and so' is rightly analysed, the phrase 'the so and so' 
disappears. Thus, for example, the statement 'The golden mountain 
does not exist' is interpreted as saying, "There is no entity C such 
that 'X is golden and mountainous' is true when X is C, but not 
o t h e r w i s e . W i t h  this interpretation the puzzle as to the use and 
meaning of the description 'the golden mountain' disappears; for it
1. Logic and Knowledge, pp.4yff,244ff.
2. Meinong is a classical source of this view; cf. J„N..Findlay, 
Meinong's Theory of Objects and Values, chapter II.
3. History of Western Philosophy, p.783 (New edition, I96I).
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is shown that the phrase is not a name and is not a constituent 
of the proposition, i.e. there is no constituent of the proposi­
tion which corresponds to the description as a whole.
The theory of descriptions thus provides a method of 
interpreting or translating propositions in order to get rid of 
phrases or symbols which are not really names and thereby to get 
rid of unreal, entities. By descriptions Eussell includes not only 
such phrases as 'the author of Waverly' and 'the present king of 
France', but also all names of ordinary language, such as Socrates, 
Piccadilly, the table, the chair, etc. He says that these ordinary 
names are not really neimes, but each "a sort of truncated 
description".
of
Now, the extension of the theory^descriptions to ordinary
names of common-sense objects involves a different level of
analysis. When, for example, a proposition containing the phrase
&
'the author of Waverÿy' is analysed, it is done in terms of ordi­
nary common-sense objects.But the analysis of the names of the 
common-sense objects involves a deep level analysis of these objects 
in terms of particulars which are sense-data with which we are 
directly acquainted in experience, and which are of a different 
kind from ordinary things.D.F.Pears calls the two levels of analy­
sis the 'horizontal' and 'deep' analyse^respectively.^ The deep
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.24-3.
2. D.F,Pears, op. cit., pp.l6f. Of. also, J.O.Urmson, Philoso­
phical Analysis, pp.2?ff*
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analysis involves the metaphysical analysis of common-sense things
and persons in terms of 'basic realities' or ultimate particulars
composing the world; it involves replacing inferred common-sense
substances by logical structures out of basic metapysical entities.
The ordinary proper names, according to Russell, are
really descriptions. The only proper names that are recognised by
him are what he calls 'the logically proper names'; these are 'this'
and 'that' which the individuals apply to the particulars which are
the immediate objects of their experience. At a later stage Eussell
gives up even these. He says, "All the well-known difficulties of
substance remain so long as we retain a 'this' which is not a bundle
of qualities, as appears at once when we try to explain how we
distinguish between 'this' and 'that' otherwise than by difference
of qualities." He declares that theoretically there is no need of
2
proper names but only names of qualities and relations.
There seems to be a wide range of agreement among philo­
sophers^ as regards the success of Russell's theory of descriptions 
in so far as the ordinary horizontal level of analysis is concerned. 
But its success has sometimes been questioned in respect of the deep
1. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p.686.
2. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, ch.6; Human Knowledge, p.321;
My Philosophical Development, p.170.
There is a controversy about the elimination of proper names; cj. 
P.P.Strawson, 'On Referring', reprinted in A.Flewfed.), Essays in 
Conceptual Analysis, pp.40ff; W.V.Quine, Methods of Logic, pp.2l8ff; 
From a Logical Point of View, pp.7f,I67.
3. Recently there have been some criticisms of the theory on general 
lines; but these sire not very serious. A brief assessment of the 
main points may be found in A.J.Ayer, 'An Appraisal of Bertrand 
Russell's Philosophy', in R*Schoenman(ed.), Bertrand Eussell —  
Philosopher of the Century, pp.169-70.
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level analysis which involves logical construction of common-sense 
objects and translation of statements about them. We shall come to 
the objections later on; meanwhile we may continue with our 
account of Russell's logical atomism.
Russell's analysis of language and meaning, then, purports 
to avoid, the logical defects of ordinary language in order to 
determine the structure of the world. The basic unit of discourse 
is proposition. Therefore the discussions are primarily concerned 
with the objective reference of propositions and their analysis 
into constituents. For a long time Russell, like Wittgenstein, 
believed that a true proposition must reproduce the structure of 
the fact to which it refers; but finally he gave up this idea, 
although he never minimised the importance of the analysis of 
language for sound metaphysical thought.
The proposition is a complex symbol consisting of parts 
which are also symbols. The objective references of propositions 
are called'facts'. If there is a fact corresponding to a propo­
sition, it is true; if not, it is false. In 'The Philosophy of 
Logical Atomism', the facts and propositions are classified into 
various types. The simplest are the 'atomic propositions' and 
'atomic facts'. Atomic facts are composed of terms and relations 
or qualities. They form a hierarchy according to the number of 
terms involved. The simplest atomic fact consists of one term and 
a quality; the next, two terms and a diadic relation; the third, 
three terms and a triadic relation; and so on.
1. My Philosophical Development, pp.113-4.
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There are more complex propositions than the atomic ones. 
These are called 'molecular* propositions. A molecular proposition 
is formed by joining two or more atomic propositions by logical 
conjunctions, such as 'if-then', 'or', 'and'. Molecular proposi­
tions sire csuLled the truth- functions of the component atomic propo­
sitions, and are true or false according as the component proposi­
tions are true or false. There are no molecular facts corresponding 
to molecular propositions; the facts they refer to are those referred 
to by the component atomic propositions. Eussell recognises at this 
stage other kinds of propositions also; these are called 'existence 
propositions'(with 'existence facts'),'general propositions' (with 
'general facts') and 'negative propositions' (with'negative facts')© 
Russell's views on the different types of propositions have under­
gone changes. We shall not, however, consider them; Russell's 
discussions may be referred to for further treatment. We shall 
carry on our discussions in connection with his analysis of atomic 
propositions and atomic facts which are the basic type anyway#
An atomic proposition contains symbols or words standing 
for the terms and relations that make the. corresponding atomic 
fact. What are these terms ? Russell initially believed that the 
terms are what are known in direct presentation or by acquaintance. 
Things that are known by acquaintance are called 'particulars'. 
Russell later on modified this position, and declared that
1# Logic and Knowledge, p.201.
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particulars; also called 'simples', are not experienced as such,
but are known only inferentially as the limit of analysis. A
particular* is defined as a term of a relation in an atomic fact*
Words that stand for peirticulars are called proper names; a proper
2
name is defined as a word denoting a particular.
As facts are composed of parts, they are complexes; 
whereas particulars are simples. And complexes and simples are 
of different logical types. The proper symbols for facts are 
propositions, and those for particulars are proper names. Facts 
can only be asserted (or denied), whereas particulars can only 
be named. Ordinary names, we have seen, are not names in the strict 
logical sense. They are, for Eussell, descriptions; and what 
they describe "are not particulars but complicated systems of 
classes or series".^ In this early formulation of logical atomism, 
Eussell accepts as 'logically proper names' only the words 'this' 
and 'that' which he thinks can only be used by the speaker for a 
particular he is acquainted with at the moment.
Particulars, being the simples, stand each entirely 
alone; they are wholly self-subsistent. They have the quality of 
self-subsistence that used to belong to 'substance* but not the 
quality of persistence through time. A particular, according to 
Eussell, lasts for a very short time, and in this respect it
4
differs from the 'old substance'. The particulars have a sort of 
being which does not belong to objects of other types. Qualities
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.337*
2. Ibid.,pp.199-200. 3. Ibid.,pp.200-1. 4. Ibid.,pp.201-4.
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and relations, which are the other factors besides particulars
that make the atomic facts, are of a different type. They differ
from the simples or particulars "by the fact that they suggest a
structure, and that there can be no significant symbol which sym-
bolizes them in isolation", and also that they cannot be the
subject of the proposition in which they occur. Thus the proper
symbol for 'yellow' is not the single word 'yellow' but the
prepositional function »x is yellow'. The same is true of relations,
and this shows that qualities and relations involve a complexity
2
which particulars do not. These are Russell's early views; but 
he has finally given up the idea of particulars as simples, which 
he now conceives as complexes of qualities and relations only; 
he now accepts no proper names but only the names of qualities 
and relations.
The logical doctrines thus developed from the analysis 
of language and meaning, of propositions and facts, provide 
Russell with a framework for analysis of the problems of tradi­
tional philosophy. The doctrines provide what he calls 'philoso­
phical grammar', and he thinks that all traditional metaphysics 
is filled with mistakes due to 'bad grammar', that is, "due to a 
failure to make the kind of distinctions in what we may call 
philosophical grammar with which we have been concerned."^
One bearing of the above analysis on metaphysics is that
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.337*
2. Ibid.,p.338. 3. Ibid., p.269.
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"you can get down in theory, if not in practice, to ultimate simples,
out of which the world is built, and that those simples have a kind
1of reality not belonging to anything else". It is also clear that 
anything that is not a simple is complex and as such a construction. 
We thus find here a metaphysical 'structure' of the world, on the 
basis of which we can now analyse the data that physical and psycho­
logical sciences may offer, in order to determine what particulars
I
or simples are there injthe universe and what can be represented as 
constructions. This last analysis enables us to organise the 
particulars under the ontological categories, namely 'mental', 
'material' and 'neutral'.
Russell's application of the method of analysis and 
construction to physics resulted in the construction of physical 
objects out of particulars or simples alone. In 'Our Knowledge of 
the External World', he shows that the only particulars that go into 
the construction of the external world are what he then calls 
’sense-data'• In 'The Philosophy of Logical Atomism', he gives an 
analysis of matter that is similar to the one given in 'Our Know­
ledge of the External World',
In the latter work Russell maintains the distinction of 
the mental and the physical in respect of the constituents of the 
world. Sensations are then distinguished from sense-data, subject 
from object; and thus mind and the mental are treated as being 
fundamentally different from matter and the material. In 'The
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.270.
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Philosophy of Logical Atomism', Russell doubts this distinction,
and even produces an analysis of 'person' to show that it is
possible to represent a person as a construction out of experiences
without reference to an 'ego'. But he is not yet sure if such a
construction of a person is right, whether the distinction of
subject and object, of sensation and sense-datum, is valid. In
other words, he is not sure if neutral monism is true. But he
thinks that his new logical doctrines have given him an instrument
of interpretation which would soon enable him to determine the
truth or falsehood of the theory. And really he soon came to
abolish the distinction of sensation and sense-datum, and thus
effected his 'partial neutralism' first in 'On Proposition; What
They Are and How They Mean', and then in 'The Analysis of Mind'.
The former is an article which as a work on proposition must be
taken as being a continuation of the analysis undertaken in 'The
Philosophy of Logical Atomism'. In fact, it begins with a reference
to that earlier work, assumes the logical doctrines provided 
2
therein and undertakes a further analysis of propositions and 
facts. As the result of this, the doubts that were there in the 
earlier work are now settled; 'ego' or 'consciousness' is rejected 
as an entity, and sensations are declared to be identical with 
sense-data and are said to be the neutral particulars. Other parti­
culars that are admitted are 'images'(purely mental) and some 
physical aspects. Thus, neutralism is produced in the context or
1. Logic and Knowledge, pp.2?6ff.
2. Ibid., p . 285 foot-note.
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within the framework of logical atomism. 'The Analysis of Mind' is 
a work that only elaborates the theory contained in this article by 
applying the method of analysis and construction to various mental 
phenomena. The 'complete neutral monism' which was developed later 
on is, we have seen, continuous with his 'partial neutralism'. This, 
again, first appeared in an article called 'Logical Atomism'. In it 
Russell calls the particulars or simples 'events', and represents 
both mind and matter as constructions out of events which are all 
neutral entities. This theory of 'eventism' or 'complete neutral 
monism' has been developed and maintained in all his later works©
It may now be clear that the metaphysics which Russell 
has thus finally produced can be characterised in two ways, namely, 
from the point of view of the logical structure of the world, and
from the point of view of the ontological categories of mental,
physical and neutral as applied to the ultimate realities or cons­
tituents of the world. In the former sense, Russell's theory is
'logical atomism', because it states that the world is composed of
many separate entities which are the logical atoms as explained 
above. In the latter sense, this theory is properly called 'neutral 
monism', because it states that the logical atoms are neither 
mental nor physical, but are all of the same category, 'neutral'.. 
Russell does not, however, confine the name 'logical atomism' to his 
metaphysics alone; he uses it to include other aspects of his 
philosophy. In this sense 'logical atomism' has a wider application 
than 'neutral monism' which applies only to his metaphysics.
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CHAPTER III 
THE THEORY OF NEUTRAL PARTICULARS
We noted earlier that a theory of neutral monism must have 
a theory of the neutral stuff, a theory of matter and a theory of 
mind. In what follows, we shall consider in some details the 
three parts of Russell's neutral monism with special reference to 
the development of his views in regard to them. In the present 
chapter we shall discuss the different aspects of his theory of 
the neutral stuff, and in the two subsequent chapters we shall 
take up his theories of matter and mind separately. Finally, we 
shall consider in a concluding chapter some special problems 
concerning the mind-body relation and the concept of a person.
1. Psycho-physical Dualism in Sensation
Russell arrived at his neutral monism by abolishing the 
relational character of sensation, that is, by abandoning the 
psycho-physical dualism of sensation and sense-datum, by giving up 
the dualism of subject and object of sensation, and by thus 
repudiating 'consciousness' as part of the stuff of the world. We 
say 'the psycho-physical dualism of sensation and sense-datum' —  
because in his earlier writings in which he upheld the relational 
character of sensation, Russell very clearly maintained the view 
that the dualism was between a mental factor, namely sensation,
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mental act or subject, and a physical factor, namely sense-datum or 
object of sensation. It is the abolition of this dualism which 
enabled him to effect his neutral monism.
In 'Our Knowledge of the External World' and other 
writings of this stage, Russell gave up the three-factor theory of 
sensation which he himself had maintained in 'The Problems of 
Philosophy', He then rejected what was called the 'content' and 
retained only the subject or mental act of sensation and the sense- 
datum, In 'On the Nature of Acquaintance' referred to above, he 
argued against the content. This and two other articles, namely 
'The Relation of Sense-data to Physics' (191^)^ and 'The Ultimate 
Constituents of Matter'(1915)^» contain essentially the same views 
as expressed in 'Our Knowledge of the External World'(l$l4), In 
these articles, he emphatically maintained the psycho-physical 
dualism of sensation and sense-datum,
Wliereas sensation has traditionally been regarded as 
mental, there have been controversies among philosophers regarding 
the nature of the immediate object of sensation. The Berkeleian 
tradition has been to regard as mental not only the 'act' of 
sensation, such as seeing, hearing, etc,, but also the object of 
sensation, such as colour, sound, etc. Now, such things as colour, 
sound, smell, taste, etc., which are the immediate objects of
1,. Logic and Knowledge, pp.l69ff,
2. Reprinted in Mysticism and Logic, ch. VIII,
3. Reprinted in Mysticism and Logic, ch. VII,
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sensation are what Moore and Russell call'sense-data'• While the
Berkeleians declare them to be mental, Russell in the articles
mentioned above takes the opposite view and declares them to be fully
physical. The term 'physical' is to be understood, according to
1Russell, as meaning "what is dealt with in physics". He calls a 
particular 'mental' "when it is aware of something", and he calls
a fact 'mental' "when it contains a mental particular as a consti-
anc
„3
2
tuent". He says, "I regard sense-data as not mental, d as being.
in fact, part of the actual subject-matter of physics.
In 'The relation of Sense-data to Physics', Russell argues
against the view that sense-data are subjective and mental. He says
that the view that sense-data are mental is derived partly from
their causal dependence on sense-organs, nerves and brain and other
conditions of the perceiving subject, and partly from a failure to
distinguish between sense-data and sensations. He maintains that the
arguments for the subjectivity of sense-data on grounds of their
causal dependence on physiological conditions âo not prove anything
4
beyond "physiological subjectivity". But physiological subjectivity
of sense-data is of the same nature as their causal dependence on
the intervening fog or smoke or coloured glass; and neither makes
sense-data in any sense mental. He says:
' Logically a sense-datum is an object, a particular of which 
the subject is aware. It does not contain the subject a.s a
1„ Mysticism and Logic, p,150.
2, Ibid., p.,150, 3,^  Ibid., p.l49.
4. Ibid,, p,l49.
81
part, as for example beliefs and volitions do. The 
existence of the sense-datum is therefore not logically 
dependent upon that of the subject. ..... By a sensation 
I mean the fact consisting in the subject’s awareness of
ths sense-datum......  The sense-datum, on the other hand,
stands over against subject as that external object of 
which in sensation the subject is aware. ..... So soon, 
therefore, as sense-data are clearly distinguished from 
sensations, and as their subjectivity is recognised to be
physiological ....., the chief obstacles in the way of
regarding them as physical are removed. ’ 'I
In 'The Ultimate Constituents of Matter' which is a
declared defence of psycho-physical dualism, Russell maintains
the same views as above regarding the status of sense-data.
Sense-data, he says, are "purely physical and among the ultimate
2
constituents of matter". In support of his position, he offers 
arguments including one refuting Berkeley's claim that objects of 
sense are not outside the percipient mind.^ He contends that it is 
an error to say that what we perceive through any of our senses 
is mental. He argues that seeing, hearing, and generally perceiving 
through senses are mental occurrences just as believing, doubting, 
wishing and willing are mental occurrences. But from this, he 
says, it does not follow that what is seen or heard or perceived 
through senses is mental.
In reply to the question whether colour, sound or ainy 
other secondary quality is inside or outside the mind, Russell says 
that colours gmd noises are not mental in the sense of having that 
intrinsic peculiarity which belongs to beliefs and wishes and
1. Mysticism and Logic, p.132.
2. Ibid., p.128. 3. Ibid., pp.132-3.
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volitions but not to the physical world. He maintains that if by 
saying that something is in the mind we mean that it has a certain 
recognisable intrinsic characteristic such as belongs to thoughts 
and desires and volitions, then "it must be maintained on grounds
1
of immediate inspection that objects of sense are not in any mind".
To put it in the words of H,A.Prichard, "What Mr. Russell holds is
that smells, colours, sounds, etc., have an independent existence
of their own, in the wsiy in which common-sense thinks of bodies
2as having an independent existence."
This is, in short, the position that Russell was maintaining 
as regards the status of sense-data. Sense-data were now regarded
as fully physical,^ and sensations as fully mental, --- a position
which he had to abandon in order to arrive at neutral monism.
2, Abolition of Dualism; Identification of Sensation
and Sense-datum
Russell maintained the psycho-physical dualism of sensation 
and sense-datum right upto 1918. But after that his views underwent 
a very great change. In 1919$ he rejected the relational character 
of sensation; and this enabled him to effect neutral monism. As he
1. Mysticism and Logic, p.133*
2. H.A.Prichard, 'Mr. Russell on Our Knowledge of the External 
World', Mind, XXIV, 1913, p.131.
3. In 'The Analysis of Mind'(p.143) Russell seems to refer to the 
articles mentioned above as he says, "I shall not trouble you 
now with the grounds for holding as against Berkeley that the 
patch of colour is physical; I have set them before ....
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himself says,
•So long as the subject was retained there was a mental 
entity to which there was nothing analogous in the 
material world, but if sensations are occurrences which 
sire not essentially relational, there is not the same need 
to regard mental and physical occurrences as fundamentally 
different. It becomes possible to regard both mind and a 
piece of matter as logical constructions formed out of 
materials not differing vitally and sometimes actually 
identical.'1
So long as Bussell was adhering to the relational theory 
of sensation, every sensation, for him, was itself a cognition.
Thus mere seeing some colour or hearing a sound was itself know­
ledge. But in his neutral monism, he regards mere sensation as 
non-cognitive. He says, "When, say, I see a person I know coming 
towards me in the street, it seems as though the mere seeing were 
knowledge. It is of course undeniable that knowledge comes through 
the seeing, but I think it is a mistake to regard the mere seeing 
itself as knowledge."^ If mere seeing, or any other mere sensation,
3
is regarded as knowledge, it seems natural, Russell points out, 
to distinguish the seeing from what is seen; and this admits the 
distinction of the subject or mental act, and the object or sense- 
datum, the subject having a relation to the object, a relation 
that may be called 'awareness'. But he is now convinced that mere 
sensation is not cognitive, and that the distinction of the subject 
and the object of sensation, in other words the psycho-physical 
dualism of sensation and sense-datum, is wholly untenable.
1. My Philosophical Development, p.139.
2. The Analysis of Mind, p.l4l. In 'My Philosophical Development' 
Russell quotes the long paragraph in which this passage occurs.
3. The Analysis of Mind, p.l4l.
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It may be noticed that Russell is doing two things at a 
time, namely (a) he rejects the cognitive nature of sensation, and 
(b) abandons the distinction of sensation ajid sense-datum and thus 
identifies them. The cognitive and the relational characters of 
sensation are, however, so intertwined in his arguments that they 
may be said to be two aspects of the same character, and the rejec­
tion of the one means the rejection of the other also ; for the 
rejection of cognition in sensation means the rejection of awareness 
or consciousness in it, and if consciousness or awareneas is not 
there in sensation it cannot include in it the subject or mental 
act, and hence no dualism remains.
The main argument that Russell offers in rejecting the 
cognitive and relational nature of sensation is that of the aboli­
tion of the subject or mental act of sensation. He rejects the 
subject of sensation and thereby arrives at the conception of 
sensation as a neutral particular which is the subject-matter of 
both physics and psychology. In 'The Analysis of Mind', Russell 
refers to the Brentano-Meinong theory of perception and says that 
his view has grown out of various views that result from modifica- 
tions:of the three-fold analysis of presentation into act, content
'I
and object. He rejected the 'content' in his earlier works; he 
emphasises this once again. As regards the 'subject' or 'mental 
act' he now argues that "the act seems unnecessary and fictitious 
...... Empirically, I cannot discover anything corresponding to the
1, The Analysis of Mind, pp.14— 20.
2. Ibid., pp.l8-20, 21-22. Russell rejects it in respect of sensation 
or presentation, but not in respect of memory and thought.
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supposed act, and theoretically I cannot see that it is indispen- 
1
sable." Russell declares that the theory which analyses a presen­
tation into act and object no longer satisfies him. He says:
'The act, or subject, is schematically convenient, but not 
empirically discoverable. It seems to serve the same sort 
of purpose as is served by points and instants, by numbers 
and particles and the rest of the apparatus of mathematics.
All these things have to be constructed, not postulated:
they are not of the stuff of the world....... The same
seems to be true ©•f the subject, and I am at a loss to 
discover any actual phenomenon which could be called an 
"act" and could be regarded as a constituent of a 
presentation.'2
The subject, according to Russell, is introduced not 
because observation reveals it, but because it is linguistically 
convenient and apparently demanded by grammar. The function it 
performs can always be performed by classes or series or other 
logical constructions, "consisting of less dubious entities"
The grammatical sentence, such as 'I think so and so ', suggests 
that 'I' stands for a person, and that thinking is the act of the 
person. But Russell thinks that the person "is not an ingredient in 
the single thought: he is rather constituted by relations of the
Zf
thoughts to each other and to the body". He says that the gramma­
tical forms, such as 'I think' and 'you think', are misleading, and 
that we should better say 'It thinks in me', or better still 'There 
is a thought in me'.Meinong's act is not empirically observable or 
even logically deducible from what we can observe.lt is what Russell
1. The Analysis of Mind, pp.17-8.
2. 'On Propositions', Logic and Knowledge, p.303#
3. The Analysis of Mind, pp.l4l-2.
4. Ibid., p. l8.
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calls the ghost of the subject or what once was the full-blooded
s o u l T h e  subject, according to him, is "a completely gratuitous
assumption" and must therefore be rejected as an actual ingredient 
2
of the world,
'But when we do this, the possibility of distinguishing the 
sensation from the sense-datum vanishes. Accordingly the 
sensation that we have when we see a patch of colour simply 
is that patch of colour, an actual constituent of the 
physical world, and part of what physics is concerned with.
A patch of colour is certainly not knowledge, and therefore 
we cannot say that pure sensation is c o g n i t i v e . '3
Russell says that all knowledge comes through sensations; in other
words, sensation, through its psychological effects, causes cognition
by virtue of its correlations with other things and by giving rise
L
to images and memories, but in itself it is not cognitive.
When Russell was earlier holding the relational theory of 
sensation, he accepted Brentano's definition of mental phenomena
5
as the "phenomena which intentionally contain an object". He now 
argues against it and says that it is incapable of maintaining 
itself either against an analytic scrutiny or against a host of 
facts supplied by psycho-analysis and animal psychology.^ Having 
rejected this view in general, he rejects it in the particular case
7
of sensation also. He says that the argument that formerly made 
him accept the view was, historically, directed against idealism; 
the emphatic part of it was the assertion, as against Berkeley, 
that sound, colour, etc., are physical, not psychical. But now he
1. The Analysis of Mind, p. l8. 2. Ibid., p. l42.
5. Ibid., p. 142. 4. See below, pp*232ff.
3* Ibid., p p .  131 142 . 6. Ibid., p. 13»
7• Ibid., p. l42.
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argues that from that colour is physical it does not follow that
it is not also psychical, unless we assume that the physical and the
psychical cannot overlap, which he no longer considers a valid
assumption. He says, "If we admit —  as I think we should —  that
the patch of colour may be both physical and psychical, the reason
for distinguishing the sense-datum from the sensation disappears,
and we may say that the patch of colour and our sensation in seeing
-1
it are identical."
3« Sensations as Neutral Particulars
Russell thus identifies sensation and sense-datum. In 
this respect he, in fact, maintains the same view as that of Mach, 
James, the new realists and Dewey^. He acknowledges this and even 
quotes from their works to support his position. Sensation and sense- 
datum are one and the same thing. So, the earlier idea of ’sense- 
datum’ as opposed to sensation is abandoned. Accordingly, in 'The 
Analysis of Mind' Russell uses the name 'sensation' for such things 
as, for example, coloured patches and sounds as well as seeing 
coloured patches and hearing sounds. In his later works he uses the 
name 'percept' for the same sort of things as 'sensation' in the 
earlier work stands for.
1o The Analysis of Mind, p.143.
2. J.Dewey, Essaya in Experimental Logic, ppo233»262.
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Sensations, according to Russell, are non-cognitive, but
supply data for our knowledge of the physical world including our
own bodies. They are what is common to the mental and the physical
'1world ; they are defined as'the intersection of mind and matter'.
They are neutral particulars and are among the ultimate stuff of
the world. They are transient entities, occurring at the place of
the perceiving organism, in fact in our brain, and lasting each for
a very short time. Russell calls them 'aspects’ and 'appearances'.
They are existent particulars; they are in themselves neither
mental, nor material, but form both mind and matter. They f8.11 into
groups in two different ways, one group forming 'a piece of matter'
and the other 'mind',
Russell brings out his position with the famous illustra-
2
tion of stellar photography. If a photographic plate is exposed to 
a portion of the sky on a clear night, it takes photographs of the 
portion of the sky with the stars. Taking one particular star, we 
are to conclude according to the laws of the continuity of physical 
processes that at the place where the plate is, and at all places 
between it and the star, something is happening which is specially 
connected with the star. If there are many such plates, each plate 
will photograph the star somewhat differently. These photographs 
are the different appearances of the star at different places. 
Russell calls them 'particulars',*aspects' or 'events'. Again, each 
plate will photograph many other things simultaneously with the
1. The Analysis of Mind, p.144; An Outline of Philosophy,p.21?,
2. The Analysis of Mind, pp.R9f.
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given star. It follows that "in every place at all times" a vast
multiplicity of things (i.e. particulars) must be happening.^
. 2 Now, the particulars may be classified in two ways :
(1) We can collect together all the happenings at different 
places as are usually talien to be emanating from the same object; 
as in the above example, all the appearances of the star at 
different places,
(2) We can collect together all the happenings that talie place 
in one place ; as in the above example, all the appearances of 
different stars and other things at the place of one particular 
plate.
In the first collection we have the group of all the 
aspects radiating from one common centre. This bundle of particulars 
constitutes a momentary physical object,—  the particular star in 
the above example. In the second collection, aspects of different 
things combine at one place;, this is what Russell calls a "
'perspective'. One particular of this second group, namely the 
appearance of the given star at the given plate, will also belong 
to the first group, which constitutes the momentary star. Thus 
every particular belongs at once to two groups or systems of 
particulars, one constituting the physical object and the other 
a perspective. Thus a material object and a perspective are both 
composed of the same particulars, which are among the ultimate
1. The Analysis of Hind, p.100; My Philosophical Development, p,26,
2. The Analysis of Mind, pp,100ff.
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stuff of the world. They differ from one another not by virtue of 
difference of stuff, but by virtue of different arrangements of 
the same stuff.
Every perspective is a view of the world from a parti­
cular place, and there are as many perspectives in the world as 
there are places from where there can be views of the world. No 
perspective contains any place in common with that contained by 
any other perspective. Each perspective consists entirely of 
particulars which are appearances from one point of view; and 
this may be called their subjectivity.
Now, if we have at the place of the photographic plate 
an organism with sense-organs, nerves and brain, what happens at 
this place axe not photographs but what we call sensations or 
perceptions of the stars and other things. These are nothing but 
the appearances of these objects at this place. One of these 
sensations will be the appearance of the given star. This parti­
cular sensation will at once belong to two different sets of 
particulars, namely the group that makes the material object 
(the star), and the group which (together with other entities, 
viz., images) make a mind. As a member of the former group it is 
usually called a sense-datum, and as a member of the latter a 
sensation. But it is one and the same particular; therefore the 
distinction of sensation and sense-datum vanishes. It is the same 
neutral particular taken twice over in two different contexts. In 
one it is a constituent of a material thing and in another it is
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a constituent of a mind. The difference between what is called a 
mind and what is called an object presented to a mind is, therefore, 
not one of substance but of arrangement of particulars that form 
the stuff of the world.
Thus, according to Russell, sensations are neutral 
particulars. Generally, everything that comes to us through senses 
is sensation, and we have to include such things as headache, 
muscular strains, in short all bodily sensations. But in actual 
experience as when we see something or hear a sound, what we have 
is perception and not mere sensation. In fact "so much interpre­
tation, so much of habitual correlation, is mixed up with all such 
experiences, that the core of pure sensation is only to be extracted
by careful investigation..... In order, therefore, to arrive at
what really is sensation in an occurrence  ....  we have to pare
'I
away all that is due to habit or expectation or interpretation."
Sensation, accordingly, is that part of perception which is due
only to stimulation; it is the non-inferred element in experience.
So, Russell defines a sensation "as the non-mnemic elements in a 
2
perception". And it is this non-inferred, non-mnemic element that 
is non-cognitive.
Russell accepts in his theory of neutral stuff not only 
our own sensations but also the sensations of other people. The 
world view that would follow if we were to develop it out of our 
own sensations only would be solipcism. But solipcism, however
1. The Analysis of Mind, pp.139-40.
2. Ibid., p.159.
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consistent it may logicsü-ly be, is psychologically impossible to 
believe. It contradicts common-sense and denies the picture of the 
world as science gives us. The usual sort of considerations that 
show solipcism to be unbelievable are sufficient reason, for 
Russell, for dismissing it.
In fact, we live our life not in a private world confined 
to ourselves alone, but in a common world in which we communicate 
with other people. When we see a physical object, we also believe 
that other people suitably situated can see the same thing. 
Verification of statements about the external world requires us 
to have reports from people with whom we can communicate, and it
is thus necessary to accept the use of testimony.
The sensations of other people are not directly perceived
by us. Our knowledge of them is indirect and inferential. We
depend on analogy for the knowledge of other people's sensations.
In this connection Russell accepts the usual analogical arguments
2
for our belief in other minds and their sensations and images.
Now, the arguments Russell offers in connection with the 
neutral character of sensations give rise to some problems which 
may be briefly noted here. Russell has dispensed with the 'subject* 
of sensation. Sensation is not knowledge, and hence no distinction 
of 'subject' (the knower) and 'object* (the known) in it. That 
sensation by itself is not knowledge seems pretty established; and 
the notion of subject as 'mental act' seems to have lost favour
1. The Analysis of Matter, pp.213$ 398; Human Knowledge, p.l80.
2. Our Knowledge of the External World, second ed.,pp.lOlff; The 
Analysis of Matter, pp.201ff; Human Knowledge,pp.203-9.
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with most philosophers. But knowledge is a fact; its very nature 
is such that it involves a distinction of the subject and the 
object, of the knower and the known. Although it is possible for 
Russell to eliminate the distinction from sensation which he takes 
as non-cognitive, he cannot possibly do so in case of perception 
and other processes which are cognitive. He has, therefore, to 
re-introduce it in his theory. He realises this; but the subject 
as he conceives it is a construction and not a single substance 
or ego.
Russell argues that in a statement like *1 think’ or 
'He thinks', 'I' or 'He' suggests that thinking is an act of a 
person; but that in fact the person is not an ingredient in a 
single thought. He suggests that instead of saying 'I think', it 
is better to say 'It thinks in me', etc. Now, it is difficult to 
see how shifting from 'I' to 'me', from 'he' to 'him', can possibly 
avoid the suggestion of a person. Even though it may be possible 
to avoid the subject by such change of the grammatical structure 
of statements, it would not certainly be possible to avoid the 
suggestion of the person. In fact, the concept of person must 
somehow and somewhere come up in the scheme of an explanation of 
the world. Russell, of course, recognises this. VJhat he intends 
to do in the above argument is to dispense with the concept of 
person as the subject of a single thought or sensation, and thus 
to show that it is not among the ultimate constituents of the 
world. Both subject and person, according to him, are construc­
tions out of the ultimate stuff; and we shall have occasion to
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consider them in due course.
Now, in declaring sensations as neutral particulars
Russell gives a very special and peculiar meaning to the word
'sensation', very different from the ordinary meaning of it.
Usually it has always meant something connected with consciousness.
But now it is stripped of all such connections and given a status
neutral between mind and matter. But when this is done, Russell
should have, as has been suggested, abandoned the term 'sensation'
and given a more neutral name to what it now stands for. Russell,
of course, might reply that the thing he calls sensation is the
very thing which other people call sensation, but that they sure
mistaken in regarding it as mental, and that he is therefore right
in retaining the word while freeing it from its false associations.
It may not, however, be a sufficient answer. As Dorward puts it,
"When they call a thing sensation, they mean to imply that it is
mental; and if they were convinced that they were mistaken in
supposing it to be mental, they would probably say, not 'Well,
you have now convinced me that sensations are not mental', but 'I
now see that what I thought to be mental is really not so, and I
2
was therefore mistaken in calling it a sensation'."
William James used the term 'experience' for his neutral 
entities. Russell objected to it saying that the use of the term 
'experience' indicated a lingering influence of idealism.^ James
1. A.Dorward, 'Critical Notice of Russell's Analysis of Mind', 
Mind, 1922, p.92.
2. Ibid., p.92. 3* Logic and Knowledge, p.143.
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might now retort in the sarae words against Russell in respect of 
his use of the term 'sensation' for his neutral particulars.
This, however, is not a grave criticism. It is a quarrel 
about names ; and names do not matter so long as we use them each 
with a specific meaning, for a particular thing or a specific kind 
of things. Neither James nor Russell seems to have failed in this 
respect.
4. Events as Neutral Particulars
Russell, at the later stage of his neutral monism, calls 
the neutral particulars 'events'. He uses the term 'event' to 
include not only sensations or percepts but also images and unper­
ceived particulars. At all stages of his neutralism he has accepted 
sensations, images and unperceived particulars as forming the 
stuff of the world. But while he has always taken sensations or 
percepts as neutral, he has not always regarded the others as being 
so. In 'The Analysis of Mind', images are purely mental and unper­
ceived particulars (sensibilia) are purely physical. But at the 
later stage he takes all particulars as neutral and gives them the 
common name 'event'. Moreover, he now includes as unperceived 
events not only 'sensibilia' but also'unperceivable' events. He
For example. The Analysis of Matter, especially chapters XX, 
XXIII, XXV, XXVI, XXVII, XXXVII, XXXVIII; An Outline of 
Philosophy, chapters X through XV, XVI, XVII; Human Knowledge, 
chapters, IV & VII of part III, and chapters V & VII of part IV; 
Portraits from Memory, chapter on 'Mind and Matter'; My 
Philosophical Development, chapter II.
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thus tries to make his theory more scientific than before and 
give it a sort of completeness by declaring all constituents of 
the world to be neutral. This is the reason why we have called this 
later theory 'complete neutral monism' and his earlier theory 
'partial neutralism*.
In his complete neutral monism Russell makes a number of 
developments from his earlier position. One of these concerns the 
nature of percepts. Things like seeing a patch of colour or 
hearing a sound (as well as coloured patches or sounds) which he 
earlier called sensations are now called percepts. But there is a 
little difference in the meaning he now attaches to them. Sensa­
tions were regarded as the purely non-mnemic, non-inferred elements 
in perception, which are entirely due to stimulation. But as in 
normal adult life such pure sensations are not obtainable and as 
by conscious attention we cannot know them in their native charac­
ter, he thinks that we may take the basic element in presentation 
as not the theoretical core of sensation, but the percept which 
includes some amount of inference due to physiological habits. The 
percept is not entirely non-inferred and non-mnemic, but is due to 
stimulation and unconscious 'physiological' inference. It is that 
actual part in perception, which does not contain conscious 
inference or interpretation. With this difference in mind, we may 
use both the terms 'sensation'and 'percept' in presenting Russell's 
later views in which sensations are to be taken in the sense of 
percepts.
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Another develoT^ment is about the conception of causal laws» 
Russell had earlier distinguished two kinds of causal laws, namely 
physical and psychological. He retains the distinction, but now 
thinks that physical causation is universal. In his earlier 
theory, only sensations were subject to both kinds of causal laws; 
whereas images were subject to only psychological causation and 
unperceived particulars to only physical causation. He now argues 
that all things whether mental or physical fall under the physical 
laws of causation. Even images are now subject to physical causa­
tion, So he says, "Kind is merely a cross-section in a stream of 
physical causation, and there is nothing odd about its being both 
an effect and a cause in the physical w o r l d , H e  thinks that we 
cannot escape from the universality of physical causation,^
We should notice that, although the above statements tend 
towards physicalisra or causal materialism, Russell does not 
in fact accept this position. He does not think that mental causal 
lawrs are all reducible to physical causal laws. On the contrary, 
he maintains that we have knowledge in psychology which can never 
form part of physics,^ In fact, for him, the criterion of the two 
ways of grouping of events into mind and matter is that of the
Zf
two kinds of causal laws. What he is asserting is that
1, An Outline of Philosophy, p . I3 6.
2, The Analysis of Matter, p. 393.
3 . Ibid., pp. 392-3; An Outline of Philosophy, p. 300; Human 
Knowledge, pp. 5 8 , 6 5.
4. For further consideration of this distinction and an 
epistemological basis of it, see below, pp. 271-7.
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the neutral events may fall under two kinds of causal laws, that 
while all events are known to be subject to physical causation, 
only some are known to be subject to psychological causation. 
Accordingly, while we can say that all events are physical, we 
cannot say that all events are, in fact, mental. Only percepts 
and images are known to be mental events, but "we do not know 
enough of the intrinsic character of events outside us to say
4
whether it does or does not differ from that of mental events".
As a matter of fact, some events may always remain outside the
scope of mental causation; and in so far as Russell now accepts
'unperceivable* events, these seem to be for ever outside the
scope of the causal laws of psychology. This is the reason why
we have said that Russell has not accepted the second doctrine of
orthodox neutral monism^ according to which any neutral event
2
can be treated by both psychology, and physics.
Events in themselves are neither mental nor physical 
but neutral. 'Neutrality' is the non-relational characteristic 
of events. It does not consist in their being subject to 'both' 
physical and mental causation; whereas 'mentality' and 'physica- 
lity' are relational characteristics depending on the relevant 
causal connections of events. Every event is a "logically self- 
subsistent entity".^ It can be treated in two different ways, 
namely (a) in isolation, and (b) in its causal relations to other
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p.222.
2. See above, p.33.
3. An Outline of Philosophy, p.293.
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events. This is a distinction of type; and it holds between 
neutrality on the one hand and mentality and/or physicality on 
the other. Whereas neutrality is the first-order characteristic 
of an event-in-isolation, mentality and/or physicality are the 
second-order characteristics of an event-in-causal-relation. Thus 
two or more neutral events may have a causal relation to one 
another, which is studied by psychology; they are then mental. 
Again, two or more neutral events may have a causal relation which 
is studied by physics; they are then physical. This interpretation 
reconciles the apparent inconsistency in Russell's writings in 
which in speaking about events he uses all the three expressions, 
namely 'neutral events', 'mental events' and 'physical events'. 
This also explains how an event may not fall under both the causal 
laws and yet can be treated as neutral.
The above interpretation of the neutrality of events 
also brings out a difference between Russell's earlier theory of 
partial neutralism and the later theory of complete neutral monism, 
In the earlier theory, a particular is neutral only when it is 
"subject to both kinds of laws", and only sensations satisfy this
'I
condition and are therefore "truly neutral". But in the later
theory as explained above, neutrality is not a matter of causal
2
laws. Morris Weitz offers a similar interpretation as above in 
connection with Russell's neutralism in general including the
1. See above, pp.33-6.
2. M,Weitz, op. cit., pp.72-3.
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theory of 'The Analysis of Mind'. But in view of the conception of 
the'truly neutral' as given in that earlier book, it seems impo­
ssible to apply the above interpretation to the theory of that 
book and regard it as complete neutral monism.
Another aspect of causation that is emphasised at this 
later stage is what is called 'the irreversibility of physical 
process', or 'the directed causality'. Russell points out that in 
classical physics everything was reversible, and that modern 
physics has abandoned this view. He says:
'Speaking generally, processes in the physical world all 
have a certain direction which makes a distinction between 
cause and effect that was absent in classical dynamics. I 
think that the space-time order of the physical world 
involves the directed causality. It is on this ground that 
I maintain an opinion which all other philosophers find 
shocking: namely that people's thoughts are in their heads.
One very important change that Russell makes at this 
later stage is his adoption of the 'causal theory of perception' , 
which forms a basis for inclusion of unperceived events which are 
the physical causes of percepts and are among the stuff of the 
world. This theory holds that apart from the subjective factors 
influencing our perceptions, external events cause our perceptions, 
and that the existence of these causes can be inferred from the 
perceptions. It is a theory which, Russell thinks, is in keeping 
with the common-sense view of perception thal^  there are external 
occurrences which cause our perceptions. Common-sense holds that 
perception reveals external objects to us directly. But science
1. My Philosophical Development, p.25<
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holds that perception occurs as an event at the end of a long 
causal chain; our knowledge of the physical object thus becomes 
indirect and inferential. But in both cases, says Russell,
’There is the assertion that it (perception) has external 
causes as to which something can be inferred from it ....
... (The theory) depends upon postulates which have little 
more than a pragmatic justification. It has, however, all
the merits of a good scientific theory ....  namely that
it links together a number of known facts, that it does not 
have any demonstrable false consequences, and that it 
sometimes enables us to make predictions which are subse­
quently verified. All these tests the causal theory fulfils..'
Russell points out that physics demands the causal theory
of perception: "Epistemologically, physics might be expected to
2
collapse if perceptions have no external causes." This theory, 
Russell feels, cannot be disproved, and it offers an alternative 
to both solipcism and phenomenalism as a way out of the difficulties 
involved in the common-sense notion of the world.
These are primarily the grounds on which Russell accepts 
the causal theory of perception. According to this theory, " a 
sensation is merely a link in a chain of physical causation", it 
is one of a vast series of connected events, travelling out from 
a centre according to some mathematical laws, in virtue of which 
the sensation enables us to know a good deal about the events 
elsewhere.^ Previously Russell did not think that the notion of 
'cause' was reliable enough to guarantee inferences to unperceived
1. The Analysis of Matter, pp.197, 199.
2. Ibid., p.197.
3. An Outline of Philosophy, p.13&.
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events. But he now accepts and uses the causal theory as the prin­
cipal ground for inferring the existence of not only the 'sensibilia' 
but EÜ.SO further unperceivable events*
Russell now calls the ultimate stuff of the world 'events'
He says, "Everything in the world is composed of 'events'; that, at
2
least, is the thesis I wish to maintain." Events are existent 
particulars, send mind and matter are complex constructions out of 
them. Every event occupies a small finite amount of space-time: it 
has a small finite duration and a small finite extension in space.
It is neither impenetrable nor indestructible^ Every event in space­
time is overlapped by other events; we know this empirically in our 
experiences. And according to physics, events in the form of elec­
trons and protons annihilate each other. No event is permanent; but 
given any event or group of events we find at a neighbouring place 
in space-time a very similar event or group of events. This is a 
character which, we shall see, accounts for what Russell calls a 
'quasi-permanence' of things and persons. The world consists of more 
or less independent chains of events called 'causal lines'.^ A 
causal line is a 'temporal series of events' so related that given 
some of them we can infer something about others. The chains of 
events are not completely independent of each other, because they 
Gsui influence each other; there is the fact of 'mutual modification'^
1. See below, pp.135-^.
2. An Outline of Philosophy, p.28?.
3. Ibid., pp.287» 290-1 ; The Analysis of Matter, p.386.
4. An Outline of Philosophy, p.124; Human Knowledge, p.308.
3 . The Analysis of Matter, pp.313-4; Human Knowledge,pp.333f.,4?6f. 
6. The Analysis of Matter, p.314; Human Knowledge, pp.490-1.
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Chains of events are continuous so that there is no 'action at a
i
distance'•
This last point marks an important difference from . 
Russell's earlier position. In 'The Analysis of Mind', he accepted 
'action at a distsmce' in time in connection with 'mnemic causation'. 
This is now rejected mainly on the ground of causal continuity.
Now, one point seems in order here. According to Russell, 
an event is a happening which has a small duration. But whatever 
happening lasts for a period of time might be called a 'process'.
But 'process' as a term seems quite unsuitable for what Russell 
calls 'event'. For, a process seems to involve among other things 
a passage of time in which changes occur; we say, 'something under­
goes a process of change' and so on. When a certain state of affair 
is changed into (i.e. succeeded by) another state of affair, there 
is a process. Process is thus a complex of successive states of 
affair. But what Russell calls events are not such complexes of 
successive states, but the states themselves. The term 'event' 
itself is not, however, unambiguous. We may call the Battle of 
Waterloo an event. "But in a complex event of this sort, there are 
parts which have spatio-temporal and causal relations to each other;
no single entity devoid of physical structure persists throughout
2
the whole period." But if we are to explain the structure of the 
world, we have according to Russell to distinguish between objects 
having physical (i.e* spatio-temporal) structure and the component
1. The Analysis of Matter, pp.328,339,3^0; Human Knowledge, pp.309ff<
2. The Analysis of Matter, p.293*
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parts of such structure. He uses the term 'event' for these parts
which do not have internal spatio-temporal structure. An event in
this sense is what he sometimes calls a 'minimal event' which has
an upper time-limit and does not last "for more than a few seconds 
2
at most". In this connection his views differ from those of 
Whitehead for whom events have no time-limits,^
Russell thus uses the term 'event' in a technical sense. 
Events, for him, are the ultimate neutral constituents of the world. 
He uses the terms 'simple', 'ultimate constituent' and 'particular* 
in a relative sense,.that is , to mean that they are the limit of 
analysis depending on the state of our knowledge. He does not mean 
that particulars or events are incapable of further analysis, but 
that we cannot at present analyse them. He has held this view from 
the beginning of his neutral monism. He at first accepts particulars 
or events as relative simples or relative ultimate constituents of 
the world. But later on he produces a further analysis of events
5
and particulars. According to this later analysis, events are
complexes of qualities and relations. Russell says that qualities
6
may recur at different times and different places. A particular 
shade of red, for exaimple, may be found to occur on different 
occasions. Thus the same quality may recur, but it is possible to
1, An Outline of Philosophy, p.288.
2. The Analysis of Matter, p.294. 3* Ibid., pp.292-4.
4. The Analysis of Mind, p.124.
5. Human Knowledge, pp.97-8, 313ff.
6. Russell does not regard qualities as universais. See his discussion 
in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, pp.683, 714.
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obtain 'unique* events. The shade of red does not occur all alone; 
it occurs as a member of a complex of compresent qualities, such as 
size, shape, hardness, etc., and relations, such as 'to the right of, 
'to the left of, etc. Any such complex of compresent qualities and 
relations will be unique; "the complex is something new over and 
above the qualities" and "can be mentioned in a way which is not 
reducible to a statement about any or all its constituents".
Such a complex may be called an 'event', and it has the
2
property of "non-recurrence". This new analysis of events does not 
introduce any conflict with the results Russell has obtained from 
employing events and particulars. In fact, he himself has continued 
his discussions generally in terms of events in 'Human Knowledge' 
and the subsequent works.
3. Sensations and Organism
In Russell's theory, sensations or percepts are dependent 
on both physical and physiological conditions. VJhen, for example, 
we see the sun, what happens is somewhat as followsi The light from 
the sun travels over the intervening space for abou<^ eight minutes 
and meets the eye where it produces its effect which produces its 
effect on the optic nerve, and this in turn produces its effect in
1. Human Knowledge, p.323*
2. Ibid., p.322.
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some visual centre in the brain. The process that starts from the 
place where common-sense takes the sun to be, ends in producing the 
effect in the brain, which is called 'seeing the sun'. It is thus 
clear that sensations or percepts are dependent on the sense-organs, 
nerves and brain, that is, on the percipient's body. The sense- 
organs, nerves and brain form part of the intervening medium and 
distort the appearance.
The dependence of sensations on the organism may be 
considered in respect of at least three points, namely (l) the role 
of organism in Russell's explanation of sensations, (2) the location 
of sensations or percepts in the brain, and (3 ) the subjectivity of 
sensations. We shall discuss these three questions separately, the 
first in this section and the second and the third in the two subse­
quent sections in this order.
Sensations, according to Russell, are as much dependent 
on physiological conditions as on physical conditions. The physio­
logical factors, namely the sense-organs, nerves and brain, may 
therefore be said to be fundamental in the explanation of sensations. 
In respect of the role assigned to the physiological factors, C., D. 
Broad has offered a criticism in his 'Scientific Thought', on which 
A. 0#. Love joy in ' The Revolt against Dualism* lays much emphasis. 
Broad remarks that Russell has not treated the observer's body in
terms of his general theory of physical objects. The body is a
consist
physical object and must, according to Russell's theory,^of a set 
of groups, each composed of correlated aspects or appearances. "I am
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not sure", saya Broad, "that his theory does not at present owe some 
of its plausibility to the fact that, while we read his exposition, 
we think of our own bodies ( and perhaps of other media, like mirrors 
and coloured glass ) as physical objects in the non-Russellian sense, 
and of all other pieces of matter as physical objects in the 
Russellian sense."
Broad has made this criticism against Russell's views
I
as expressed in The Analysis of Mind'. But as to the role of the
organism in respect of sensation or percept Russell holds the same
views in his later works as well, and therefore this criticism, if
valid, may be said to apply to his theory generally irrespective
af the stages of the development of his neutral monism.
Russell has offered a reply to this criticism in 'The
Analysis of Matter'. He points out that the criticism arises from
a failure to notice that in the theory of perception a physical
object has a 'twofold character*. On the one hand, it is a group of
appearances or events; and on the other hand, it has an influence
upon the appearances of other objects, particularly appearances in
its neighbourhood, making them different from what they would have
2
been if they followed the laws of perspective only. He says,
'The sense-organs have only this second function to perform 
in the theory of perception, while the object perceived has 
the first function. It is this difference of function, in 
the theory of perception, which makes it seem as if we were 
treating the percipient's body more realistically than 
external objects. But this is only a matter of degree. The
1, C.D.Broad, Scientific Thought, pp.333-4.
2. The Analysis of Matter, p.239.
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appearance of sin external object is modified also by other 
external objects —  e.g. by blue spectacles or by a micro­
scope. I conceive the part played by the eye as essentially 
analogous to that played by a microscope; and I take the same 
view as to the part played by the optic nerve. *1
2
Now, Lovejoy rejects this reply as unsatisfactory. He
points out that in Russell's theory a physical object cannot have
a neighbourhood and that only aspects or appearances can be neigh­
bours to other aspects. He says that the reply misses the point at
issue. For, the objection is that any objects, —  sense-organs,
nerves, mirrors or coloured glasses, —  in so far as they are
regarded as distorting factors, have not been taken "as having the
properties of a piece of matter" in the Russellian sense. "It is no
reply to this remark that a 'physical object' (in the theory) has
' a twofold chsuracter ' ; that fact is the point of departure of the
objection.The essence of the objection, he points out, is that
Russell has ascribed 'two implicitly incongruous characters' to
physical objects. To say that one character or function belongs to
the physical object as perceived and the other to the object that
is a distorting factor, does not answer the objection; for the
sense-organs or any other media such as mirrors and coloured glasses,
Ccin also be perceived and therefore "must have both characters —
one set qua physical 'in the Russellian sense', the other qua
causal —  and yet cannot have both consistently..... . The secret
of the new theory .....  consisted in operating with two distinct
1. The Analysis of Matter, pp.239-60.
2. The Revolt against Dualism, pp.239-61.
3 . Ibid., p . 260
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and opposed concepts of a 'physical object', using one or the other 
as the exigencies of the argument required."
C.E.M. Joad offers a similar criticism wherein he remarks
that "an analysis of objects of perception in terms of physics can
c#ly be given provided we refrain from applying it to the sense-
organs by and through which we perceive them", and that if we push
the analysis further and resolve the sense-organs into their
'atomic components' the explanation of the facts of perception
2
becomes impossible.
Now, the issues involved in the above arguments and 
counter-arguments relate as much to the theory of sensations as to 
the theory of the construction of matter. We have not yet considered 
the latter in detail; but what has been said above^ will not perhaps 
be insufficient for at least understanding the situation.
The objection raised by Broad and emphasised by lovejoy 
and Joad is not without its justification altogether. In fact, in 
explaining sensations or percepts, Russell very often speaks as if 
the sense-organs, nerves and brain, and also other distorting media 
were each a simple physical unit and could, act as such. This is 
unfortunate; it is all the more so because his own reply in itself 
does very little to dispel the difficulty, lovejoy seems to be 
right in so far as he says that speaking of 'a twofold character' 
of a physical object is useless.
1. A.0.lovejoy. The Revolt against Dualism, p.261.
2. Joad, Philosophical Aspects of Modern Science, p.106.
See above, pp.88-90.
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The situation, however, is not as bad as it looks. In 
explaining a certain fact or thing it may be sometimes necessary 
and also legitimate to use certain concepts or things as part of the 
explanatory mechanism. Such concepts or things may or may not be 
real; even if real, their nature need not be explained in course of 
the particular explanation concerned any more than to be defined in 
terms of the functions they perform as part of the explanatory 
mechanism. This is so, because we cannot explain the facts or things 
of the world all at a time. It is, therefore, possible that, when 
Russell speaks of the function of the 'media', he has in mind the 
idea of this sort of explanatory function that they may be said to 
perform in the theory of perception* But as Russell speaks of the 
other character or function of a physical object as a group of 
appearances or connected events, he is talking ontology. If they 
could be kept separate, the two characters would perhaps be quite 
understandable. But in Russell's philosophy, they have not been, 
and cannot be, kept separate. They have been combined, and combined 
in a way so as to give rise to a confusion of epistemological and 
ontological arguments.
What Russell has done is this: He explains sensations 
or appearances by using the sense-organs, nerves and brain as also 
other 'media* as part of the explanatory mechanism. He then cons­
tructs physical objects out of such sensations or appearances, 
declaring also that all the media —  i.e. parts of the mechanism 
of the former explanation —  are constructions out of sensations.
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What he should do now is to bring the two together so as to obtain 
a final explanation of sensations in which the 'media' as units 
would disappear and would be replaced by particulars or appearances 
that form the constructions of things which have previously been 
so used as though they were real units. Until this is done, the 
whole position remains confused and involved in a vicious circle.
Now, it is not the case that Russell does not realise 
the importance of what we have said above. In fact, he has at times 
made such statements as to give us the final position that we are 
looking for. As an early example we may quote him from 'Mysticism 
and Logic' where in discussing the notion of 'causal dependence' 
he writes:
'The fact that there exists a chain of antecedents which makes 
our seeing dependent upon the eye and nerves and. brain does 
not even tend to show that there is not smother chain of 
antecedents in which the eye and nerves and brain as physiceuL 
things are ignored. If we are to escape from the dilemma 
which seemed to arise out of the physiological causation of 
what we see when we say we see the sun, we must find, at 
least in theory, a way of stating causal laws for the physical 
world, in which the units are not material things, such as 
the eye and nerves and brain, but momentary particulars of 
the same sort as our momentary visual object when we look at 
the sun. The sun itself and the eyes and nerves and brain 
must be regarded as assemblages of momentary particulars.
 ....  Thus the sun of eight minutes ago is a class of
particulars ....... The various particulars constituting
this class will be correlated with each other by a certain 
continuity and certain intrinsic laws of variation as we pass 
outward from the centre, together with certain modifications 
correlated extrinsically with other particulars which are not 
members of this class. It is these extrinsic modifications 
which represent the sort of facts, that in our former account 
appeared as the influence of the eye and nerves in modifying 
the appearance of the sun.'1
1» Mysticism and Logic, pp.136-7.
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Russell has discussed intrinsic and extrinsic causation
at some length in his later works as well# According to him, events
in
change/two different ways. One kind of change happens according to 
the laws of perspective. Any two appearances of the same thing, 
although they are very similar and may be at two neighbouring places, 
are different to some extent. No two views of the world are exactly 
the same. The other kind of change is what he calls 'extrinsic 
modifications'. When a particular belonging to a group of events 
making one thing meets . - i.e. comes to the immediate neighbourhood
of  particulars of another group making another thing, there is
this sort of change or modification because of mutual influence.
This is the kind of change that Russell is speaking about in the 
concluding part of the passage quoted above.
Now, applying this to the case of sensation, for example 
seeing the sun, we would get a situation like this: A chain of 
events, that is a causal line, passing outward from a centre where 
we suppose the sun to be and traversing the intermediate space for 
about eight minutes, meets ( or reaches the immediate neighbourhood 
of ) some particulars or events of another group which we would call 
the eye; here the former and the latter interact, and as a result 
of this the appearance of the sun changes its character. Similar 
changes occur as the process or chain reaches successively the 
neighbourhood of particulars of the groups forming respectively the 
nerves and the brain. Thus the final appearance or event is what we 
call 'seeing the sun'.
1. The Analysis of Matter, pp.313ff*;324ff.; Human Knowledge, pp.494f.
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When this is said, the objector may still insist that 
such extrinsic modifications are not possible. He may point out 
that the suggested modifications, to be possible, must occur at 
some places, namely the places of the eyes, nerves and brain, that 
according to Russell there is nothing at the places of these things, 
that these places are empty centres around which events or 
appearances scattered all over space are arranged to form the 
constructions which are these objects, and that therefore the 
suggested contact is impossible.
The concept of a 'hollow centre' defined as the place of 
a thing offers a real difficulty. We can, however, indicate gene­
rally how the supposed contact may be possible. Taking the eye 
for example, we can say that, although the place of the eye is 
said to be an empty centre, the centre as the limit of analysis 
may be taken as very small, and that it has all around it in its 
immediate neighbourhood some particulars of the group forming 
the eye. These particulars may be treated as a causal unit. Now, 
the chain of events forming the light-wave as it reaches the
place of the eye will come into the immediate neighbourhood of
these particulars. The influence of one particular of one group 
upon that of another group does not require anything more than
this. But this explanation will not perhaps cover the whole of
what Russell says about the 'hollow centre'. We shall come to it 
later on. We may now only note that he has finally rejected
1. The Analysis of Mind, p.106.
2. See below, pp.184-Jl 1@3.
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the idea of the ’hollow centre* in his later writings, and conse­
quently the difficulties about it have been removed.
6. Location of Percepts in the Brain
One aspect of the relation of sensations or percepts to
the organism, as Russell conceives it, is the location of percepts
in the brain. According to him, the correct interpretation of what
is usually called the observation of physical objects is that what
we perceive are really percepts located in our brain. The well-
known illustration with which he brings out the idea is that of the
physiologist observing another person's brain. He says, "It is
natural to suppose that what the physiologist sees is in the brain
he is observing. But if we are speaking of physical space, what
2
the physiologist sees is in his own brain."
This appeared as a startling position; and Russell has 
been vehemently criticised on this account.^ But within the frame- 
work of his theory this is quite an intelligible position.
1. The Analysis of Matter, p.320; An Outline of Philosophy, pp.l40ff; 
Human Knowledge, p.229; My Philosophical Development, p.23; The 
Philosophy of Bertraind Russell, pp.703-6.
2. An Outline of Philosophy, p.l46.
3. For example; E.P.Edwards, 'Are Percepts in the Brain?',Australian 
Journal of Philosophy,1942; A.0,Lovejoy, op.cit.,pp.280ff; 
E.Uagel's article in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell.
4. C.Fritz, Bertrand Russell's Construction of the External World, 
p.1l6; D.Cory, 'Are Sense-data in the Brain?',Journal of Philo­
sophy, 1948, pp.333ff.
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In this connection Russell's position differs from the 
positions of other philosophers who gave the same or similar 
status to percepts. It is a new development and is not found in 
the theories of the earlier neutral monists. In this, he differs 
also from other thinkers who, along with him, accepted the causal 
theory of perception. C. D. Broad, for instance, in his 'Sensum 
Theory' accepts the causal theory of perception amd gives percepts 
or what he calls 'sensa' a similar status as Russell does. Accor­
ding to Broad, the sensum is the joint effect of external stimula­
tion of the sense-organs, nerves and brain. Sensa are transitory 
particulars; "they are really extended; they really last for so 
long".^ They are particular existants "of a particular kind, being 
neither mental nor physical".^ They are 'appearances' of physical 
objects. In all these. Broad seems to be in complete agreement 
with Russell as regards the status of sensa. But one fundamental 
point (among others) in which he differs from Russell is that
while Russell places percepts in our brain. Broad thinks that
plain
sensa "are not, in anyyj'straightforward sense, in the one Physical 
Space in which physical objects are supposed to be."
In order to understand Russell's position, we should keep 
in mind that he has now accepted the causal theory of perception
5
along with what he calls 'the directed causality', and the
1. Scientific Thought, ch. VIII; The Mind and its Place in Nature, 
pp.l80ff.
2. Ibid., p.l8l. 3. Ibid., p.l84. 4. Ibid.,p.l8l.
3. I.e. the irreversibility of causal processes. See above, p.100.
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impossibility of 'action at a distance'; that all events including 
percepts exist as events in causal chains. From süLl this he draws 
the conclusion that percepts as physical events must have a place 
in the physical space and that this place cannot be anywhere else 
than that of the brain. He says;
'Whoever accepts the causal theory of perception is compelled 
to conclude that percepts are in our head, for they come at 
the end of a causal chain of physical events leading, spatially, 
from the object to the brain of the percipient. We cannot 
suppose that, at the end of this, the last effect suddenly 
jumps back to the starting point, like a stretched rope when 
it snaps. And with the theory of space-time as a structure of
events, ...... there is no sort of reason for not regarding
a percept as being in the head of the percipient. I shall 
therefore assume that this is the case, when we are speaking 
of physical, not sensible, location.'1
As an event in a physical causal chain, a percept must 
have a place in the physical space. Where could it possibly be ? 
Certainly it cannot be outside the percipient's body. It has to be, 
then, somewhere within the body. But it cannot be in the sense- 
organ or the sensory nerves, for we do not have the sensation or 
percept until the sensory stimulation reaches some sensory centre 
in the brain. It follows that the percept must be in the brain, 
while the events that occur in the sense-organ and sensory nerves 
form part of its causal ancestry.
Russell maintains that every event occupies a finite 
amount of space-time and that 'points' or what he calls 'minimum 
volumes' are only collections of events. "CausauL laws enable us to 
subrange points (or minimum volumes) in a four-dimentioneil order.
1. The Analysis of Matter, p.320.
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Therefore when the causal relations of an event are known, its
1position in space-time follows tautologieally." Now, what happens,
when for example I see a friend coming towards me, is that some
physical process starts from the body of my friend, meets my eyes,
where it produces its effects; these in turn produce their effects
on the optic nerves, which again produce an effect at the visual
centre of the brain, which I call 'seeing my friend'. Again, seeing
my friend leads to my movements towards my friend and embracing him#
This means that the event I call 'my seeing the friend' produces
its effects on the efferent nerves leading finally to the movement
of the external limbs. Thus the percept, causally considered, is
an event between events in the efferent and the afferent nerves.
So Russell concludes that "the causal and temporal connections
of percepts with events in afferent and efferent nerves give percepts
2
a position in the brain of the perceiver."
When Russell says that percepts are in our brain, he does 
not mean that a percept is a 'portion' of the brain. 'Portion', he 
says, is a material concept; ...... a 'portion' of a brain is a
set of points (or minimum volumes); an event may be a member of 
certain points (or minimum volumes) that are members of the brain, 
and is then said to be 'in' the brain, but it is not 'part' of the 
brain. It is a member of a member of the brain.
1. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p.703.
2. Ibid., p.703. 3* Ibid., pp.703-6.
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So much for the physical location of percepts. But percepts 
have 'sensible' location also. A percept has spatial and temporal 
relations with other percepts of the same perceiver, all the 
percepts of one perceiver making a 'perspective'. The space that 
is generated by the mutual spatial relations of the events forming 
a perspective is called the 'private space' of the perspective.
In this sense, there is a private space at every place from which 
there can be a view of the world; thus there is a private space 
in the perspective that is at the place of the photographic plate 
as there is one at the place of a percipient's brain* In the 
private space of an observer, percepts may be outside one another* 
Thus in my private or perceptual space my percept of a star is 
outside my percept of my body, just as it is outside my percept 
of a table*
But this perceptual or private space, —  though it is 
immense within itself, i.e. has enormous relations obtaining among 
its meraber-events, —  is in a "tiny region"^ that forms part of 
the one physical space, also called the 'perspective space'. Each 
private space is only a small region of the physical space. What­
ever events are there in this small region, i.e. the private space, 
are then in a region which is a region of the physical space, and 
therefore are in the physical space. Thus, "when I see a star, 
three places are involved; two in the physical space and one 
in my private space. There is the place where the star is in
1. My Philosophical Development, p .24,
119
the physical space, there is the place where I am in the physical 
space; and there is the place where my percept of the star is among 
my other percepts." Of these three places, the first and the second 
are outside each other, but the third is within the second.
It may be noticed that when we use such words as 'in',
'inside' or 'outside', we may mean either of two sorts of relations, 
namely (a) the relation of one percept to another percept within 
the same private space, or (b) the relation of one physical event 
to another in the physical space. Daniel Cory amplifies this point 
as follows: When the layman saya that the table he sees is outside 
his head,
'...... he is right in one sense of the word "outside". The
content of naive perception can be phenomenally analysed 
into a given arrangement of coloured patches __ what I call 
the "apparent thing", and the apparent table is certainly 
outside my head, considered as another apparent thing in
perceptual space........ But if we are using the word" ’ :>
"outside" in Russell's other sense, the layman is neither 
right nor wrong, because he does not make the necessary 
distinctions. In the second sense of the word, then, the 
physical table is outside of my physical head in the inferred 
space of physics. It does not follow from this, however, 
that the apparent table (the percept) is outside of my 
physical head; on the contreiry, if Russell is right, it 
is in it.'2
There is a correspondence between physical space and 
private space. The spatiail relations of private space and public 
or physical space cannot be identical; their correspondence consists 
in the similarity of structure. The percepts in a private space
1. My Philosophical Development, p.106.
2. D.Cory, 'Are Sense-data in the Brain?', Journail of Philosophy, 
1948,
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have similarity of structure with the physical objects in the physi­
cal space. The logical properties of the relations in the two 
spaces are the same. When, for example, a person observes three 
physical objects a, b and c, they being situated in the physical 
space such that b is between a and c, the percepts in his private 
space will have the same relation, namely that the percept of b 
will be between the percepts of a and c.
A private space may be that of an individual, or of a 
recording instruisent, or may be one at a place where there is no 
observer or instrument at all. When a photographic plate photographs 
a number of stars at a time, the photographs of the stars have 
spatial relations between them, which make the private space of 
the perspective that is in the photographic plate; and these 
relations correspond to the spatial relations of the physical 
stars in the physical space. The photograph of any of the stars is 
in the photographic plate. It is an appearance of the star as much 
as my percept of the star, which is in my private space, is an 
appearance of the star.
That the photograph of any object is a physical event 
which is in the plate will not perhaps be seriously doubted even 
by Lovejoy. Perhaps it will not also be required of a photograph 
of a five-mile-high mountain-peak to be itself five miles in height, 
and consequently of the plate to be even bigger than that. But
1. The Analysis of Matter, p.232.
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when we come to the question of the nature oMà location of percepts,
all these doubW are raised and all these demands are made.^ But
if the doubts and demands are not legitimate in respect of the
photograph, it is difficult to see how they are so in respect of
percepts. It must be emphasised that the correspondence between
things and their percepts is a relation of 'structural' resemblance
and not of actual physical extension.
The view that our percepts (and even all our experiences)
are in our brain is no more a shocking idea now-a-days. Many
philosophers admit it; the modern identity-theorists are the most
2
emphatic supporters of it. But Russell seems to be the 
originator of the idea as also of the identity theory.^
7. Subjectivity of Percepts.
Sensations or percepts, according to Russell, are as much
dependent on physical conditions as on physiological conditions.
In so far as they are conditioned by the physiological factors,
^ R
they may be said to be subjective in a wider sense. Russell
1. A.O, Lovejoy, op. cit., pp.301ff.
2. See for example, A.Quinton, op. cit., p.214.
3. See below, pp.2$6ff.
4. J,Passmore, op. cit., p.238.
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admits it and extends the concept of subjectivity to relate it even 
to ohysicol conditions* He says that subjectivity is not a pecul­
iar characteristic of percepts alone; it is present in all per­
spectives, "What may be called subjectivity in the point of view 
is not a distinctive peculiarity of mind: it is present just as
much in the photographic p l a t e A s  every event occurs in the 
private space of the perspective of which it is a member, it is in 
this sense subjective and private.
We have seen how Russell considered the subjectivity of 
sense-data. The subjectivity of sense-data on grounds of their 
dependence on physiological factors was then called 'physiological 
subjectivity'. While he retains this opinion in his later writings, 
he therein develops a distinct theory of subjectivity.^ He 
discusses side by side the notions of subjectivity end objectiv­
ity as connected with perception. We may put it briefly as 
follows.
When, for example, a number of people see a particular thing 
and a number of cameras photograph it simultaneously, the impres­
sions upon different persons and cameras vjill be alike in some 
resnects and different in others. The elements which are alike 
are 'objective', and the elements which are peculiar are 'sub­
jective ' Now, impressions differ in two ways: "Their first-
order differences are in accordance with the laws of perspective, 
while their second-order differences are functions of
1 * The Analysis of Mind, pp.130-1.
2. Ibid., pp.118-9; The Analysis of Matter, p p ,222 ff; 
An Outline of Philosophy, pp.l60 ff.
3. An Outline of Philosophy, p«l60«
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groups with other centres",^ that is, are due to distortions 
caused by the objects of intervening medium. It is because of 
their similarity that we can group them together as forming one 
physical object; and the more the distortion of an impression, 
the less the possibility of our connecting it with, or inferring 
from it, other impressions or events of the group to which it should 
belong, "The more correct are the inferences we can draw from a 
percept as to other events (whether percepts or not) belonging to 
the same group, the more objective is the perception,"^ This 
Russell offers as a definition of objectivity (also publicity) 
in perception, which is a matter of degree.
In a wider sense, subjectivity consists in either or both 
of first-order and second-order differences; in this sense all 
events are subjective. The subjectivity of percepts generally 
consists of both types of differences. But in a special sense the 
subjectivity of percepts and other events consists in a marked de­
gree of the second-order difference. In this sense, subjectivity is 
defined by the element of distortion due to the function of the 
intervening o b j e c t s R u s s e l l  distinguishes three kinds of sub­
jectivity according as the distorting objects are (a) outside the 
body of the percipient, or (b) inside his body but not in his brain, 
or (c) in his brain. They are called respectively (a) physical 
subjectivity, (b) sensory or physiological subjectivity, and (c) 
cerebral or psychological subjectivity. Physical subjectivity
1. The Analysis of Matter, p.221,
2. Ibid., p.222. 3« Ibid., p.222.
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exists in photographs, gramophone records, in the appeairance
(or percept) of a stick as it looks bent when it is half in water,
and in similar other events. Sensory subjectivity arises in cases
of defects of sense-organs or afferent nerves as is exemplified
in the case "where one person sees two colours, red and green,
another only sees one". Cerebral or psychological subjectivity
is a result of past experience. "An obvious example is a sensation
2
which appears to be in a leg which has been amputated."
The three types of subjectivity are connected with 
perception where "subjectivity enters in when we are led to make 
•false inferences'. Russell is using here 'subjectivity' in a 
special sense in which it includes those cases only which he calls 
"the sources of error". But though there; is a difference of 
meaning of subjectivity in Russell's usages, they have one very 
important feature in common which we should specially notice here# 
His use of 'subjectivity' has very little to do with the traditional 
use of the word, in which when something is said to be subjective 
it is understood to be in some sense 'mental'. Russell's subjecti­
vity has no such exclusive implication.
Russell's two meanings of subjectivity, though distinct, 
are not however incompatible. In fact, they may be regarded as a 
wide and a narrow sense of the word, the narrow sense being implied 
by the wide sense. In the wide sense subjectivity stands for any
1. The Analysis of Matter, p.224.
2. Ibid.,p.225. 3* Ibid., p.223. 4. Ibid., p.223.
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difference of percepts or events, irrespective of the degree of 
their distortion or modification; while in the narrow sense it 
stands only for those cases of unusual degree or kind of distortion 
which makes inferences difficult or even leads to wrong inferences.
There is an important question about the special sense
of subjectivity. It is as to how we know that in a particular
perception there has been distortion at all. When, for example, a 
stick half in water looks bent, how do we know that it is not, in
fact, bent ? The question is about the criterion of determining
cases of distortion in perception. Eussell does not seem to directly 
ask the question himself, sind hence no direct answer from him.
But from his discussions of related points, it is possible to 
suggest what his answer would be. Now, it is obvious that a single 
percept, however much distorted it may be, does not contain in 
itself anything that would enable us to know that it is a distorted 
appearance of the object. We can only know about the distortion 
from a comparison of the percept concerned with other percepts 
related to the object. While looking at the stick we may also touch 
it moving our hand from one end of it to the other. There will 
then be a discrepancy between the two percepts. We cannot yet tell 
which is the distorted percept. But normally we have other expe­
riences also in connection with the object both at the same time 
and at successive moments under different conditions. We then find 
that all the percepts agree with one another in a certain respect 
except one, namely the percept of the bent look. It is this lack
126
of correlation with other relevant percepts that is the criterion 
of determining the fact of distortion of any percept. This is an 
empirical criterion and becomes increasingly perfected as our 
experience grows more and more numerous.
This accords with what Russell says about the inferability 
of correlated events from our perceptions. He says that very little 
can be inferred from a single percept, that a single percept may be 
deceptive, aind that we need for the purpose of inference observation 
from different points of view and through a certain period of time. 
This may be taken as a clue to what Russell’s emswer would be to the 
question we have raised. And accordingly the answer we have suggested 
above seems to be the only possible answer from the Russellian point 
of view; aind this is perhaps the only possible criterion from any 
point of view.
8. Images as Particulars
From the beginning of his neutralism Russell accepts
images as part of the ultimate stuff of the world. He explains
images by comparing them with sensations. Images do not differ from
2
sensations intrinsically; they are ’copies’ of sensations» which are
1. The Analysis of Matter, pp.225-6.
2, It hardly needs emphasising that Russell’s theory of images is 
in the main Humeian.
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their prototypes. He says:
*It is this fact, that images resemble antecedent sensations,
which enables us to call them images of this or that. For
the understanding of memory, and of knowledge generally, the 
recognizable resemblance of images and sensations is of 
fundamental importance. *
The difference between images and sensations, according 
to Russell, is that of causal nature.^ Images are caussuLly connected 
with past experiences. An image is caused, through association, by
a sensation or another image. He says that "the causation of an
image always proceeds according to mnemic laws, i.e. that it is 
governed by habit and past experience."^ But in the causation of 
sensation, past experience and mnemic laws do not play any part.
The stimulation of nerves carrying ein effect into the brain has an 
essential role in the causation of sensations, but not in the
If.
causation of images.
Sensations and images also differ in respect of their 
effects* Sensations have both mental and physical effects, but 
images have only mental effects, or at any rate effects that follow 
according to mnemic laws.^
On the basis of the similarities and causal differences 
between images and sensations, Russell develops his definition of 
’image*. He says, "We might have called an event an ’image’ when 
it is recognisably of the same kind as a’percept’, but does not
1*- The Analysis of Mind, p.155*
2. Ibid., pp.l49ff; An Outline of Philosophy, pp.l87ff* 
3* The Analysis of Mind, p.150.
4. Ibid., p.151. 5 . Ibid., p.151*
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have the stimulus which it would have if it were a percept." He 
makes a further refinement of the definition and says that "an 
'image* is an occurrence recognisably visual (or auditory or etc., 
as the case may be), but not caused by a stimulus which is of the 
nature of light (or sound or etc., as the case may be), or at any 
rate only indirectly so caused as a result of association."^
We already know that Russell, in his partial neutralism, 
regards images as purely mental; but in his complete neutral monism 
he regards them as neutral.. In the earlier theory, he takes images 
to be subject to only psychological laws, —  mnemic laws being part 
of psychological laws. He then wisheS that, if mnemic causation of 
images could be explained in terms of modifications of brain states, 
it would have been possible to bring images under physical causation 
and to treat them as neutral. In the later theory, he effects what 
he wished before, and thus tries to bring images under physical 
causation. He now declares images to be neutral. But we have seen 
that neutrality, in his later theory, does not depend on causal 
relations; and therefore bringing images under physical causation, 
or in other words explaining mnemic causation in terms of modifi­
cations of brain states, has little to do with the neutrality of 
images. Anyhow, the neutrality of images is a new development in 
his later theory.
Another development from his earlier position is that, 
whereas images were previously regarded as constituents of mind or
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p.193.
2. Ibid., p.193.
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mental phenomena only, they are now constituents of matter as 
well, namely the matter of our brain.^
Russell takes images as among mnemic phenomena, that is as 
being subject to mnemic causation. But his conception of mnemic 
phenomena and mnemic causation has undergone changes at different 
stages. In 'The Analysis of Mind', he gives the following 
explanation :
'We will give the name of "mnemic phenomena" to those res­
ponses of an organism which, so far as hitherto observed 
facts are concerned, can only be brought under causal laws 
by including; past occurrences in the history of the organ­
ism as part of the causes of the present response. ....
I mean that, in attempting to s+'ate the proximate cause of 
the present event, some past event or events must be 
included. ' -
According to this view, mnemic causation involves an inter­
val of time between, the cause and the effect without any interven­
ing chain of causes. This is action at a distance in time.
In his later works Russell rejects 'action at a distance' and 
accordingly modifies his conception of mnemic causation. He says 
that "if we are to avoid 'mnemic' causation, which involves action 
at a distance in time, we must say that mnemic phenomena in mental 
events are due to the modification of the body by past events*"^
He makes this position more specific and explains mnemic causation 
in terms of modification of brain states. He says that the con­
nection of images with past experience is clearly known and that 
"this connection works through an effect of the past experience
1* See below,ç.p.l^^-i+.
2. The Analysis of Mind, p.7 8*
3o An Outline of Philosophy, p*306,
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on the brain".^ Thus it is possible to talk of association in 
regions of the brain. "The state of the brain which causes us to 
hear the word 'Napoleon* may become associated with the state of
the brain which causes us to see a picture of Napoleon and thus
2
the word and the picture will call each other up*"
Russell accepts this brain-state theory of image and 
association first tentatively in 'An Outline of Philosophy' and 
then categorically in his reply to criticism in which he uses the 
term 'modifications of brain structure'^ to convey the idea.
Now, the term 'modification of the body' or ’modifi­
cations of brain structure' needs a little clarification. For, 
according to Russell, there is no permanent body or brain, but 
only a series of groups of events. What he seems to mean by these 
terms is this: A percept or sensation is an event in the brain; it
is succeeded by an event which is its copy or image; this is
succeeded by another event, and so on. Thus there persists a chain
of events as a part of the series of groups of events that is the 
brain.
4
Thus, Russell offers what he calls a "physical basis" of the 
mental mnemic phenomena. But we need not suppose that this 
necessarily means a reduction of the mental causal laws of images 
to a physical lavf of brain events. It is of course true
that according to Russell the events of this
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p. I89
2. Ibid., p. 187.
3. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p. 700*
4. An Outline of Philosophy, p. I 87.
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particular chain are constituents of the brain and as such are
subject to physical causation. But so also are our percepts and
conscious experiences. It is possible that the events of this
chain remain all the time members of the other arrangement which
is the mind. It is not necessary to suppose"that one member of the
chain becomes mental at the time when there is a memory or thought,
and that its antecedent and consequent members of the ehain should
remain purely physical. In so far as Russell maintains at this
later stage that there can be unconscious images and percepts and
that the brain has for its constituents all mental events,
conscious or unconscious, it seems only natural to suppose that
the events of this particular chain remain all the time members of
both the groups or arrangements, namely mind and brain* At times
members of the chain are conscious, as in cases of memory and 
other
thought, and at^times, the members are unconscious, —  we may say 
unconscious images. This does not contradict any of Russell's
1
fundamental principles, and accords well with the causal dualism 
which he in fact retains throughout his neutral monism.
1. See below » pp.Z^Off.
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9# Unperceived Particulars
Besides sensations and images, Russell accepts 'unper­
ceived particulars* as part of the stuff of the world# He recog­
nised them prior to his acceptance of neutralism* He then called 
them 'sensibilia'• In his neutralism, he retains them, but no more 
calls them sensibilia; he now names them variously as unperceived 
appearances, particulars, aspects or events* The name 'unperceived 
events' is used in his complete neutral monism with a wider 
denotation, and includes not only the unperceived particulars which 
were called sensibilia, but also 'unperceivable' events.
Russell defined sensibilia as "those objects which have
the same metaphysical and physical status as sense-data without
necessarily being data to any mind". He conceived the relation
of a sensibile to a sense-datum as "like that of a man to a husband:
a man becomes a husband by entering into the relation of marriage;
and similarly a sensibile becomes a sense-datum by entering into
2
the relation of acquaintance"*
Russell gave this definition in 1914 when he believed 
in the psycho-physical dualism of sensation and sense-datum* He 
then took sense-data as appearguuces of objects to a perceiving 
mind, and sensibilia as appearances of objects from places where 
there were no perceiving minds. Now, as in his neutral monism 
sensation aind sense-datum aire identified, the above definition
1* Mysticism and logic, p.l48*.
2*. Ibid., pp.148-9*
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needs modification which may be effected by taking sensation in
place of sense-datum. While sensations are now appearances where
there are percipient organisms, sensibilia are appearances where
there are no percipients. The relation of sensation and sensibile
is still like that of husband and man, in the sense that a sensi-
bilB is an aspect which can become a sensation by coming "into
1
contact with a living body".
Russell feels the necessity of asserting the existence
of unperceived aspects because without them our construction of
the world would be fragmentary and discontinuous. Physical objects
are groups of aspects or appearances. If am object be only the
group of perceived aspects, it would then exist only where and
when there were observers.. But this is not the usual conception
of materisil objects; amd according to this conception it would be
impossible for us to make statements about things when no observers
were perceiving them, and verifiability of physical laws would
become impossible. To avoid these difficulties, Russell accepts
unperceived aspects or events correlated to one another and to tha
perceived aspects according to the laws of physics.
At the early stage of his neutralism Russell asserts
the existence of unperceived aspects on grounds of continuity and 
2
resemblance. As we move around an object, we get similar sensa­
tions from different positions, and we believe that if the object
1. The Analysis of Mind, pp.l43-4.
2 Ibid., p.99; Mysticism and Logic, p.134.
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is a physical thing we should be able to get a continuous series of 
sensations. Agaih, if a number of people observe the same thing, 
they get more or less similar sensations, and it is believed that 
if there were other observers,, they also would have similar sensa­
tions. The existence of aspects of objects at places where there are 
no observers can. be verified to some extent by placing recording 
instruments, such as cameras, dictaphones, etc#, between observers 
and then comparing the records with the sensations of observers as 
they would recollect them* This argument is developed in some detail
in 'The Analysis of Matter'
In his complete neutral monism, the acceptance of the
causal theory of perception offers further justification for our
inference from perceived events to unperceived events. Russell now
feels that continuity alone is not enough for establishing the
"reality" of unperceived events; 'ideal* or imaginary aspects would
be sufficient to give continuity and fullness to a set of aspects.
But "it is hard to see how anything merely imaginary can be essen-
2
tial to the statement of causal laws". It is therefore necessary 
to establish the existence of unperceived events on some surer 
ground than mere continuity; and the causal theory of perception, 
Russell thinks, affords the desired ground. On the basis of this 
theory, we can infer from our percepts the existence of unperceived 
events causally correlated and continuous with them. We cannot, 
however, infer anything as to the intrinsic nature of these events
1. Op. cit., pp.236ff.
2. The Analysis of Matter, p.197#
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but only that they are similar in structure to our percepts; and 
beyond this we cannot go.
From the percept we can infer something about the stimu­
lus which is an event that causes the percept. Differences between 
percepts enable us to infer the differences between their stimuli. 
Russell says that by inverting the maxim 'same cause, same effect' 
we may argue 'different effects, different causes'. He says:
* ...... if a person hears two sounds at once or sees two
colours at once, two physically different stimuli have 
reached his ear or his eye* This principle, together with 
spatio-temporal continuity, suffices to give a great deal 
of knowledge as to the structure of stimuli. Their intrinsic
character, it is true, must reitfain unknown;  ....  there is a
roughly one-one relation between stimulus and percepts .... .
This enables us to infer certain mathematical properties of 
the stimulus when we know the percept, and conversely enables 
us to infer the percept when we know these mathematical 
properties of the stimulus.
The acceptance of the causal theory of perception leads 
Russell to assert, not only unperceived events which were called 
sensibilia, but also 'unperceivable* events. The unperceived 
appearances of his partial neutralism are all perceivable in so far 
as they can be transformed into sensations by their coming into 
contact with appropriate organisms.^ But his later theory includes 
further unperceived events which are unperceivable as well* This 
follows from the causal theory. If perceptions are caused by events 
outside our body, there must always remain some events which are 
only causes of perceptions and are not themselves percepts* In a 
causal chain of events of which the end-product is a percept, any
1. The Analysis of Matter, pp.226—7, 234; An Outline of Philosophy,
pp.165-4.
2. The Analysis of Matter, pp.226-7*
3# The Analysis of Mind, p.l44.
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two neighbouring events would be such that the prior one is the 
cause of the other which is later. Now, if we take various positions 
along this chain, it is possible that most of the events of the 
chain would be transformed by our organism into percepts; but there 
will have to be some event, at least the one at the beginning of the 
series, which cannot become a percept. For, if it does, this percep­
tion will have no cause, and this will contradict the causal theory 
of perception.
Thus our inferences from percepts to unperceived events 
are made possible; and what we know about them is their structural 
similarity with percepts. Russell does not, however, think that the 
arguments for unperceived events are as strong as those for the 
percepts of other people; but these arguments, especially the one 
from the causal theory of perception, are as good as any of the 
fundamental inductions of science. Accordingly, there are three 
grades of certainty or probability that attach to our knowledge of 
the events which form the stuff of the world. While our own percepts 
and images are most certain, those of other people are less certain 
than ours, and the unperceived events are even less certain than 
the percepts of Other people.
Russell calls all particulars *verifiables'. He uses the 
term 'verifiable' in a wide sense to include not only what we our­
selves or human beings generally experience, but also unperceived 
particulars which can be inferred from what we experience. Two,
1* The Analysis of Matter, pp.206-7#
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principles must be followed in inferring unperceived events: (1) 
the inference must be made explicit and must be in accordance with 
recognised canons of scientific method; and (2) the entities infer­
red should be similar to and continuous with the observed entities 
and must not be like the Kantian 'Ding an sich' which is wholly un­
like and removed from the observed data#^ An unverifiable entity is 
in this sense any supposed object the like of which we can never 
experience; it is something which involves an inference the ground 
for which cannot be discovered. "In this sense", says Russell, "I 
do wish to dispense with 'unverifiable' entities. This is my reason 
for doing without matter, points, instants, etc. It is my reason 
for the use of Occam's razor ..... if entities are validly inferred,
I do not think they can be rightly called 'unverifiables', in the
2
sense in which this word is commonly used in science."
Now, unperceived particulars are constituents of physical ob­
jects just as perceived particulars are. So the question naturally 
arises as to whether unperceived particulars possess the same 
qualities as the percepts do. There seems to be no difference of 
opinions as to Russell's later views on the subject according to 
which we can only know the abstract logical and mathematical pro­
perties of structural similarity of unperceived events with per­
cepts. But as regards his earlier views there is much confusion 
among commentators. Fritz and Lovejoy^ represent him as maintaining
1. Mysticism and Logic, p.137; The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, 
pp.707-8 ,
2. Ibid., p.70S.
3 . C.Fritz, op.cit., ch. IV, part I; A.O. Lovejoy, op. cit.,
pp.1 3 0, 132 f., 2 7 7.
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at the early stage that unperceived, aspects are in all ways 
exactly "like sense-data (or sensations), except that they do not 
happen to he perceived".^ According to their interpretation, the 
unperceived aspects have all the sensible qualities of sensations. 
Thus the unperceived appearance corresponding to a perceived red 
patch is red in the same sense as the perceived patch. Lovejoy 
represents Russell’s views as,follows:
'An "appearance" is just the sort of thing you actually see, 
even though it may be in fact unseen; it is primarily a 
colored shape, or rather a group of colored shapes .....
It is only by thus imputing to the "outside particulars" ...
... all the sort of properties empirically found in sense- 
data, that he is enabled to maintain that sense-data are 
matter.
But this seems to be a complete misrepresentation of Russell’s 
position. This seems to be based on a failure to take notice of 
his clear positive statements which are sufficient to establish his 
position which in fact is contrary to the one imputed to him in 
the above interpretation. This interpretation seems to have been 
derived from a misunderstanding of some such statements as (a) that 
sense-data (or sensations) are perceived sensibilia; (b) that 
sensibilia are similar to, and have the same metaphysical and physi­
cal status as, sensations or sense-data; (c) that colour, sound, 
etc., are actual constituents of the physical world. What Russell 
says later" about ’ideal elements' by way of constructing the 
phenomenalistic picture of the world only to reject it, seems to 
have been taken by these commentators as his own views on the
1. C. Fritz, op. cit., p.I63»
2. A.O. Lovejoy, op.cit., pp.233-4.
3» The Analysis of Matter, pp.210 ff.
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subject. But if they considered these statements carefully in their
proper contexts and compared them with many other statements (some
of which we shall present shortly), they would have then seen that
their interpretation could not be thrust upon Russell.
The statements (a) and (b) above do not by themselves prove
that sensibilia as unperceived have the same qualities as when they
are perceived. For when they are perceived, they are sensations
(sensibilia transformed) and not sensibilia as such. The similarity
of unperceived particulars and sensations may not be, and according
to Russell is not, a complete similarity; and their partial
similarity may be enough for treating them as having the same
metaphysical and physical status. About the statement (c) above
there is a clear misunderstanding of Russell's position. Lovejoy
says, "it is, of course, an essential of Mr. Russell's theory now
under consideration that colours and sounds and secondary qualities
generally should not be excluded from the physical w o r l d . H e
then quotes from ’The Analysis of Mind' (p. 142) the following:
'The sensation that we have when we see a patch of colour 
simply is that patch of colour, an actual constituent of the 
physical world, and part of what physics is concerned with.'
Lovejoy finds in this sentence justification for regarding unper­
ceived aspects as having colour, sound and all other secondary 
qualities. But I fail completely to see how it can offer the 
justification sought for. We have already seen that this sentence
forms part of Russell's arguments for abolishing the dualism of
2
sensation and sense-datum. In this sentence, it is the sensation.
1. A.O. Lovejoy, op. cit., p. 253 footnote,
2, See above, p. 86.
i4 o
and not sensibile unperceived aspect, that is the patch of
colour; and even without going into the context it is easy to see
that in it there is absolutely no reference to any unperceived
aspect. Sensations are constituents of physical objects, and the
possession of secondary qualities by them would preserve their
inclusion in the physical world. But from this it does not follow
that other particulars, namely the unperceived aspects, should
necessarily possess them; and Russell's sentence quoted above
does not have any such implications.
As to the 'ideal elements' which Russell speaks of in his
formulation of phenomenalism, we need only to point out that he
does not assert anything there as his own views. He develops that
position only to reject it; and the ground for this rejection is
mainly his non-acceptance of 'ideal elements'
Now, let us consider some positive statements that show that
unperceived aspects, according to Russell, cannot have the same
qualities as sensations. In 'Cur Knowledge of the External World*
he says that "immediate objects of sense depend for their existence
upon physiological conditions in ourselves, and that, for example,
the coloured surfaces which we see cease to exist when we shut 
2
our eyes". When two people see the world from neighbouring
1. See above, p. 134; The Analysis of Matter, p. 197* Phenomen­
alism has been variously defended and criticised in recent 
philosophy. Compare, e.g., its defence by A.J. Ayer in 
Philosophical Essays, pp. 125 ff., and its criticism by R . J ,  
Hirst in The Problems of Perception, chapter four, and
I. Berlin, 'Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical Statements', 
Mind, 1950. (Ayer has now abandoned phenomenalism).
2* Our Knowledge of the External World, second edition, p. 68.
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places, they will see two somewhat similar worlds. If a third man 
comes and takes a position between them, he will see a third and 
intermediate world. Now, "we cannot", says Russell, "reasonably 
suppose just this world to have existed before, because it is 
conditioned by the sense-organs, nerves, and brain of the newly 
arrived man; but we can reasonably suppose that some aspect of the 
universe, existed from that point of view, though no one was per­
ceiving it.""*
The same view is expressed in 'The AnauLysis of Mind'.
Speaking about particulars other than those we experience, he saya
that they are what "make up that part of the material world that
does not come into the sort of contact with a living body that is
2
required to turn it into a sensation".
These statements clearly show that unperceived events 
cannot become sensations without contact with percipient organisms, 
and cannot have the qualities possessed by sensations because these 
qualities are dependent upon physiological conditions. It follows 
that it is very wrong to suggest that according to Russell unper­
ceived aspects have the same qualities as sensations or percepts.
As to what we cam know about the qualities of unperceived 
aspects, Russell's views are clearly stated in the following 
passages:
'What it is that happens when a wave of light reaches a given 
place we cannot tell, except in the sole case when the place
1. Our Knowledge of the External World, second edition, p.95*
2. The Analysis of Mind, p.l44*
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in question is a brain connected with an eye which is 
turned in the right direction. In this one very special 
case we know what happens: we have the sensation called 
"seeing the star". In all other cases, though we know 
(more or less hypothetically) some of the correlations 
and abstract properties of the appearance of the star, 
we do not know the appearance itself.'1
'I contend that the ultimate constituents of matter are not 
atoms or electrons, but sensations and other things similar 
to sensations as regards extent and d u r a t i o n . '2
Thus, according to Russell, we can only know some corre­
lations and abstract properties of unperceived aspects. This is 
virtually the same theory as that of the later stage according to 
which we can only know abstract logical and mathematical properties 
of unperceived events. While in the earlier theory the similarity 
of unperceived aspects with sensations is said to be as regards 
'extent and duration*,in the later theory it is said to be a 
structural similarity. But extent and duration are structural 
properties; so, the earlier and later views are in effect the same.
Now, the contention that unperceived aspects are similar 
to sensations * as regards extent and duration' gives Stace a clue 
for saying that Russell in the earlier theory revives Locke's 
distinction of primary and secondary qualities, that he holds the 
selective type realism in respect of vthe primary qualities and the 
generative type in respect of the secondary qualities, and that he. ;
holds primary qualities to be objective and secondary qualities
3 4subjective*. But Russell has rejected this interpretation t he holds
1. The Analysis of Mind, p.1)4.
2. Ibid., p.121. 3* W.T.Stace, op. cit.,pp.368ff; For a
discussion of selectivism and generativism, cf. E.H..Price, 
Perception, pp.40ff.
4. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p.709*
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the generative theory about both primary and secondary qualities, 
and he regards "both as subjective in the sense that neither can 
exist except in a region where there is an organism with sense- 
organs and a brain". This last statement is apparently misleading 
in so far as it seems to suggest that there are no qualities at 
places where there are no percipient organisms. Taken in this sense, 
this would contradict his other statements to the effect that 
every event, perceived or unperceived, occupies a little space and 
has a short duration and that there are differences between events 
which are causes of different percepts such as those of red and 
green, and so on# It would appear from this that he is simultane­
ously affirming and denying qualities of unperceived events*
But the inconsistency is more apparent than real* Of 
course, the statement quoted above is am example of the sort of 
ambiguity one often finds in Russell's writings. The ambiguity 
here arises from the fact that he does not specify whether he is 
speaking here of qualities of events in general or of the qualities 
of percepts alone. But if we are to avoid the inconsistency 
mentioned above, we have to take the statement to be about the 
qualities of percepts, qualities that we know directly in our 
experiences. We have also to remember Russell's special sense of 
'subjective' according to which every event is subjective in so far 
as it occurs in the private space of a perspective having its own 
local time, and is somewhat different from every other event 
correlated with it. Thus the qualities (primary and secondary) of
1. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p.709#
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percepts are known to us directly in our experience; they do not 
exist anywhere else then in us, and do not qualify anything outside 
us. The above statement means only this. But the extent and, dur­
ation of any unpe.rceived event are a matter of inference from our 
percepts, and are peculiar to the event itself and are not just the 
same as those of our percepts. Accordingly, the extent and duration 
of an unperceived event, which more or less correspond structurally 
to the primary qualities of a percept, are as much subjective as 
the latter are. As regards secondary qualities, what we can at best 
infer about unperceived events is that there are differences be­
tween them, corresponding to the differences between the percepts 
they cause; but we cannot know what these differences are. VJe 
cannot therefore know the intrinsic characteristics of unperceived 
events; and whatever these characteristics (if any) may be, they 
would be entirely subjective depending on the perspectives to which 
the events belong, and on the conditions connected with these 
perspectives. Thus all qualities are found to be subjective in 
this senseo
Now, coming to the question of the neutrality of unperceived 
events, we have only to repeat that in Russell's partial neutral­
ism they are purely physical and that in his later theory they 
are neutral. In the early theory, a particular is neutral if 
it is subject to both psychological and physical laws ; but 
unperceived particulars are subject only to physical laws and are 
therefore purely physical. But Russell could perhaps avoid this 
and take unperceived particulars as neutral even on the basis of
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that early criterion. For the unperoeived aspects or sensibilia, 
besides being of the same status as sensations, are all percei­
vable; each sensibile can become a sensation by coming into 
contact with a living body. Thus, although unperceived appearances 
are in fact subject to physical laws only, they have a potentia­
lity of being subject to psychological laws. On the basis of their 
potential nature they might be regarded as neutral particulars.
But Russell does not so regard them at that stage. So long as 
they are unperceived, they are not part of any experience and are 
therefore outside the scope of psychology and are purely physical. 
We have seen that Russell was then quite emphatic in denying 
their neutrality. It is only in his complete neutral monism that 
he regards them as neutral entities.
10. Monads and Neutral Particulars
So, according to Russell, sensations (or percepts), 
images and unperceived particulars form the primary stuff of the 
world, and mind and matter are complex constructions out of them. 
In his partial neutralism only sensations are neutral, but in his 
complete neutral monism all particulars are neutral. Now, the 
influence of Hume on Russell's conception of the constituents of 
the world is obvious and can hardly be exaggerated. There is
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complete agreement between them as regards the rejection of sub­
stance generally and the self or ego as an entity In particular. 
Russell conceives the nature of sensations and images more or less 
in the fashion of Hume's impressions and ideas. His concept of 
' sensibilia ' is also derived from Hume v;ith the difference that for 
Hume they are imaginary or hypothetical elements^ while for Russell 
they are self-subsistent real entities. Russell, however, goes 
beyond Hume in accepting unperceived events other than sensibilia, 
namely the unperceivable events. There is also a difference of 
standpoint. Hume's approach is psychological, and his philosophy 
is called psychological atomism. Russell's analysis is logical, 
and his philosophy is logical atomism. His atoms are finally 
declared to be neutral, while Hume's atoms are psychological.
Another philosopher who was not a neutral monist but with 
whose philosophy Russell's neutral monism has similarities in some 
important respects, is Leibniz. Russell himself acknowledges that 
his neutral monism can be understood "as a modification of Leibniz,
dropping the dogma that monads are 'windowless' and the belief that
2
all of them are in some sense 'souls'." The general structure of 
Russell's world can, according to him, be derived by emending that 
of Leibniz's world. In view of this, a comparative study of Leib­
niz's monadology and Russell's neutral monism must be instructive. 
This should therefore form the subject-matter of an independent 
research project. We cannot go into it here and will
1. D . Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part IV, Section II;
H.H. Price, Hume's Theory of the External World, pp.178-9*
2. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p.708; My Philosophical 
Development, pp.24 f.
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therefore make only a very brief statement about how we could under­
stand Russell's neutral particulars with reference to the monads of 
Leibniz#
The world, according to Leibniz, consists of an infinite 
number of unextended simple substances which are called 'monads'# 
Each monad is a soul or spiritual atom# There is no interaction 
between monads; each monad is shut up within itself, it is 'window- 
less'# It mirrors the universe as a whole from a certain 'point of 
view'; it is a universe in miniature# In the world consisting of 
monads there are two kinds of space: (a) the subjective or private 
space in a monad's picture of the world, which orders a manifold 
that is within the monad; and (b) the objective space which is the 
assemblage of 'points of view' (i#e. monads) ordered according to 
differences of perspective; this is the space of physics#
We have already seen how Russell accepts the Leibnizian
2 3
distinction of private and public space# But as he explains,
various modifications of the Leibnizian 'schema' are necessary in 
order to obtain from it his neutral monistic world#- In the first 
place, there is no reason why a monad should be a 'soul'; it con­
sists, according to Russell, merely "of all the occurrences exhi—
A
biting a certain perspective point of view"; even a photograph 
satisfies this condition# Secondly, a monad, for Russell, is not 
windowless and does not mirror the whole universe but only a part
1#. G.W.Leibniz, Monadology, in Basic Writings(Open Court Ed# ),pp#251ff> 
2# See above, pp. 1l8ff.
3# The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, pp.708-9#
4# Ibid., p.708.
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of it, namely that part i-jith which it is causally connected = 
Thirdly, the image (or effect) of one monad at another depends 
not only on the former and its distance from the latter, but also 
on the intervening medium. Fourthly, a monad does not mirror the 
present state of another monad but only a somewhat earlier state 
of it, depending on the velocity of light, sound, etc. Fifthly, 
the images of two monads may so inferfere with one another that the 
resultant event at a third monad cannot be regarded as representing 
either or both. Russell thinks that further modifications may be 
necessary, but he accepts the Leibnizian 'schema' as emended in 
the above manner as a "ground plan"#^
But we have not yet got Russell's neutral particulars.
What has so far been done by making the above emendments is that 
the monad has been made neutral and also a causal unit. It was 
originally a 'soul' or spiritual atom; but it is no more so, and 
it is not matter either even for Leibniz. But to arrive at 
Russell's neutral particulars one further step is necessary.
For a monad mirrors a part of the world; it is a point of view or 
what is called a perspective. But we know that for Russell a 
perspective is not atomic or simple, it is the group of all the 
particulars that exist at a place at a given moment.
Thus in Russell's neutral monism, the monad is analysed 
into its constituent elements which are the neutral particulars.
1. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p .709.
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The position is analogous to the one that we find in physics. In 
'atomic’ physics, the atoms are the ultimate units, while 'sub­
atomic ' physics analyses the atom into electrons and protons. If 
monadology is taken as ’atomic', Russell's theory is 'sub-atomic'; 
Russell analyses the monads into neutral particulars.
Russell's neutral particulars are sensations (or percepts), 
images, sensibilia and unperceivable events. All these except the 
last are found in Hume's psychological atomism. Thus we may 
conclude that there is in Russell's theory of neutral particulars 
a peculiar fusion of the atomistic ideas of Hume and Leibniz. 
Russell, in fact, makes the monads neutral and analyses them in 
terms of Hume's atoms (with additions) which also are made neutral. 
He takes the Leibnizian 'schema' or structural plan of the world, 
fills it up with Humeian elements adding to them unperceivable 
events, and applies to all the elements the category of 'neutrality' 
as conceived by Mach, James and the new realists.
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CHAPTER IV 
THE THEORY OF MATTER
1. Simples versus Constructs
In the preceding chapter we considered the nature of 
neutral particulars and some problems connected with them. We should 
now consider how Russell constructs matter aoid mind out of them. But 
before that, something should be said about what distinguishes a 
construct from what is not a construct. From our earlier discussions 
it is perhaps clear that the particulars obtained as the limit of 
analysis are not constructs; they are the units which are the ulti­
mate entities in the relative sense as explained above. But what is 
a construct ?
There is some confusion as to what Russell takes to be
a construct. He makes at least two suggestions. He puts it as a
msLxim: "Wherever possible, substitute constructions out of known
entities for inferences to unknown entities." He calls it the
2
principle of "constructions versus inferences". The unknown infe-
3 'rred entities with neat logical properties are the suspects and 
are to be represented as constructions.
Now, the expression "constructions versus inferences" 
seems misleading. It may be supposed to mean that all inferred
1. Logic and Knowledge, p.326; Mysticism and Logic, p.153; See above,
p.64.
2. Logic and Knowledge, p.329.
3. Ibid., p.3 2 6; My Philosophical Development, p.l6..
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entities should be regarded as constructs, and that whatever is 
not inferred is not a construet. It may also be taken to mean that 
the materials used in a construction must all be non-inferred, that 
a construction which uses inferred elements fails to perform the 
function of replacing the unknown inferred object for which it is a 
construction, because it then involves a "circularity" in the sense 
that it purports to replace an inferred object by a construction 
out of inferred elements (with additions). Russell's maxim has 
sometimes been interpreted in this sense, and his use of unperceived 
particulars has been accordingly criticised.^ This interpretation 
and the criticism based upon it seem relevant with reference to 
Russell’s expression "constructions out of known entities for 
inferences to unknown entities", if 'known' and 'unknown' here are 
supposed to mean 'perceived' and 'unperceived' respectively.
But this interpretation as well as the criticism seems 
unnecessary. Of course, Russell is partly to blame for this un­
fortunate situation; for he does not initially specify the meaning 
of the words 'known' and 'unknown' in the above maxim, and thus 
leaves his position ambiguous. But the ambiguity can be removed 
by considering his actual practices and later statements.
We should notice that Russell proposes to substitute 
constructions for inferred objects "wherever possible". This 
means that we cannot, possibly need not, dispense with
lo For example, C. Fritz, op. cit., pp.177-8.
132
inferences altogether. Inferred entities with neat logical 
properties are the suspects, hut all inferred entities may not 
be taken as constructs. In fact, Russell allows two kinds of 
inferred entities, namely the percepts of other people and 
unperceived particulars.
Secondly, we have seen that Russell calls particulars 
(both perceived and unperceived) *verifiables'. What is verifiable 
or rather verified is also 'known* to the extent of its verifi­
cation. This sense of 'knov/n' is wider than that in which 'known' 
means 'perceived' or 'experienced'; and Russell's use of 'known' 
is to be understood in this wider sense in which it means 'veri­
fiable'. Some inferred entities are verifiable because the like 
of them (with which they are continuous) are directly perceived, 
and the former are inferred from the latter in accordance with 
scientific methods. Thus unperceived particulars, though inferred, 
are verifiable.^ But some inferred entities are not verifiable, 
because neither they themselves nor anything like them are ever 
experienced. Matter and mind, for example, are such inferred 
non-verifiable entities, and are to be shown as constructs. 
Russell's maxim would perhaps avoid the above criticism, had he 
used in it 'verifiable' and 'non-verifiable' in places of 'known' 
and 'unknown' respectively. It is a fact about Russell that he 
has never produced constructions of material objects out of
1. See above, pp.136-7»
2. According to Russell they are of the same kind as the perceived 
particulars, whereas the non-verifiable inferred objects are
of a different kind.
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'perceived* elements alone. Even in 'Our Knowledge of the External 
World' wherein he proposes to construct matter out of 'hard data' 
(i.e. perceived data) alone, he in fact includes sense-data of 
other people and unperceived 'sensibilia' which are for us only- 
inferred entities. Indeed, the meaning of Russell's use of the 
maxim can be given by saying: ^Wherever possible, substitute 
constructions out of verifiable entities for inferences to non-
verif iable entities" ---  using 'verifiable' and 'non-verifiable'
in Russell's sense as explained above.
We should not, however, suppose that the inferred non- 
verifiable entities are alone constructs, or that the materials 
for constructions are all non-inferred. Russell obviously does 
not mean this. He in fact uses constructions for phenomena that 
are directly known to us. Our actual experiences such as percep­
tion, memory, etc., are neither inferred nor non-verifiable, but 
according to Russell they are constructions. Moreover, the parti­
culars out of which constructions are made are not all non­
inferred; unperceived particulars are the obvious examples.
It follows that neither 'inferred-ness' nor 'non- 
verif iable-ness ' is by itself the distinguishing characteristic 
of the construct. Some constructs, for example perception, memory, 
etc., are non-inferred and also verifiable; whereas some constructs, 
for example mind, matter, etc., are inferred and non-verifiable.
The 'inferred non-verifiable' entities are constructs; but all 
constructs are not so. Thus we do not get here the distinguishing 
mark of the constructs.
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vie have, therefore, to turn to Russell's second suggestion 
According to it, a construct is something which is a complex. 
Whatever is analysable into elements and their relations is a 
complex and is therefore a construct; and whatever is not so 
analysable is a simple and thus is not a construct. Thus the real 
distinction between the constructs and the non-constructs is that 
between the simples and the complexes composed of simples. From 
the standpoint of neutra], monism this distinction is important; 
the neutral particulars are the simples that form the ultimate 
stuff of the world, and both mind and matter are complexes composed 
of the simple particulars.
The uses of constructions in Russell's philosophy are 
various; numbers, points and instants are some of the early ex­
amples of them. His construction of matter and mind with which we 
are mainly concerned may be considered from various epistemological 
and metaphysical points of view. As we are not primarily concerned 
with the epistemological uses of his constructions, we shall not 
dwell on them at length. We shall only give a brief statement of 
the epistemological problem and then pass on to the metaphysical 
use of constructions, particularly with reference to neutral 
monism»
The epistemological problem may be stated as follows. We 
have beliefs about our immediate experiences and beliefs about 
what common-sense and science call physical objects, matter 
and mind* The former beliefs are certain
1, See above, p.73; c*f. E. Nagel's article in The Philosophy
of Bertrand Russell, pp.340 ff*
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because they are self-evident* But the latter beliefs are all 
inferred and are about unverifiable entities. Question arises 
as to how we are justified in entertaining beliefs about such 
entities. The evidence necessary for such beliefs cannot, 
according to Russell's analysis, be provided by our fragmentary 
experiences. At this point the use of constructions becomes 
significant, for it makes such evidence unnecessary. The 
analysis of these entities as constructions out of particulars 
some of which are actually experienced and the remaining of which 
are legitimately inferred from them as being similar to and 
continuous with them, offers an interpretation of the beliefs 
in question in terms of justifiable beliefs. It shows how we 
can entertain the beliefs about these entities without assuming 
non-verifiable substances.
We express our beliefs in statements or propositions* So 
the epistemological problem may be stated in terms of the state­
ments of our beliefs. The problem is to find an interpretation 
of the statements of the beliefs about non-verifiable entities 
like matter and mind in terms of the statements of beliefs about 
verifiable entities. By showing that non-verifiable inferred 
entities are constructions out of verifiable entities, Russell 
offers a method of interpretation of the statements of the be­
liefs about the former objects* Thus in apparently establishing 
the truth of the statements about complexes we are in fact 
establishing the truth of the statements about the classes of
particulars that constitute these objects, or about the structures 
composed of simple particulars*
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The extent of the success of Russell's constructions in 
solving the epistemological problem has sometimes been doubted»
For example, his contention that the statements about complexes 
are equivalent to the statements about their constituents has 
been questioned. It has been said that the suggested trans­
lation or analysis of a statement about a complex into those 
about the constituents and their relations is not possible, 
because symbols such as 'table* and 'I* are indispensable,^ or
because the translation would introduce serious complications in
2
the structure of science, or because the collection of simpler 
statements into which the original complex statement is analysed 
do not give the whole meaning of the original and therefore are 
not equivalent to it
Russell seems to think that the difficulties are of a 
practical nature due to lack of sufficient knowledge and the 
lengthy elaborate process of analysis that may be required for 
translating a given complex proposition» He thinks that, given 
sufficient time and knowledge, all the facts asserted by the use 
of complex symbols such as 'Whale' or 'England* could be asserted 
without the use of these symbols» He says, "No logician imagines 
that such a language would have practical utility» He is only 
concerned to say that it is possible, and that its possibility
if
is due to the nature of world-structure."
1. M. Black, in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p.250.
2» E. Nagel, Ibid, p.548.
5. J.O. TJrmson, Philosophical Analysis, pp. 150 ff. Russell's
reply may be seen in My Philosophical Development, pp. 225-5.
4. My Philosophical Development, pp. 224-5*
157
Now, the difficulty of the supposed translation does not 
seem to be only that of the lack of sufficient knowledge and 
time. Of course, if the question of enumerating the constit­
uents of a complex is involved, there is, then, one form of 
constructionism in which it might be an endless process* In 
the phenomenalist form of constructionism which Russell shares 
in his early theory wherein he constructs things out of their 
appearances, this would be the case; for the appearances of a 
thing could be anywhere and everywhere and present themselves 
under an infinite variety of conditions, and as such would be 
infinite in number^ or at least of such an indefinite number as 
we would never be sure to have completely enumerated them. But 
this does not affect his later theory in which, as we shall see, 
he constructs things out of the events that are at the place of 
the thing and therefore limited in number.
It is not, however, the number of the constituents of a 
given complex that alone is in question. There is the objection 
that any list of statements about the constituents could only 
give us the means of referring to some particular occasion of 
the use of such a sentence as "The battalion is on a night exer­
cise" or "This table is brown". And on each occasion the trans­
lation would be different with the result that the meaning of the 
sentence was different on each occasion. But it seems that such
sentences are quite significant without reference to any specific
2
occasion of their use. To this the simple reply that in the
1. R.J. Hirst, The Problems of Perception, p. 83.
2. Cf. G.J. Warnock, 'Empirical Propositions and Hypothetical 
Statements', Mind, 1951» pp. 90-94.
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the world there are only specific cases seems insufficient, 
because it leaves the generality of the use or meaning of such 
sentences unexplained. Perhaps the general meaning of such a 
sentence is to be found in the 'respects* in which the particular 
cases resemble one another; there must be some similar constit­
uents related in some similar ways. Perhaps the statements about 
the similar constituents and relations would give a translation 
of the general meaning of the sentence. But then it is not 
clear how these similarities are to be mentioned when no specific 
case is being considered. We do not seem to have any definite 
logical and philological rules that might help us here; and 
short of these it is not clear how this is possible.^
Some philosophers think that constructionism or logical 
analysis is in the main true, although the supposed translation
is not possible. Carnap at a later stage came to take such a 
2
position, and Urmson seems to maintain such a view in his book 
referred to above* Russell's final position is peculiar. He 
thinks that the assertion that something is a logical construction 
such that it is not anything new over and above the constituents 
and the assertion that the statements about the constituents are 
not equivalent to the statement about the complex are incompatible.^
1. There are similar difficulties about translating sentences 
like "There is a car in the garage" or "There is a dog in 
the garden". Of. R.J. Hirst, op. cit., p. 85.
2. Preface to the Second Edition of The Logical Structure of 
the World, P. VIII.
3 . My Philosophical Development, p. 22$.
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But this has to be taken with a grain (in fact, a big pinch)
of salt. For, in 'Human Knowledge' he maintains a view
according to which many complexes are such that the statements
about them cannot be reduced to the statements about their
constituents. These are what he calls the 'complexes of
compresence'. He says that when several things or qualities
are compresent, they form a complex of compresence. (Events
or particulars, point-instants, I-now, X-then, the total states
of mind or person, physical particles or minimal pieces of matter
are all complexes of compresence.) He says that a complex of
compresence, though defined when all its constituents are given,
"is not to be conceived, like a class, as a mere logical
construction", but as something which can be known and named
without our having to know eüLl its constituents. In the case
of a purely logical construction, a statement about the complex
can be reduced to one about its components. But a complex of
compresence can "be mentioned in a way which is not reducible
2
to a statement about any or all of its constituents". A complete 
complex of compresence is a "single complex whole, defined when 
its constituents are given, but itself a unit, not a class.
That is to say, it is something which exists, not merely because 
its constituents exist, but because, in virtue of being com­
present, they constitute a single structure. One such structure, 
when composed of mental constituents, may be called a 'total
1. Op. cit., pp. 315-2 5.
2. Human Knowledge, p. 325*
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momentary experience*."^ Such a complex is "something new"
2
over and above the constituents; and what is new in it is 
the "single structure" that is produced by the constituents and 
their relations. We may say that it is not just an aggregate 
but an * organised whole* which can be treated as a unit.
Thus, Russell finally recognises two kinds of constructs 
or complexes, viz. complexes that are purely logical constructions 
(logical fictions as he sometimes called them) such as classes, 
and complexes of compresence that are not merely logical con­
structions but are also something new, each being an organised 
whole and possessing a single structure composed of its 
constituents. The statements about the former are reducible to 
the statements about their constituents; but the statements 
about the latter are not so reducible. We have generally 
indicated the sort of difficulties connected with the concept of 
the supposed translation. Throughout Russell's later theories 
of complete neutralism, the emphasis is on the complexes of 
compresence; and as he finally admits the non-reducibility of the 
statements about them and as we are mainly concerned with some 
of the complexes of this type, the question of the translation 
should not detain us any longer.
What Russell seems to have achieved by his epistemolo­
gical use of constructions is that he has made it explicit that 
our ordinary beliefs about matter and mind involve inferences to
1. Human Knowledge, p. 315*
2. Ibid. p. 325; see above, p. 103*
I6l
unknown and unverifiable 'substances', that these inferences are 
unnecessary, and that it is possible to entertain beliefs about 
matter and mind without assuming some unknown permanent entities 
the ground for the inference to which cannot be discovered.
The epistemological use of constructions does not require 
any consideration of the metaphysical status of either the 
particulars or the constructs. In this sense Russell is not 
required to say whether or not entities like matter and mind 
exist. But in metaphysics, such a non-committal procedure is 
not possible. He therefore gives to the particulars the meta­
physical status of being the ultimate neutral stuff of the world, 
and then shows that matter and mind are constructs out of them.
The sole purpose of constructions as applied to his neutral 
monism is to snow that matter and mind are not simple permanent 
substances but are complex structures composed of simple elements, 
that both are composed of the same neutral stuff, and that there 
is therefore no dualism between them. It is this use of 
constructions which primarily concerns us, and we shall therefore 
consider the constructions mainly from this point of view*
Now, in the specific case of the construction of the physical 
world Russell has the two-fold problem: epistemological and meta­
physical* Epistemologically, it is the question of justifying 
inferred beliefs in the existence of common-sense permanent 
material objects and the beliefs comprising physical sciences.
One essential part of justifying scientific beliefs is what he 
calls the interpretation of sciences, especially physics, —  a
162
problem that has considerably absorbed his attention, particular­
ly in his later works. Russell says that the interpretation of 
physics is important, if physics is to be taken as an empirical 
science. The laws of physics are generally believed to be true 
and the evidence for them are empirical. All empirical evidence 
ultimately consists of perceptions and therefore "the world of 
physics must be, in some sense, continuous with the world of our 
perceptions".^ But perception gives us knowledge of the immed­
iate data of sense alone such as patches of colour, sounds, 
tastes, etc., with certain spatio-temporal relations. But "the 
supposed contents of the physical world are prima facie very 
different from these: molecules have no colour, atoms make no
noise, electrons have no taste, and corpuscles do not even smell 
Thus there is a "gulf between physics and perception".^ If this 
is to be bridged over, physics must be so interpreted as to show 
that the objects of physics have some correlations with perception
4and are verifiable through their correlations. Russell says:
'The evidence for the truth of physics is that perceptions 
occur as the laws of physics would lead us to expect ....
••• But physics never says anything about perceptions ...
... The passage from what physics asserts to the expected 
perception is left vague and casual ..... We must therefore 
find an interpretation of physics which gives a due place 
to perceptions; if not, we have no right to appeal to 
empirical evidence.'
1. The Analysis of Matter, p. 6.
2. Mysticism and Logic, p. 143. 3* The Analysis of Matter, p.8,
4# Mysticism and Logic, p. 143; Human Knowledge, pp. 213 ff#
3. The Analysis of Matter, p. 7»
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Thus the question of the interpretation of physics is the 
same as that of the relation of physics and perception* Russell's 
construction of physical objects out of percepts and other 
entities inferred from them as being similar to and continuous 
with them is supposed to serve the purpose of correlating 
physics with perception.
The problem of the relation of physics and perception has a 
metaphysical side also* The question here is: What are the
ultimate existants in terms of which physics is true? Are 
percepts or their correlates among these ultimate existents?
Here comes the question of absorbing the world of physics and the 
world of perception into one another. As Russell says "It be­
longs to this part of our subject to enquire whether there is 
anything in the known world that is not part of the metaphysically 
primitive material of physics."^
In his reply to criticism, Russell clearly expresses his 
attitude towards the metaphysical and the epistemological problems 
of the relation of physics and perception, and the statements he 
makes are relevant to the consideration of his neutral monism©
He says:
'I wish to distinguish sharply between ontology and epis- 
temology. In ontology I start by accepting the truth of 
physics; in epistemology I ask myself: Given the truth
of physics, what can be meant by an organism having "know­
ledge", and what knowledge can it have?'
1. The Analysis of Matter, p© 10*
2. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p. 700©
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His justification for accepting the truth of physics is 
"merely a commonsense basis". The common man supposes that 
physics has a much better chance of being true than has this or 
that philosophy. "To set up a philosophy against physics is 
rash; philosophers who have done so have always ended in 
disaster."^ Russell has elsewhere expressed the same attitude 
as regards the acceptance of the truth of physics. It is just 
for common-sense reasons that we cannot afford to ignore physics; 
we have to accept it "on pain of death",^
Thus in ontology Russell's problem is not that of the 
justification of physics; this belongs to epistemology. The 
ontological problem is that of showing that the world of physics 
and the world of perception consist of the same kind of "meta­
physically primitive" existents, —  showing that the traditional 
separation "between physics and psychology, mind and matter, is 
not metaphysically defensible".^ The two are brought together 
"not by subordinating either to the other, but by displaying each
as a logical structure composed of what ..... we shall call
I I
'neutral stuff." This is the metaphysical use of constructions 
with which we are mainly concerned. In what follows we shall 
consider Russell's constructions accordingly.
1. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p. 700
2. My Philosophical Development, p. 17*
3. The Analysis of Matter, p. 10.
4. Ibid., p. 10.
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2. Material Objects as Classes of Appearances
Russell, in his theory of 'partial neutralism' as advocated
in 'The Analysis of Mind',^ accepts sensations and unperceived
'aspects' as the constituents of the physical world. He calls
them appearances. The theory of matter as maintained in this
book is the one which had appeared in 'Our knowledge of the 
2
External. World ' and two articles which later on formed Chapters 
VII and VIII in 'Mysticism and L o g i c O n e  important change 
that is now effected is the abolition of the distinction of 
sensation and sense-datum; they are now identical and can be 
used interchangeably. Another point of difference is that where­
as in the earlier works the account of matter was put forward 
tentatively as a "hypothetical construction" which was to fulfil
certain functions but did not necessarily claim to be true, it
A
is now advanced as a theory claiming truth. With these 
differences in mind we can, following Russell's practices, refer 
to all these sources in presenting his account of material 
objects and matter as classes of perceived and unperceived 
appearances. We have seen how Russell classifies particulars 
into two groups, one forming a 'perceptive' and the other a 
'momentary thing'. We shall now consider these in some detail.
1. Op. cit., Chapters V, VII and XV.
2. Op. cit., Chapters III and IV.
3. A critical exposition of the theory is to be found in 
C. Fritz, op. cit.. Chapter IV, Part I.
4. W.T. Stace, op. cit., p. 355 footnote.
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The appearances that constitute the physical world are our 
own sensations, the sensations of other people and unperceived 
appearances or 'sensibilia'* These momentary particulars in 
their various correlations form the material objects or 'things' 
of common-sense and the 'matter' of physics* To understand these 
correlations, the most natural way is to begin with our own 
sensations and their correlations, and then to add up to them other 
particulars. Each individual possesses at any given moment 
various sensations of different things of his environment, 
obtained from his visual, tactual, auditory and other senses.
His perceptual experience of the moment consists of a set of 
sensations giving him a momentary view of the world; and his 
life-long experiences would consist of sOLl the views or sets of 
sensations he has ever had.
Now, the sensations of one sense form a 'world' peculiar to 
that sense with spatisuL relations determined by these sensations* 
Thus the sensations of sight are given as spatial in eight-space, 
the sensations of touch as spatial in tactual space, and so on for 
the other senses. The one inclusive space of the individual's 
perceptual experiences is a construction from the 'spaces' of the 
different senses made by variously correlating the sensations of 
one sense with those of others. This construction makes it 
possible for him to say that the object he is seeing is at the 
same place as the one he is touching, and so on. Bussell 
maintains that this correlation is learned in our early childhood.^
le Our Knowledge of the External World, second ed., p* 118;
Mysticism and Logic, p.159; The Analysis of Matter, p.252.
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The momentary set of sensations of an individual is the 
view of the world that he has at one moment; this Russell calls 
a 'private world'. The private world of an individual at any 
moment is a perspective; and this is called a 'perceived per­
spective'. He defines the perspective to which a given sensation 
belongs "as the set of particulars that are simultaneous with this 
sensation"^, where 'simultaneous* is to be understood "as a
direct simple relation, not the derivative constructed relation 
2
of physics". He intends to avoid in this definition any refer­
ence to a perceiving subject, and thereby to include unperceived 
perspectives also. "Thus a 'private world' is a perceived 
'perspective' but there may be any number of unperceived per­
spectives."^ A perceived perspective is a momentary set of 
sensations of an individual; at different moments he has differ­
ent sets of sensations, which can be said to form a series of 
sets of sensations. The complete series of such sets of sen­
sations that the individual has ever had in his life, is what 
forms his 'biography'. But just as there are perspectives which 
are not perceived, so also there may be biographies which are not 
lived by anyone. Thus the biography to which a given particular 
belongs is defined as "the sum-total of all the particulars that 
are (directly) either simultaneous with or before or after a
1. The Analysis of Mind, p. 128.
2* Mysticism and Logic, p. l4l.
3# Our Knowledge of the External World, second ed., p. 95*
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given particular".^ A biography that is not lived by any one
2
is called an "official" biography.
The private world of which one can be certain is only one's 
own. But Russell accepts the beliefs that there are other 
people having their private worlds and that there are unperceived 
perspectives. We have seen his arguments for accepting the 
percepts of other people and unperceived particulars. Now, two 
perspectives, whether of the same individual at different places 
or of different individuals, are never exactly a^ike, but are 
very often similar,, Thus an individual will have different 
perspectives with the continual change of his bodily state or 
position. Moving around an object he will have a sequence of 
perspectives containing changing sensations or appearances of the 
object. He can correlate the changing appearances of the object 
into a series. Admitting the testimony of other people, we find 
that they also have sequence of perspectives containing similar 
appearances of the object. It becomes thus possible to correlate 
the similar 'aspects* of different perspectives, our own and also 
those of other people; to these we may add the unperceived 
aspects belonging to unperceived perspectives. It is the estab­
lishment of such correlations between similar perspectives that 
gives us a basis upon which we can define material objects as 
classes of correlated appearances. Thus Russell says:
'By the similarity of neighbouring perspectives, many 
objects in the one can be correlated with objects in
1. Mysticism and Logic, p. l4l; The Analysis of Mind, p. 128,
2. Mysticism and Logic, p. l4l.
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the other, namely with the similar objects. Given an 
object in one perspective, form the system of all the 
objects correlated with it in all the perspectives; that 
system may be identified with the momentary common-sense 
"thing". Thus an aspect of a "thing" is a member of the 
system of aspects which is the "thing" at that moment.'
The 'thing' so explained has, according to Russell, the merit
of being neutral as between different points of view, and of being
observable to more than one person in the sense that each observes
2
one of its aspects. According to this view, a piece of matter 
or a physical thing is not a single existing thing but a system 
of existing things. When a number of people simultaneously see 
a table, they all see something different. 'The' table is to be 
neutral as between different observers. Therefore, common-sense 
mistakenly supposes that there exists a 'real' table as the common 
cause of all the appearances which 'the table' is said to present 
to different observers. But Russell thinks (at this stage) that 
"the notion of 'cause' is not so reliable as to allow us to infer 
the existence of something that, by its very nature, can never be 
o b s e r v e d " H e  therefore suggests that instead of looking for a 
common unknown cause of the sensations of various observers, we can 
secure the desired neutrality by the equal representation of all 
'parties', that is, by taking the whole set of these sensations 
together with the unperceived appearances correlated with them as 
actually being the table. In other words, the table which is 
neutral as between different observers and different points of 
view, is the set of all those particulars which would naturally
1. Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 96.
2. Ibid., pp. 96-7; The Analysis of Mind, pp. 97-8* 
3* Ibid., p. 97.
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be called aspects or appearances of the table from different points
„ . 1 of view.
A 'momentary thing* is thus the set of all particulars,
perceived and unperceived, which may be defined as appearances of
the thing at one moment. We can now define "the successive
states of one thing" as "the series of momentary things" correlated
according to laws governing changes of aspects from one time to a
slightly later time, "Thus the momentary thing is a set of
particulars, while a thing (which may be identified with the whole
history of the thing) is a series of such sets of particulars.
The particulars in one set are collected together by the laws of
perspective; the successive sets are collected together by the
2
laws of dynamics»"
Here we find the answer to a question that naturally arises 
in connection with the above account of material objects. The 
thing is identified with a class of correlated appearances; there 
is no single permanent substance as the common cause of these 
appearances. The question is: On what basis can we collect this
class of appearances without employing the notion of a permanent 
substance? Why do we distinguish one series of appearances as 
being the 'thing* rather than some other series of appearances? 
Things are continuous series of similar appearances. From this, 
it might be supposed that similarity and continuity were the sole 
grounds upon which aspects were arranged into groups. But Russell 
does not think that these are sufficient grounds. Similarity is
1. The Analysis of Mind, p. 98.
2. Ibid., p. 126.
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not a sufficient condition; for two similar things would pre­
sent similar appearances, and we should be able to distinguish 
them. Continuity, again, is neither a necessary nor a sufficient 
condition.^ It is not a necessary condition because it is 
largely hypothetical; we do not observe any one thing continu­
ously* It is not a sufficient condition, because in some cases 
there is sensible continuity between appearances of separate 
objects; for example, there is sensible continuity between drops 
of water in the sea; but we should be able to define 'drops' and 
distinguish a current within water. It is therefore necessary 
that a class of appearances to be defined as a 'thing' should, 
besides being similar and continuous, conform to laws. Thus a 
momentary thing is a set of particulars collected together by the 
laws of perspective;^ and the series of momentary things which 
constitute one 'permanent' thing are collected together by the 
laws of dynamics.^ Thus series of appearances belonging to one 
'thing' behave, with regard to the laws of physics, "in a way in 
which series not belonging to one thing would in general not 
behave. If it is to be unambiguous whether two appearances belong 
to the same thing or not, there must be only one way of grouping
appearances so that the resulting things obey the laws of 
/|
physics." Russell thus lays down this definition: "Things are
1. Mysticism and Logic, pp. 170-1; Our knowledge of the
External World, p. Il4.
2. The Analysis of Mind, pp. 125-6.
5# Ibid#, pp. 125-6; Mysticism and Logic, p. 172.
4. Ibid., pp. 172-3; Our Knowledge of the External World, p.115#
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those series of aspects which obey the laws of physics."^
We have seen that an individual's percepts determine their 
own space, and that his private space is constructed from the 
correlations between the 'spaces' of his different senses. Each 
perspective, perceived or unperceived, has its private space, and 
Russell constructs the all-embracing public, physical or perspect­
ive space by correlating the private spaces of perspectives. He
2
places material objects in this public space. This may be illus­
trated with a penny which appears in many perspectives. The penny 
will appear in one perspective as larger than in another perspect­
ive, in some perspectives as round and in others as elliptical, in 
some perspectives in one colour and in others in another colour, 
and so on. We can arrange in a straight line the perspectives 
in which the penny looks round according to the varying sizes of 
the appearances. We thus form a continuous series of these 
perspectives, and can imaginatively prolong the line indefinitely# 
Similarly we can form another straight line consisting of the 
perspectives containing elliptical appearances of the penny, and 
6 0 on for other kinds of appearances of it. These straight lines 
will meet at a certain place in the perspective space. It is 
this place of intersection of these lines which is "defined as 
the place (in perspective space) where the penny is"#^
1. Our Knowledge of the External World, pp. 115-6;
Mysticism and Logic, p. 173*
2. Ibid#, pp. 162 ff; Our Knowledge of the External World pp.98 ff,
3 . Ibid., p. 98; Mysticism and Logic, p. 162;
The Analysis of Matter, p. 208«
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Now, every particular is at once a member of two groups,
namely the group making a thing to which it belongs and the
group making a perspective to which it belongs. Accordingly,
two places in perspective space are associated with every
particular, namely the place in perspective space where the thing
is and the place in perspective space where the perspective is.^
Russell calls these two places the 'active* and the 'passive*
places respectively, using them as mere names without implying
2
any idea of activity at all.
The perspectives containing a large appearance of a thing 
are 'nearer* the thing than those containing a small appearance. 
But there is a limit to the closeness we can get to any object, 
"because so far as experience goes, the penny ceases to present 
any appearance after we have come so near to it that it touches 
the e y e " A t  the place in perspective space which is defined 
to be the place of the thing, there may not be any appearance 
of the thing; it is the centre about which the appearances are 
arranged into a group, the whole group being the thing of common- 
sense. As Russell says, "As a rule .... the centre «•••. 
contains no member of the group, not even an ideal member: 'the
eye sees not itself*. A group, that is to say, is hollow; when 
we get sufficiently near to its centre it ceases to have members."
1. Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 100; Mysticism and 
Logic, pp. 162-3; The Analysis of Mind, p. 130,
2. Ibid., p. 1 30.
3 . Our Knowledge of the External World, p. 98.
4» The Analysis of Matter, pp. 211-2. Of. also C. Fritz, op.
cit., pp. 130-1 ; A.O. Lovejoy, op. cit., pp. 243-5.
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The 'physical thing' of common-sense is defined as the 
class of its appearances that fall into a group about a centre 
which is defined to be the place of the thing. Russell thinks 
that this can hardly be taken as the definition of 'matter' of 
physics. The appearances of a thing from different places 
change partly according to laws of perspective and partly accord­
ing to the nature of the intervening medium. We should be able 
to express the fact of the influence of the medium as also of the 
'matter* of the thing on the appearances in question. It is 
therefore desirable to construct 'things' and 'matter' differently, 
The difference, however, is not one of procedure, but that of the 
appearances which are included in the construction. The 'thing* 
consists of all its appearances from every point of view at 
varying distances and through all sorts of media. But the 'mat­
ter' of the thing is to be constructed out of those appearances 
only which are not at a great distance from the thing and which 
are not seriously affected by the intervening medium. Thus in 
'Mysticism and Logic* Russell offers the following tentative 
definition:
'The matter of a given thing is the limit of its ^
appearances as their distance from the thing diminishes#'
Russell feels that this definition is not quite satisfactory
but that it suggests the right direction in which to look. In
2
'The Analysis of Mind* , he defines 'matter* in terms of the
1. Mysticism and Logic, p. 165.
2. Op. cit., pp. 106-7 .
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’’regular appearances” which are not affected by the inter­
vening medium at all. If we construct hypothetical systems 
of appearances of an object approaching nearer and nearer to it, 
we shall finally ’’approach to a limiting set, and this limiting 
set will be that system of appearances which the object would 
present if the laws of perspective alone were operative and the 
medium exercised no distorting effect” .^  This limiting set which 
is an ’’ideal system of regular appearances” is defined, for 
purposes of physics, to be the ’matter' of the thing; 'matter*
in this sense is only a "logical fiction, invented because it
2
gives a convenient way of stating causal laws”.
We have seen that Bussell distinguishes between ’active’ and 
’passive’ places of an appearance. The material object is a 
group of appearances collected about the same active place; and 
a perspective (as well as a biography) is a collection of appear­
ances at the same passive place. Now, as the place of a thing 
(in this sense an active place) can also be the place of a 
biography (in this sense a passive place), the result is that 
there is a "dualism of body and biography in regard to everything 
in the universe’’*^ But this, Russell points out, does not imply 
a mind-body dualism; for this is present not only in the case of 
living beings but also in the case of non-living things. Thus 
’’the photographic plate has its biography as well as its ’matter’*
1* The Analysis of Mind, p* 10?.
2# Ibid., pp. 107, 300.
3. Ibid., p. 129.
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But this biography is an affair of physics, and has none of the 
peculiar characteristics by which ’mental' phenomena are dis­
tinguished, with the sole exception of subjectivity*"^ The 
biography and the body (or material object) are thus two dis­
tinct groups at one and the same place such that no member of 
the one is a member of the other. Strictly speaking, the former 
is a group of appearances collected "passively" 'at' the place in 
question, whereas the latter is a group collected "actively" 
'about' the same place. Thus the 'biographical particulars’ in 
the photographic plate are not among the stuff of the plate as 
a material thing.
Now, in the theory as presented above, Russell calls 
material things logical constructions. By this he does not, 
however, deny that there are things such as chairs and tables. 
What he means is that they are not simple single permanent things 
but are complex structures composed of 'simple' particulars or 
appearances. The significance of Russell's account of the 
physical world lies not in denying the existence of physical 
objects, but in defining the sense of such expressions as 
'material objects', 'things’, etc*, and in showing that physical 
objects as complexes are composed of elements that are constit­
uents of mental phenomena as well.
It may have been noticed that, in presenting Russell's 
theory of material objects, I have avoided such expressions as 
"the external world", "external objects", and "external things".
1. The Analysis of Mind, p. 131®
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For, the epithet "external" as found in these expressions is not 
consistent with Russell's neutral monism. "External" and "inter­
nal" have the old metaphysical implication of a dualism of matter 
and mind with their spatial separation such that "internal" is 
supposed to apply to the mental world and "external" to the 
physical world. But in a theory of neutral monism, it is this
dualism which is rejected; and if Russell's theory is correct, 
the physical world cannot be said to be external to mind; on the 
contrary, in so far as material objects and mind are composed of 
the same neutral stuff, they overlap. There is, I understand, a 
sense in which 'things' are external to our body, and also a sense 
in which a material object may remain external to any mind in so 
far as it may not be perceived by anyone;^ but neither the former 
nor the latter is implied when the physical world and physical 
objects are traditionally called 'external'. Traditionally, the 
physical world as a whole is said to be external to mind; and 
neutral monism is incompatible with this idea* It will, there­
fore, be a mistake to call Russell's theory the "construction of 
the external world". Charles Fritz seems to have failed to 
notice this important point about Russell's position; the very 
title of his book on the subject is thus misleading. I suspect 
that he took up that title from that of Russell's pre-neutralistic 
work 'Our Knowledge of the External World'; but his discussions 
are not confined to the theory of this book, they include most of 
Russell's later views which are all neutral monistic. But it is
Russell sometimes uses the word 'external' in these senses.
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worth noticing that the appellation in question cannot be given 
to the material world as conceived in Russell's neutral monism.
In evaluating the above theory of matter we should consider 
how far it fulfils the purposes it is supposed to serve. One 
important motive is the abolition of dualism* Another is to 
construct material objects out of 'verifiables' only in order to 
show that there is no unknown and unknowable permanent entity cal­
led 'material substance' or 'thing-in-itself'• A third motive is 
to solve the problem arising out of 'the relativity of sensations'*^ 
Besides, there are those epistemological purposes which we mention­
ed in the preceding section, wherein I stated whatever comments I 
had to make in regard to them.
The problem of the relativity of sensations is an epistemo­
logical one which we have not so far considered, but which must 
be solved in a theory of physical objects* The problem may be 
stated as follows: When several people simultaneously see an
object, they all are supposed to see the same thing* But the
appearances they see are not the same* To one person the object
may look round, to another elliptical; to one it may look red, to
another green* The common-sense view that they all see the same 
identical thing entails that the red thing is at the same place as 
the green one, that the round thing is at the same place as the 
elliptical one* But this is impossible; for red and green, 
round and elliptical, are mutually exclusive* This is the 
puzzle which Russell's theory is supposed to solve*
1 * These three objectives are mentioned by W.T. Stace in his
article in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, pp* 363 ff(
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Now, there is, as Stace points out,^ only one possible 
principle for solving this problem, namely to suppose that the 
appearances with opposed qualities do not exist at the same 
place. Berkeley adopted this principle in so far as he thought 
that the aspects with opposed qualities exist only as sensations 
in different minds; as there are different private spaces in 
different minds (which are not, however, in space), the red 
aspect is in the private space of one mind while the green aspect 
is in the private space of another mind, and so on. For Russell 
also, the different aspects are not at the same place; they are 
spread out through space^; there is no appearance at the centre 
which is defined to be the place of the thing. Thus the red 
circular aspect one person sees is at the place where he is or 
rather his head or brain is, and the elliptical green aspect is 
at the place where another person's head is. But Russell's 
solution of the problem should not be supposed to rest only on 
the principle of the variation of characteristics of appearances 
according to the spatial position of the percipient; this alone 
would not explain such differences as are experienced by two 
persons who may take the same position at successive moments and 
see an object as red and green respectively. This principle, 
therefore, has to be taken in conjunction with the principle of
1. W.T. Stace, op. cit., p. 372.
2, Russell seems to have accepted this idea from T.P. Nunn;
cf. the letter's article 'Are Secondary Qualities Independent 
of Perception?', Proceedings of Aristotelian Society,
N.S.X (1909-1 0), pp. 191 ff.
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the subjectivity of sensations. We have seen that according to 
Russell all qualities are subjective and that he adopts the 
generative theory of realism in respect of all qualities of 
appearances. Thus these two principles together solve success­
fully the problem arising out of the relativity of sensations.
As to the success of the above theory in constructing 
material objects out of 'verifiables' only, the question must 
depend on what is meant by 'verifiables'. We have seen that 
Russell uses the term 'verifiable' in a wide sense to include 
not only what we ourselves or even human beings generally 
experience but also such particulars as can be inferred from 
what we experience in accordance with the recognised canons of 
scientific method.^ Accordingly, his theory may be said to 
fulfil the purpose of constructing material objects out of 
verifiables only. But many thinkers would perhaps object to 
treating unperceived particulars as verifiables, for they might 
like to restrict the use of the term to such entities as* are 
actually experienced by us. . In that case, the question is 
whether we are entitled to accept entities which are not veri­
fiables in this strict sense. If we are not, it would obviously 
be impossible to get out of 'scepticism of the moment', a position 
which few philosophers have in fact entertained. Science and 
common-sense do assert entities beyond what is actually experienced, 
so also do most philosophers. Russell does the same thing.
In what his position differs from that of many others is that he
1. See above, pp. 136-7»
l8l
refuses to assert entities which are unlike anything conceivably 
experienced by us. Thus, material objects of common-sense and 
•matter’ of science are entities the like of which we never 
experience, and can therefore be asserted only on risky grounds. 
But the particulars accepted by Russell on the basis of continuity 
and resemblance (and supported by the laws of physics) are never 
completely unlike what we experience. Accordingly the inference 
to such particulars is perhaps better grounded than the inference 
to material objects. Russell's constructions, therefore, seem 
more reasonable than the assumption of the permanent material 
substance.
Thus, it seems reasonable to admit particulars other than 
those we actually experience. Whether we should call them 
'verifiables' is a matter depending on how we define 'verifiables', 
There seems nothing objectionable in accepting Russell's use of 
the term in an extended sense to include such particulars as can 
be inferred in accordance with scientific methods. This wider 
notion of 'verifiables' allows for degrees of verifiability and, 
therefore, degrees of certainty that we can attain in respect of 
our beliefs; and the concept of degrees of reasonableless or 
certainty in matters of rational beliefs seems to deserve a place 
in our philosophies.
The assertion of the existence of unperceived particulars
and their inclusion in the construction of material objects are
very important in Russell's theory of matter. Without them his
position would not have differed significantly from that of 
Berkeley; for in that case, material objects would consist, for
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him as for Berkeley, only of actual sensations* But the inade­
quacy of Berkeley's position is what Russell intends to avoid*
He therefore accepts them as real constituents of the physical 
world.
The abolition of the psycho-physical dualism is the most
important objective of the theory under consideration. But it
is here where the theory fails most. The unperceived appearances
which Russell admits as part of the stuff of the physical world,
are now regarded by him as "purely physical"; they are not
neutral* This is one reason why this theory is only partially
neutral; and this makes it impossible to abolish psycho-physical
dualism* In so far as there are "occurrences that do not form
part of any experience" and are therefore "purely physical",^ it
is clear that there is dualism* The most that Russell may be
said to have done is that he has shown material objects to consist,
partly at least, of sensations which constitute mental phenomena
as well* If this is found successful, he has then considerably,
but not wholly, bridged over the gulf between mind and matter.
But this would not mean abolition of dualism, and as such it is
reasonable to doubt the validity of calling this theory 'neutral
monism'* Stace says that it is difficult to see how Russell can
2
have "one foot in the dualist camp and the other in the monist"*
It may however be possible in a philosophy to combine some neutral
1 * We said earlier (pp. 144—3) that Russell could perhaps avoid 
this and regard 'sensibilia' as neutral even on the basis of 
his early criterion* But in fact he did not; and hence the 
dualism in this theory of matter*
2. W.T. Stace, op. cit*, p* 564*
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elements with some dualistic .ones. But I do not think that such 
a philosophy could be properly called 'monism', I have therefore 
called Russell's metaphysics of this stage 'partial neutralism' 
rather than 'partial neutral monism'.
The failure to abolish psycho-physical dualism is, of course, 
the main objection to Russell's theory of this stage. But the 
theory also involves some other difficulties. One of them 
concerns the statement that there is a dualism of body and bio­
graphy in regard to everything in the world. The photographic 
plate, for example, has a body and a biography; but according 
to Russell's definition of material objects, the biographical 
elements are not among the stuff of the plate as a physical thing. 
This biography is a physical affair and belongs to the plate.
And yet the plate as a thing cannot, and does not , possess as its 
constituents the particulars of its biography. These seem to be 
contradictory statements. If the plate has a body and a bio­
graphy, it consists of both; both are physical; therefore the 
plate as a physical thing should be defined as the whole class of 
particulars composing the body and the biography. But Russell 
seems to identify the thing as being the one, and not the other. 
This, of course, accords with his refusal to admit any constituents 
of the thing at the centre which is the place of the thing; and 
the biographical elements are all at the centre and are not there­
fore constituents of the thing. Yet the biography is of the 
thing, though it is not a part of it. This is an inconsistency; 
it is difficult to see how a thing can have a body and a biography,
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and at the same time be wholly the one and not the other also.
Similar inconsistency is to be noticed in respect of 
Russell's use of the notion of cause* He says that this notion 
is not very reliable and that we cannot suppose a 'table' as the 
common cause of the table-appearances perceived by various obser­
vers* The table-appearances are not caused by any 'table'. Yet 
he says, "The appearance of a star at a certain place, if it is 
regular, does not require any cause or explanation beyond the 
existence of the star ... a regular appearance is due to the 
star alone ..
The concept of the "hollow centre" defined as the place of
2
a thing offers another difficulty. We have seen that it raises 
questions as to how causal contact (e.g. the stimulation of sense- 
organs) is possible when there is no member of the group at the 
centre where the 'contact' is supposed to take place. We have 
then said that the centre as the limit of analysis could perhaps 
be taken as very small and that the appearances in its immediate 
neighbourhood could explain the causation in question. But this 
explanation is possible only on the basis of Russell's later 
theory and not on the basis of the theory now under consideration. 
In 'The Analysis of Mind' he suggests that the particulars 
sufficiently near the place of the thing can be taken as a causal 
unit9^ But difficulty arises from the assertion which seems
lo The Analysis of Mind, p. 134.
2. See above, p. 113*
3« Op. cit., p. 106.
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characteristic of the present position, namely that the centre of 
the group is not a point, "but a volume which may be as small as 
an electron or as large as a s t a r " N o w ,  if the whole area 
which is the place of our brain or of a house is hollow, even its 
nearest appearances will be at quite a distance from most parts 
of the place, and any causal contact at these parts would be 
rather implausible and would involve 'action at a distance'*
Thus there is an oddity about the concept of the 'hollow centre'; 
and although oddity and implausibility are not logical objections, 
they are good reasons for doubting the truth of a theory.
These difficulties may be said to be due to the very concept 
of analysis of physical things in terms of appearances. Appear­
ances of a thing are ordinarily regarded as being different from 
the thing, 'Appearance' usually implies something appearing to
some one. Russell, of course, warns us against this. For him, 
there is nothing of which a particular is an appearance; appear­
ances are the only 'realities' that are there in the world. But 
I suspect that he has not been able to get rid of the ordinary 
implications of the word 'appearance'. The idea that an appear­
ance of a thing is not and cannot be at the place of the thing is
1. This statement occurs in 'The Analysis of Matter' (p. 217); 
but it refers more characteristically to the position we are 
now considering. In this book as also in subsequent works, 
this assertion is later modified, and the construction of 
physical objects in the above form is supplemented by the 
construction of electrons or the 'minimum material units', 
which may be taken as pushing the centre to its minimum.
In fact, in his later theories Russell abandons the concept 
of the 'hollow centre', which is, however, a characteristic 
of the theory now under consideration. (cf. p. l95 below).
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a characteristic consequence of the ordinary concept that an
appearance of a thing is different from the thing* In asserting
the consequence Russell is, in fact, assuming the premise itself.
That the idea of the common-sense thing is at work at the back
of his mind is to be noticed in many of his statements. He says,
for example, that "the penny ceases to present any appearance
after we have come so near to it that it touches the e y e " H e r e
'near to it', 'it touches the eye', etc*, are expressions that
indicate how Russell is using the common-sense notion of things*
We have already said that he uses such expression as "appearances
due to the star" and so on# It is not necessary to cite many
more examples of his uses of similar expressions* We need only
to notice that in his exposition of the theory he has not been
able to dispense with common-sense notions altogether. This has
2
been emphasised by many commentators and hardly needs elaborations.
Indeed, Russell's theory of matter at this stage has not been 
fully satisfactory* We have pointed out several difficulties 
involved in it. Russell himself has realised some of these 
defects and has accordingly revised his account of material 
objects and matter. It is this revised theory which we shall 
now proceed to consider.
See above, p. 173*
2. E.g., A*0. Lovejoy, op* cit., pp. 235 ff; C . Fritz, 
op. cit., p. 1 6 3.
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3* Material Objects as Structures of Events
The account of material objects and matter that Russell pro­
duces in 'The Analysis of Matter' and the later works is designed 
to give a more adequate view of the world than the earlier account 
provided. His construction now includes, not only what he 
formerly called perceived and unperceived appearances, but also 
further unperceived events. All particulars, perceived and 
unperceived, are called events, and all events are regarded to 
be of the same kind; they are all now neutral particulars* Accord* 
ingly, his theory takes the form of 'complete neutral monism'.
The procedure of construction in the revised theory is 
basically the same as in the earlier theory* The new theory is 
to be viewed as a modification, rather modifications, of the old 
one. In order, therefore, to understand this new position, it 
is only necessary to notice the developments that are made from 
the earlier position* The modifications are not, however, made 
all at once. Although most of them are effected in 'The Analysis 
of Matter', some are introduced in 'An Outline of Philosophy'.
We should rather say that the theory of matter produced in this 
former work undergoes a further major change in the latter work.
It is the theory of the latter work that has been adopted and 
advocated in all subsequent works of Russell* It is therefore 
possible to maintain that the theory in 'The Analysis of Matter' 
is an intermediate link between the earlier theory discussed 
above and the final theory developed in the later works*
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In 'The Analysis of Matter', as also in his later works, 
Russell, in the first place, calls all particulars 'events' and 
does not make much use of the earlier term 'appearance'. This 
makes it possible for him to avoid the difficulties connected 
with the word 'appearance'. Moreover, 'event' as a term can be 
used with a wider denotation to include particulars that cannot 
all be called appearances. Images cannot possibly be called 
appearances, and so also perhaps such particulars that are now 
regarded as unperceivable causal particulars. But they can all 
be called events; and in fact the whole world, for Russell, is 
now a complicated system of events correlated according to causal 
laws.
Secondly, one of the most fundamental points of departure 
from the earlier position is that Russell now accepts the causal 
theory of perception. Previously he did not consider the notion 
of 'cause' as at all reliable to guarantee inferences to unper­
ceived entities. He now accepts and uses the causal theory of 
perception as the main ground for inferring the existence of 
unperceived events. We have noted his reasons for accepting this 
theory*^ At a later stage he expresses his conviction as to the 
legitimacy of the theory in the following words:
'I have been surprised to find the causal theory of 
perception treated as something that could be questioned.
I can well understand Hume's questioning of causality in 
general, but if causality in general is admitted, I do not 
see on what^grounds perception should be excepted from 
its scope.'
1. See above, pp. 100-1.
2. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p. 702.
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The acceptance of the causal theory of perception leads 
Russell to assert, not only unperceived 'sensibilia', but also
unperceivaHe events,^ the inclusion of which forms a third point
of difference. The reason for employing these additional events
arises from his desire for a more adequate metaphysical theory
than the previous one; these events, he thinks, provide a view
of the world that more nearly accords with common-sense and
attains a sort of completeness which the earlier theory could
not achieve. He had already admitted unperceived particulars,
namely the percepts of other people and unperceived appearances.
He now says, "If we have once admitted unperceived events, there
is no very obvious reason for picking and choosing among the
events which physics leads us to infer.
The acceptance of the causal theory does not, however, 
require the existence of a permanent material substance. The 
material object is still a construction; only that it now includes 
more events than those previously used. The physical thing is now 
a group of events, including our own percepts, percepts of other 
people, and unperceived events (some of which are unperceivable) 
that are causally continuous with percepts. Even 'images', and 
in fact all "mental states",^ are now included among the stuff of 
the physical world (i.e. of the brain), --- a fourth point which
1. See above, pp. 135-6.
2. The Analysis of Matter, p.323; An Outline of Philosophy,
p . 302.
3. This phrase as used by Russell needs clarification. See 
below, p. 1 9 4.
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makes the new theory fundamentally different from the earlier
one, a point which, as emphasised more and more in Russell's
later works, marks the beginning of the development of modern
'Identity Hypothesis*.^
We have said that the procedure of construction in the
new theory is basically the same as in the earlier theory. But
this needs a little modification. In the earlier theory Russell
constructed two groups of particulars, namely the material
thing and the biography (or series of perspectives); he then kept
them separate, though inconsistently. The material object did not
then include biographical elements. But in the new theory he
combines the two and constructs the physical object as the
totality of the two groups. In 'The Analysis of Matter' he does
this in two steps. He first gives a construction of the physical 
2
object as consisting of our percepts, the percepts of others, and 
unperceived events. Up to this point, his construction is very 
much the same as the earlier one with the sole difference that he 
now includes unperceivable events. This group of events occur as 
arranged about a centre which is hollow and "as small as an 
electron or as large as a s t a r " H e  then proceeds to give a
4
construction of matter, more properly of electrons and protons 
composing physical objects. This latter construction is so 
infused into the former that the physical thing becomes a com­
bination of the two. That Russell intends this infusion is
1. See below, pp.
2. The Analysis of Matter, Chapter XX.
3. Ibid., p.217. 4. Ibid., pp. 319 ff.
191
evident from the fact that having given the construction of 
electrons he immediately returns^ to the views suggested in the 
former construction with a view to completing the account of 
material objects and matter.
Russell thinks that "we must find some reality for the
electron, or else the physical world will run through our fingers
2
like a jelly-fish. But he does not think electrons to be part 
of the ultimate stuff of the physical world; they are real in 
the sense that they are groups of events. He explains this by
way of constructing the electrons of our brain. We do not,
Russell s a y s k n o w  much about the contents of any part of the 
world except our own heads; our knowledge of other parts is only 
abstract. But we know our percepts, thoughts and feelings more 
intimately; and these are in our brain. He says:
'What is in the brain by the time the physiologist examines
it if it is dead, I do not profess to know; but while its 
owner was alive, part, at least, of the contents of his 
brain consisted of his percepts, thoughts, and feelings. 
Since his brain also consisted of electrons, we are compel­
led to conclude that an electron is a grouping of events, 
and that, if the electron is in a human brain, some of the 
events composing it are likely to be some of the "mental 
states" of the man to whom the brain belongs. Or, at any 
rate, they are likely to be parts of such "mental states"
  This, I think, is the most concrete statement that can
be made about 
is more or
)u electrons; everything else that can be said 
less abstract and mathematical*'
1. The Analysis of Matter, p. 322.
2. Ibid., p. 319. Russell intends the construction of electrons
to be that of protons also.
3. Ibid., pp. 319-20.
4. Ibid., p. 320.
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Russell thus concludes that "an electron at an instant is a
grouping of events ....  Obviously it includes all the events
that happen where the electron i s " T h e  size of the electron,
whether finite or infinite, is not important; but "it will save
2
circumlocution to speak of the electron as a point". The term 
'point* or 'point-instant' is defined as a minimal place in space­
time occupied by a group of events having two properties, namely 
that "any two members of the group are compresent", and that "no 
event outside the group is compresent with every member of the 
group"'Corapresence' is another name for 'overlapping' of
events in space-time; any two events are said to have the relat­
if
ion of compresence when they "overlap in space-time".
An electron is thus a complex of events. This has to be 
combined with the view of physical objects according to which 
"events occur, usually, in groups arranged about centres. These 
centres may be taken to be the places where there is matter. ...
... The centre is 'where the piece of matter is' ..... But as to
what are the actual events at the centre, we know nothing except 
what follows from the fact that our percepts and 'mental states' 
are among the events which constitute the matter of our brain."^ 
Several results follow from the above account of matter.
1. The Analysis of Matter, pp. 520-1.
2. Ibid., p. 521.
5 . Ibid., p. 295? An Outline of Philosophy, pp. 288-9.
4. Ibid., p. 294.
5 . Ibid., p. 522.
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The centre, "where the piece of matter is", is not in fact empty.^ 
It contains the matter of the thing; the matter consists of 
electrons and protons, but electrons and protons are only groups 
of events. As each electron or proton is a point, the centre 
where the thing is consists of a complicated system of events; 
in fact it contains as many points or centres, and groups, as 
there are electrons and protons in it. Accordingly a physical 
thing or piece of matter, for example a table, is a very complex 
system consisting of our percepts, the percepts of others, and the 
unperceived events including a ’central system' of events.
Now, this central system consists, partly at l^ast, of
such events which in the earlier theory were regarded as the
2
biographical elements*. This follows from the fact that our 
percepts and 'mental states* constitute part of the stuff of our 
brain. Formerly my percept of a table was a member of the group 
making the table and a member of the biography at the place of 
my brain; my brain was not composed of my percepts, but of its 
appearances. But now my percepts are among the stuff of my brain; 
the brain now consists of all the events which formerly formed 
two separate groups, body and biography. This is true of all 
physical things, only that we do not know what the central events 
are except in the case of our own brain.
Not only our percepts but also our thoughts and feelings, in 
fact all mental states are constituents of the matter of the
1. This settles the difficulty connected with the earlier con­
cept of a hollow centre. See above, pp. 113-4,
2. See above, pp. 175-6, I83*
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brain.^ Thoughts and feelings and other ’mental states' are not, 
however, simple elements. In this sense, these expressions are 
misleading; we should not suppose them to be among the ultimate 
constituents of the brain. All mental states including thoughts 
and feelings are, according to Russell, complexes of percepts 
and images in their various correlations. Accordingly, we must 
interpret Russell as maintaining that the brain is composed of 
percepts and images, besides other events. This brings out a 
difference of the present theory from the earlier one in which 
images were not constituents of matter; but now they are. Images 
are now constituents of both mind and matter, whereas previously 
they belonged to the former only.
Nov;, this is a consequence of the present theory, which is
sometimes overlooked but which needs emphasising. The view that
images constitute part of the stuff of both mind and matter is
adopted in Russell's subsequent works as well. This is one of
those points of difference, the recognition of which would properly
direct the attention of the critics more to the later views than
to those of 'The Analysis of Mind*• This is one of our reasons
2
for saying earlier that Quinton's rejection of Russell's neutral 
monism is not very proper. One of Quinton's arguments concerns 
the point that images in Russell's theory are constituents of mind 
alone. This is correct as regards his earlier position; but this
1. This is the basic thesis of 'identity hypothesis'; 
see below, pp. 296 ff.
2. A. Quinton, 'Mind and Matter', in Brain and Mind (J.R. 
Smythies ed.) pp. 216-7*
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does not even touch the position that is being explained here.
If Quinton is to reject Russell's neutral monism, he has to re­
pudiate this later position. In another argument Quinton 
suggests that according to most theories of neutral monism, 
"experiences are not literally parts of physical o b j e c t s " I t  
is not clear what he means by 'literally parts of; but as against 
Russell's present position this seems quite inapplicable. 
'Experiences' in this quotation are taken as part of the ultimate 
stuff of the world. For Russell percepts and images make all 
'experiences'; and if our analysis is correct, these, then, 
are as much constituents of matter as they are constituents of 
mind. Quinton's arguments therefore fail to refute Russell's 
position as explained above.
We may now come to another consequence of the present 
account of matter, which concerns our percepts. In the earlier 
theory, a percept is a constituent of a mind and of a physical 
object. In the new theory, it enters at once into the constitu­
tion of three different complexes, namely a mind and two physical 
things, —  a point which often passed unnoticed, but which is a 
peculiarity of the theory of 'The Analysis of Matter'. Thus, my 
percept of a table, for example, besides being among the stuff of 
my mind, is a constituent of the table and a constituent of my 
brain. This three-fold role as assigned to our percepts leads to 
two very important results; one concerns the relation of mind
1. A. Quinton, 'Mind and Matter', in Brain and Mind 
(J.R. Smythies ed.), p. 2l6.
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and matter, and the other the relation of our brain and other 
physical things.
The first result is this. In 'The Analysis of Mind*, the 
two ways of classifying appearances into matter and perspective 
(or biography) formed a fundamental basis for distinguishing 
matter and mind, physics and psychology. The perspective (with 
additions) at the place of a human brain was a mind. This 
particular perspective was constituted by all the sensations or 
percepts obtained by the percipient at one moment; it was a 
group 'passively' collected at the 'passive' place of the per­
cepts, whereas a piece of matter was a group 'actively' collected 
about the 'active' place of percepts and similar appearances.^
In the present theory, the percepts form both mind and brain 
(i.e. matter); and they do so as collections at the same 
'passive' place. It follows that the distinction of 'passive' 
and 'active' places with the corresponding classification of 
events at and about them does no more form a basis for disting­
uishing mind and matter. However, Russell still thinks that the 
difference of mind and matter is a difference of arrangements of 
events, but it is not a difference of arrangements about two
different places, but a contextual difference relating to two
2
different causal laws.
The second result which follows from the three-fold role of
1. See above, pp. 173, 175-6.
2. An Outline of Philosophy, p. 300; Portraits from Memory, 
p. 1 3 2; see below, pp.
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percepts is rather puzzling. My percept of the table is at once 
a constituent of the table and of my brain. Thus a 'part' 
(constituent) of my brain is a 'part' (constituent) of the table, 
and 'vice versa'; and this is true of each of my percepts. But 
this is not the usual conception of physical things; neither 
common-sense, nor science, regards a part of my brain to be a part 
of a table. It sounds absurd to say that as I eat a meat-pie I 
also eat a part of my brain, or that in burning the rubbish heap 
in my garden I actually burn a part of ray brain too. This also 
opposes the much emphasised assertion of Russell's that the table 
as a physical thing is outside the physical thing 'brain'; but 
the inconsistency follows naturally from his inclusion of the same 
percept in the constructions of both the table and the brain#
Russell perhaps comes to realise this difficulty. In 'An 
Outline of Philosophy', he abandons the three-fold role of our 
percepts and thereby effects a major modification of the theory 
we have discussed above. In this work, he no more regards our 
percepts as part of the stuff of the physical objects such as 
tables and chairs; the only physical thing of which they are 
constituents is our brain. He comes to emphasise more and more 
the construction of what we have described as the 'central system' 
in the above analysis of physical things; and he recognises this 
'central system' as being the physical object and thus brings his 
theory of matter closer to common-sense. Our percepts as well 
as 'mental states' constitute our brain and not the things out­
side our body; percepts thus come to have a two-fold role in the
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final version of Russell's neutral monism; they are constituents 
of mind and of the brain. Thus he says,
'I take it that, when we have a percept, just what we per­
ceive ..... is an event occupying part of the region which, 
for physics, is occupied by the brain. In fact, perception 
gives us the most concrete knowledge we possess as to the 
stuff of the physical world, but what we perceive is part 
of the stuff of our brains, not part of the stuff of tables 
and chairs, sun, moon, and stars. Suppose we are looking 
at a leaf, and we see a green patch. This patch is not 
"out there" where the leaf is, but is an event occupying a 
certain volume in our brains during the time that we see 
the leaf. Seeing the leaf consists of the existence, in 
the region occupied by the brain, of a green patch causally 
connected with the leaf  .... '1
'Where the philosopher's child at the Zoo says "There is a 
hippopotamus over there", the philosopher should reply:
"There is a coloured pattern of a certain shape, which may 
perhaps be connected with a system of external causes of the 
sort called a hippopotamus"•*2
The leaf or the hippopotamus is a system of events at the 
region where the physicists place the thing. Our percepts of the 
thing belong to a wider system of events that emanate from the 
place of the thing; but they do not constitute the thing, they 
are causally connected with the other events of the system includ­
ing a "central system" of events which is the thing, the "common 
%
causal ancestor" of the whole complex system of events.
Russell adopts this modified theory in all his later works.
if
In 'Human Knowledge' he recognises that there are common objective 
'things' or groups of events which are the common origin of the
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p. 292*
2. Ibid., p. 291.
5. Human Knowledge, p. 483.
4. Ibid., pp. 480 ff.
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percepts of various observers. One illustration is the case of 
several people and several motion picture cameras watching the same 
performance of a play. These observers describe similar percepts, 
and the earnera-records are also found similar to each other and 
the percepts. In such a case, "When a group of complex events 
in more or less the same neighbourhood and ranged about a central 
event all have a common structure, ...... they have a common
causal ancestor ...... In the case of a physical object seen
simultaneously by a number of people or photographed simultaneous­
ly by a number of cameras, the central original event is the 
state of that physical object at the time when the light rays 
which make it visible left i t T h e  "central original event" 
is a complex event and therefore a system or structure of minimal 
events; and this is the momentary thing*
Our percepts, then, are not constituents of any physical
objects other than our brains. In 'Portraits from Memory' as also
later on Russell maintains the same view. Thus, "What we see when
we see chairs and tables and the sun and the moon and so on ,•...«
are not either the whole or part of the physical objects that we
2
think we are seeing." Our percepts are constituents of our 
minds and brains; other physical things are composed of events 
which form the original causal ancestry of our percepts.
Thus the world as conceived by Russell in this modified 
theory of his later works is a complex system of events. The
1. Human Knowledge, p. 483.
2. Portraits from Memory, p. 150.
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events form themselves into different groups; they fall into
various causal series or chains that are called "causal lines"
In 'Human Knowledge', a causal line is defined as "a temporal
series of events so related that, given some of them, something
can be inferred about the others whatever may be happening else- 
2
where". A causal line may always be regarded as the persistence 
of something, a person, a table, a photon or what not.^ There 
are two specially important kinds of chains of events, namely 
"those which constitute the history of a given piece of matter"
if
and "those which connect an object with the perception of it".
The sun, for example, has its history or biography consisting of 
all that happen in the part of space-time that it occupies;
"this biography may be said to be the sun".^ The other causal 
chain consists of events radiating from the sun and terminating 
in our perception of the sun. Not only do we have causal lines 
from a centre to our own percepts, but also a number of similar 
causal lines proceeding from the same centre to different 
observers and other places. Thus various observers have 
similar perceptions of the same object which is independent of 
such perceptions. It is this notion which provides a public 
objective world of common reference.
1. The Analysis of Matter, ch. XXX, pp. 313 ff; Human 
Knowledge, pp. 333-4, 476-7*
2. Human Knowledge, p. 477#
3* Ibid., p. 477#
4. Ibid., p. 341#
3# Ibid., p« 341#
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The events out of which the physical world is constructed 
are, Russell points out, very different from matter as tradition­
ally conceived. Matter is traditionally expected to be impene­
trable and indestructible. But events are neither. Matter as 
constructed in this theory is impenetrable as merely a tautological 
result of the way in which it is defined.^ The matter in a place 
is all the events that are there, and consequently no other event 
or piece of matter can be there. Indestructibility is an 
empirical property, and is believed to be approximately but not
exactly possessed by matter; and there is no known reason why
2
matter should be indestructible*
The view of the world as thus finally produced by Russell 
more nearly accords with common-sense and science than his 
earlier view. It is a more believable world which provides the 
publicity and independence of the physical objects. The theory 
also offers a probable explanation of the nature of the relation 
between perception and physical objects. Russell does not 
dogmatically assert that it is the only possible view of the 
world that accords with science; he accepts the view he has 
produced on grounds of greater consistency, simplicity and 
believability. He thinks that there might be alternative views 
which would be equally probable, but he does not see what these 
alternatives could be *
1. The Analysis of Matter, p. 385; An Outline of Philosophy, 
p. 291; Human Knowledge, p* 297»
2* The Analysis of Matter, pp. 386-7; An Outline of Philosophy,
p. 290; Human Knowledge, pp. 3^7, 4-76-7*
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Now, throughout his 'eventism* Russell maintains the causal 
theory of perception* In the latest version of the theory, 
physical objects are the remote causes of our perceptions; we do 
not perceive the events making these objects* What we perceive
are our own percepts which are in our brains* The events that
make things outside the brain are only known indirectly as 
inferences from our percepts* All that we know about them is 
their structural similarity to our percepts and not their intrinsic 
nature. Epistemologically, this constitutes a return to the 
position of 'The Problems of Philosophy' in which Russell had 
maintained a sort of representative theory which he subsequently 
abandoned. The difference is that in that early work physical 
objects were simple permanent things, but now they are complex 
structures of momentary events, —  permanence is not now a
characteristic of the stuff of the world, it is "only approximate,
1 2 not absolute"; there is only a sort of 'quasi-permanence'
belonging not to single events but to series of events correlated
in certain ways*
The causal theory of perception, we have said, offers Russell 
a better ground for the inference to unperceived events than mere 
continuity* But this causal theory is itself an inference which 
needs justification. We have seen that Russell accepts it on 
more or less 'pragmatic' considerations* But these considerations
1 * An Outline of Philosophy, p. 290*
2. Human Knowledge, pp. 475-6, 506-7*
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cannot be taken as sufficient for establishing the theory.^ More­
over, Russell very often appeals to physical causal laws and utilises 
them in both his earlier and later constructions which are again 
supposed to justify our beliefs in physics. But if he is to avoid 
circularity and if the laws of physics are to serve as grounds for 
inferences involved in his constructions, he has to obtain them 
independently of the constructions. In his writings he has always 
assumed that in general laws of physics are true and that there 
must be some principles of scientific inference which would justify 
them. He has asserted that unperceived events that are inferred in 
accordance with the canons of scientific methods are *verifiables* « 
But it is necessary to formulate and establish these canons#
Russell realises this, and consequently employs himself in 'Human 
Knowledge' to the task of formulating the fundamental principles of 
scientific inference that he thinks will be sufficient to guarantee 
the truth of science and to justify those inferences which result in 
what he maintains is the picture of the world that science gives us. 
These principles are called the 'Postulates of Scientific 
Inference',
2
Russell formulates five postulates , namely (I) the 
postulate of quasi-permanence, (II) the postulate of separable 
causal lines, (ill) the postulate of spatio-temporal continuity
1. A.J, Ayer objects to the causal theory of perception as he 
thinks that it is an hypothesis without any valid evidence and 
that it is an illegitimate extension of the concept of causal­
ity beyond the field of its significant application. Cf#
The Foundations of Empirical Knowledge, pp. 220-1. For 
Russell's reply to similar criticism, see The Philosophy of 
Bertrand Russell, p. 702; see above, p* 189#
2. Human Knowledge, pp. 506 ff; My Philosophical Development, 
pp. 190 ff#
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in causal lines, (IV) the structural postulate, and (V) the postu­
late of analogy. He feels that it may be possible to reduce their 
number by further investigations, and accordingly they all may 
not be necessary to validate scientific methods* But he believes 
that they are sufficient*^
The postulate of quasi-permanence states; "Given any event A, 
it happens very frequently that, at any neighbouring time, there is 
at some neighbouring place an event very similar to it #"^ The 
chief use of this postulate is to preserve, and to account for, the
relative permanence of things and persons without assuming the
common-sense notion of substance* This can be done if we do not
suppose that any event is permanent in the strict sense of the
word, but instead speak of quasi-permanence among events* We 
should not suppose that a thing, for example a table, is composed 
of some events which all persist throughout its history, but that 
the events composing it at one moment are not the same but very 
similar to those composing it at a shortly earlier or later moment * 
Thus the table is a series of events; it has no absolute permanence, 
but only quasi-permanence*
But similarity alone would not be enough to identify a 
thing* We should be able to distinguish two similar things*
Russell therefore introduces the notion of separate independent 
'causal lines*; and his second postulate relates to them* Accord­
ing to it, "It is frequently possible to form a series of events
1. Human Knowledge, p* 513»
2. Ibid*, p* 506*
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such that, from one or two members of the series, something can 
be inferred as to all the other members*"^
Causal lines or chains of events are continuous* Russell 
denies 'action at a distance'* Events will not influence each 
other if they are completely separate in space and time; when 
there is a causal connection between two events which are not 
continuous, there must be intermediate links in the causal chain 
such that each is contiguous to the next* The third postulate, 
namely the postulate of spatio-temporal continuity^, is concerned 
to deny 'action at a distance*. This enables us to believe that 
physical objects exist when unperceived, and that between our 
recollections of an occurrence there is something in the brain 
which exists at the intervening times and makes causal lines contin­
uous* A great many of our inierences to unperceived events, 
according to Russell, depend upon this postulate*
The fourth postulate, namely the structural postulate 
is concerned with our belief in common objective things or common 
origin of the percepts of various observers* We have seen that 
Russell accepts such common objects; and the structural postulate 
is supposed to valiaate their acceptance. The postulate of analogy, 
the fifth postulate, relates to our inferences to events in other 
minds* We do not perceive the percepts and images of other people.
1 * Human Knowledge, p. 5 08*
2* Ibid., pp. 509-10#
3* Ibido, pp. 510-1 .
4. Ibid*, pp. 511-3 .
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but infer them on analogical grounds. The postulate of analogy
formulates the principle of this inierence, and is supposed to
justify this inierence.
These postulates collectively ere intended to provide "the
antecedent probabilities required to justify inductions",^ and thus
to justify inferences to unperceived events. But there is now the
question of the justification of the postulates themselves. Accord*
ing to Russell, they cannot be deduced from experience, nor can
2
they be definitely proved by us. Their justification is their 
great usefulness in validating the inferences from perception to 
the laws of science; their justification is that they enable us 
to form a view of the world which is confirmed, and never contra­
dicted, by our experience. The postulates are universal proposi­
tions of a sort that exp>erience alone cannot prove. But we most 
certainly need some universal propositions to validate science. 
"Either, therefore, we know something independently of experience 
or science is m o o n s h i n e R u s s e l l  says further:
*It is nonsense to pretend that science can be valid 
practically but not theoretically, for it is only valid 
practically if what it predicts happens, and if our canons 
(or some substitutes) are not valid, there is no reason 
to believe in scientific predictions.'4
Thus the postulates are not based on experience, but all 
their verifiable consequences are confirmed by experience.^
1. Human Knowledge, p. 506.
2. Ibid., p. 5 27.
3. Ibid., p. 5 2 4.
4. Ibid., p. 5 2 4.
5 . Ibid., p. 5 2 7.
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Sc, finally Russell admits that empiricism has its limits,^ that
if we are to avoid 'solipcism of the moment’ we have to accept some
such principles as the postulates or their substitutes in order to
arrive at a view of the world which is confirmed by experience.
Before leaving this chapter, we would like to refer back
to Russell's postulate of quasi-permanence which seems to admit
of alternative interpretations. A thing or a person at one
moment is composed of a group of events. The next moment the group
is replaced by another group of similar events, and so on at all
subsequent moments. Thus the history of the thing consists of the
series of groups of events.
This seems to suggest that the events of a momentary group
making the momentary state of the thing change or are replaced
"all at once" by a set of new but similar events. This would
perhaps accord with Russell's statement in 'The Analysis of Mind'
2
that a (permanent) thing is a series of momentary things. This 
may also be supposed to be implied in his explanation of continuity 
as given in 'The Analysis of Matter'^: He says there that events
can be arranged about centres; that given such a group at one time 
it is generally found that there are similar events arranged about
If
neighbouring centres at slightly earlier or later times; and that 
by taking the centre very small and by continually diminishing the 
time-like interval concerned, we get continuity in the limit when
1. Human Knowledge, pp. ff.
2. The Analysis of Mind, p. 125»
5» Op. cit., p. 522.
4. This is, in fact, what is later on asserted by the postulate
we are considering.
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the interval tends towards zero.
According to this interpretation a thing (i.e. a 
momentary thing) comes into existence at one moment and then 
completely goes out of existence at the next moment when another 
group of similar events, that is another momentary thing, comes 
into existence. The two groups are numerically different having 
no numerically common identical element between them. We identify 
them as the same thing or as the states of the same thing because 
of the similarity of the groups. This may be called a 'cinemato­
graphic' view of the world. But this is not the sort of continuity
that is usually supposed to characterise things and persons. 
Similarity alone cannot account for their relative permanence; 
this would not enable us to distinguish between two similar things 
that may occupy the same place at two successive moments. Russell 
realises this, and therefore introduces the concept of independent 
causal lines with the postulate concerning them. This postulate 
asserts 'self-determined' causal processes or chains of events.
Of the two kinds of causal c h a i n s t h e  one which relates to 
quasi-permanence of things and persons, does not seem to counter­
act the cinematographic view that between two successive momentary 
states of a thing or person there is nothing common except the 
similarity of the component events. Thus interpreted, Russell's 
theory of quasi-permanence would, among other things, fail 
entirely to account for our feeling of moment to moment continuity 
of our personal life.
1. See above, p. 200,
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But we need not suppose that this interpretation is necessary 
or that such a view of quasi-permanence is correct. It is possible 
to produce another interpretation of the concept of quasi-permanence 
of things and persons, which would equally avoid the notion of a 
permanent substance and yet would not make the states of a thing 
or person at two successive moments entirely different as being 
composed of numerically different events. This account of quasi­
permanence may be stated as follows.
Every event is momentary (i.e. of very brief duration) and 
is replaced by a new but similar event. But this need not be a 
necessary feature of that complex group of events (as a whole) 
which makes the momentary state of a thing or person. For it is 
possible that, while each event is replaced by a new event, the 
group as a whole is not completely replaced by a group of all new 
events. The events of a given group may not change 'all at once*, 
but differently such that any particular event belongs to two 
contiguous moments in the history of the thing# The thing at any 
two successive moments is not entirely different; the group of 
events at any particular moment is partially new in so far as some 
earlier events have now been replaced by new events (say, A B C  ...); 
but it is also partially 'old* in the sense that some events 
(say, X Y Z ...) which came into existence slightly before the new 
events ( A B C  ...) have not yet been replaced but are about to be 
replaced. When these * old * events (X Y Z ...) are then replaced, 
the former new ones ( A B C  ...) will not have yet been replaced 
but will be about to be replaced. Thus successive moments in the
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history of the thing may be roughly represented as the following, 
in which any two bracketed lines represent two contiguous moments
or states of the thing:
(I) Or, (II) A B C
X Y Z A B C
X Y Z
X Y Z A B C
A B C
4 1^ 4
^2 ^2 ^2 *1 *^1 *2 ®2 *^2
2 2 2
X2 Yg 4  %2 ^2 A, B, C,
3 3 5
and so on* and so on*
We need not sort out the events of the groups into two 
varieties only as shown in these lines; the varieties of the
slight difference in the time of change of events may in fact be
many# The main point is that the events composing a thing are all 
changing but in slightly different times, such that it would not 
be possible to isolate two contiguous states of a thing into two 
completely discrete groups#
This conception of a series of groups or structures of events 
retains all the important features of Russell's account of things 
and persons including their quasi-permanence, and yet does not 
require a cinematographic view of the world. This accords with, 
or rather follows from, Russell's statements that "every event is 
contemporaneous with events that are not contemporaneous with each 
o t h e r " t h a t  an event may overlap in time or be compresent with
1# An Outline of Philosophy, p. 288;
The Analysis of Matter, p# 292*
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events which do not overlap in time with each other,^ and that an
2
event is a member of many point-instants. Thus an event which is 
a constituent of a thing belongs to more than one instant in the 
history of the thing; and this may be true of all events composing 
a thing or person* Accordingly, between any two successive 
moments in the biography of a thing or person there will be events 
that are actually identical, and events that are only similar*
This account of quasi-permanence of things and persons does not 
involve complete separation of their momentary states which are 
thus shown to be overlapping. This view will, I hope, be seen to 
offer an explanation of our feeling of moment to moment continuity 
of our personal life.^
This view of quasi-permanence is not explicitly stated 
by Russell; his formulation of the postulate concerned does not by 
itself seem to result in this explanation. But it follows from his 
conception of overlapping events in time and overlapping points and 
instants (or point-instants) taken in conjunction with the 
postulate. This analysis of quasi-permanence does not involve any 
new ideas; but it follows from putting together several of 
Russell's ideas. It avoids the difficulties of the alternative 
interpretation stated above. I, therefore, suggest that this is 
a more appropriate explanation of quasi-permanence of things and 
persons. It is difficult to say if Russell intends it this way*
1. The Analysis of Matter, p. 315» An Outline of Philosophy, p.288; 
Human Knowledge, p. 348,
2. An Outline of Philosophy, p. 289; The Analysis of Matter, 
pp. 299» 302*
3. See below, pp*
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I think he does; but if not, I should offer this as a modification 
of his concept of quasi-permanence.
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CHAPTER V 
THE THEORY OF MIND
1• Rejection of the Dualistic Criteria of Mind
The theory of mind as produced in Russell's neutral monism, 
may be said to have a negative and a positive side. Negatively, 
it consists of an analysis and rejection of the Cartesian and 
non-Cartesian dualistic criteria of the distinction between mind 
and matter; positively,it consists of an explanation of mind 
and mental phenomena in terms of sensations and images, the 
neutral atomic constituents of mind. We shall consider the 
negative side of the theory in the present section and the positive 
side in the subsequent sections of this chapter.
Mind, according to Russell, is not a simple substance. 
Following William James, he rejects the notion of 'conscious­
ness ' as a specific entity containing or expressing itself as the 
'act' or 'subject' of consciousness. There are sensations (or 
percepts) and images, but not a 'consciousness' which is conscious 
of, among other things, sensations and images. Nor is conscious­
ness an essential characteristic of all mental phenomena. There 
is much in our mental life, that is to be taken as unconscious# 
There are such things as unconscious desires, motives, conflicts, 
etc. This is confirmed by comparative psychology, psycho-
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analysis and behaviourism. Consciousness in the sense of 
’awareness’ belongs to groups of sensations and images by virtue 
of their various correlations among themselves and with the 
organism.
In recent philosophical literature there are many
instructive discussions about various dualistic criteria of the
distinction of mind and matter. Herbert Feigl in his 'The Mental
and the Physicalhas produced a list of alternative ways of
distinguishing the mental and the physical, and has argued against
them. Besides the notion of 'consciousness' as a substance, he
considers eight Cartesian and non-Cartesian dualistic criteria of
the mental. These identify the mental with the intentional, the
subjective (private), the non-spatial, the mnemic, the purposive,
2
the qualitative, the holistic and the emergent. A. Quinton refers 
to this list and offers his arguments against these criteria.^
The arguments of these philosophers are indeed very useful in re­
jecting dualism and go a long way in favour of monistic philosophy. 
Now, Russell has been arguing against psycho-physical dualism . 
since a long time before these philosophers; and it is curious 
to notice that the criteria they mention have all figured in some 
form or other in Russell's discussions. In this sense, the argu­
ments of these philosophers may be viewed as in many respects 
extensions and elaborations of Russell's views. As the case
1. Op. cit., in Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science, 
vol. II, pp. 370 ff.
2. Ibid., pp. 396 ff.
3. A. Quinton, op. cit., pp. 204 ff.
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against the dualistic criteria of the mental has been elaborately- 
argued O'lt by these philosophers (and many others to whom they 
refer), it seems hardly necessary for us to reproduce Russell's 
arguments in detail * We shall therefore state his views here in 
bare outline and only to the extent that seems necessary for an 
understanding of his position.
A. Intentionality. It is a criterion which was much stressed
by Brentano and his followers. According to this point of view,
the most fundamental difference between the mental and the
physical is that the mental life consists of 'acts' directed upon
objects*^ We have seen that Russell's rejection of this principle
consists in rejecting the act-content-object scheme. The 'act*
(or subject) is not empirically discoverable and is logically
unnecessary. The relation of 'content' and 'object', again, "is
not ..... the simple direct essential thing that Brentano and
2
Meinong represent it as being". In sensation th^re is no such 
distinction; and in cases where it seems to be present, as in 
memory, it is a derivative relation involving belief which is 
again a complex phenomenon. In pure imagination there is only 
'content' without 'object' Thus, the reference of an 'act' to 
some object cannot be regarded as the essence of mental phenomena.
B. Subjectivity or Privacy. We have already considered the 
notions of 'subjectivity'and 'objectivity' as conceived by
1 « The Analysis of Mind, pp. l4 ff; H. Feigl, op. cit., p. 417»
2. The Analysis of Mind, p. l8«
3. Ibid., p. 19.
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Russell, particularly in connection with sensations or percepts
Subjectivity, according to him, is not a pwculiar characteristic
of the mental alone. It is present in every perspective
perceived or unperceived. Thus it is there in a photographic plate
as it is there in a mind. An event is in the private space of the
perspective of which it is a member. It may be similar to other
events in other perspectives, but it is also somewhat different
from those others. Thus subjectivity or privacy belongs to every
event, no matter whether it is a member of a mental or a physical
group. In this sense there is no fundamental difference between
the case of two men seeing the same table and "the case of two
thermometers immersed next to each other in the same glass of 
2
water." The sensation of each of the men is subjective or private, 
but so also what happens in each of the thermometers. Yet it makes 
good sense to say that the two persons see the 'same* table and 
that the two thermometers indicate and have the same temperature*
Thus subjectivity and objectivity inhere in each event*
Objectivity or publicity consists in the similarity, or 
rather semi-similarity, of events, which makes it possible to 
correlate them and thus infer them from one another. It is the 
degree of the correctness of the inference that determines the 
degree of the objectivity or publicity of the event*^ As Russell 
says, "there are different degrees of publicity attaching to
1. See above. Chapter III, Section 7*
2. H. Feigl, op. cit., p. 398.
3. The Analysis of Mind, pp. 118-9; The Analysis of Matter, 
pp. 222 ff; An Outline of Philosophy, pp. l60 ff;
See above, pp. 122-3*
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different sorts of sensations"*^ Sight and hearing are the most 
public of the senses, and the bodily sensations are the most pri­
vate sensations; while touch, smell, taste are intermediate 
between them in increasingly lower degree of publicity in this 
particular order. "As regards privacy, all images, of whatever 
sort, belong with the sensations which only give knowledge of our
own bodies *...• even the most private sensation has correlations
2
which would theoretically enable another observer to infer it"#
Thus the dentist does not feel my toothache, but he can infer it 
from seeing the cavity that causes it. As, in ultimate analysis, 
all our experiences consist of sensations and images, they can be 
inferred by other observers. It is this fact which, according to 
Russell, constitutes the objectivity or publicity of our experiences; 
and Feigl's conception of 'objective* or 'public' in the sense of 
"in-principle-intersubjectively-confirmable"^ is simply the 
Russellian principle as indicated above.
In this connection it is perhaps worth mentioning that there 
is a fundamental difference between Russell and the behaviourists 
as regards the question of 'introspection'. The behaviourists 
over-emphasise the publicity of experiences and thus "extrudes from 
science observations which are private to one observer". But for 
Russell, privacy and publicity are not mutually incompatible, and
1# The Analysis of Mind, p. Il8*
2. Ibid., pp. 118-9*
5. H. Feigl, op. cit., p. 599*
4. The Analysis of Mind, p. 119»
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therefore privacy "does not by itself make a datum unamenable to 
scientific treatment. On this point, the argument against intro­
spection must be rejected."^
In favour of introspection or self-observation, Russell 
has produced elaborate arguments as against the behaviourists, 
particularly J.B. Watson.^ We need not go into the details of 
these arguments. It will perhaps suffice to point out that for 
Russell introspection is a genuine source of knowledge. He argues 
that in one sense all our knowledge is based on introspection.
The facts of physics like those of psychology are obtained by what 
is really self-observâtion. All our percepts are in our heads; 
and in knowing them, we are knowing what is in us; their external 
causes are only inferred from them, and the inferences are sometimes 
mistaken»^ Russell, however, recognises that there is a difference 
in the degree of correlation of our knowledge with events outside 
our body. In some cases these correlations can be easily establish­
ed and are often testified by other observers; in others they are 
difficult. In the latter cases, other observers can only have
very indirect knowledge. Another man can see the hole in my tooth 
and can infer that I feel toothache, but "he still does not have the 
very same knowledge that I have". A man knows a great deal about 
himself which another man can know only indirectly. "This peculiar
1 « The Analysis of Mind, p. 119»
2. Ibid., pp. 108 ff; An Outline of Philosophy, Ch. XVI. .
3* An Outline of Philosophy, p. l80.
4. Ibid., p. 182. /
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knowledge is, in one sense, 'introspective* . . . Moreover, 
thinking, imagination, hallucination and dreams are facts about our 
life. In these cases, though there may be an external stimulus, 
there is not anything in the outside world correlated with them in 
the same way as in normal perception. Yet in all these cases, we 
clearly know what is happening in us. In this sense, self-obser­
vation or introspection "can and does give us knowledge which is no
2
part of physics." Introspection therefore makes important contri­
butions to the study of psychology, and there is a distinction between 
psychology and physics such that the former cannot be reduced to 
the latter.
Russell accepts introspection as a source of knowledge; but 
it is not infallible, it is often misleading "unless it is constantly 
checked and controlled by the test of external observation".^ It
2f
gives us direct knowledge about what is private to ourselves and 
can only be known by others through inference and testimony. But 
privacy and publicity are not mutually incompatible and cannot, 
therefore, be the basis of the dualistic distinction of mind and 
matter. In this sense, this criterion was rejected by the new 
realists especially by R.B. Perry^; it is rejected by Russell as 
also by the modern identity theorists.
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p. l82.
2. Ibid., p. 1 83.
3 . The Analysis of Mind, p. 48*
4. There is an argument in Stace's article (op. cit., pp. 38O-I) 
which seems to suggest that Russell does not accept intro­
spection. But what we have said above is enough to show that 
the suggestion is unacceptable.
5 . R.B. Perry, op. cit., pp. 286 ff.
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One thing should, however, be mentioned here. Although we 
cannot divide the world into two separate compartments as the 
private and the public and thereby erect an absolute barrier between 
mind and matter, there is nevertheless an important distinction.
What is private to oneself is known by oneself directly. When 
one feels a pain, others may have an indirect inferential knowledge 
of it, but they do not have the same knowledge as one has. But 
what is not private to anyone, i.e. the outside events, are known 
by one in the same manner as by others. This is a distinction 
which Russell finally recognises to be the ordinary source of our 
making the distinction between the mental and the physical. As 
this point needs further considerations, we may leave it for a 
later occasion.^
C. Non-spatial versus Spatial. The Cartesian distinction of
mind and matter as non-spatial and spatial has persisted throughout
centuries. Russell has opposed it and argued that all events
whether they are members of the mental or the physical group occupy
space and time, rather space-time, and that all our experiences
(sensations and images) are located in our body, more particularly
in our brain. This argument, we have seen, is connected with the
distinction of perceptual (psychological) space and physical space
and their relation to each other. Russell derives an argument from
2
the relativity of space and time. He says that it is usual to 
hold that 'mental' events are in time but not in space. But
1. See below, pp.273ff.
2. The Analysis of Matter, pp. 383-5
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according to the modern scientific theory of relativity, space and 
time are not as distinct and disparate as they were thought to be. 
Consequently, "it has become difficult to hold that mental events, 
though in time, are not in space*"^
The important point in this connection is the relation 
of the psychological space and the physical space* The mere recog­
nition of the two kinds of space would not amount to a rejection of 
dualism. For one may accept the spatiality of mental events and at 
the same time maintain that mental events are in psychological 
space and physical events are in physical space. This would be 
psycho-physical dualism, though not in Cartesian sense. Such a 
view, however, would have a difficulty similar to one of Cartesian 
dualism. One difficulty of Cartesian dualism is that it cannot 
explain the fact of interaction of mind and matter; it is difficult 
to conceive how something not in space can affect, and be affected 
by, something else which is in space. Spatiality of mental events 
is supposed to overcome this difficulty. But if the mental and the 
physical events are supposed to be in entirely two different 
'spaces' having no relation between them, the old difficulty 
returns. The question is as to how a mental event which is in the 
'mental' space can affect, and be affected by, a physical event 
which is in the physical space. The problem can only be solved if 
the two 'spaces' can be shown to be so related as to make 'inter­
action' possible* Russell's construction of physical space out of
1. The Analysis of Matter, p. 384,
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perceptual spaces (i.e. the private spaces of perspectives) offers 
a solution of the difficulty and makes it possible to maintain 
that all events including our experiences (percepts and images) are 
not only in private or perceptual spaces but also in the one 
physical space.
D . The 'Mnemic *. As regards the question of the 'mnemic' as a 
criterion of the mental, I should better begin by quoting Feigl, 
for it seems to me that he definitely misunderstands Russell. He 
says:
'The mnemic as a criterion of mind was stressed especially 
by Bertrand Russell. But long before him, the physiologist 
Ewald Hering (and his disciple Semon) considered the mnemic 
as a general property of all organic matter. Even in inor­
ganic matter there are more or less permanent modifications 
of dispositional properties which can be effected by various 
influences.
From the last sentence in this passage it would appear as 
if Feigl is stating something new which was not noticed by anybody 
before him. This is not true; nor is it true that Russell 
accepts the 'mnemic' as an absolute criterion which distinguishes 
the mental from the physical or even some forms of organic matter 
from some others. We have already seen^ how Russell's views have 
undergone changes in respect of 'mnemic* causation. But in one 
respect his position has remained constant. Though he accepts the 
'mnemic' as a characteristic which "broadly" distinguishes the 
behaviour of living organism from dead matter, he never takes it 
as an "absolute" criterion of mind alone or of organism alone *
1. H. Feigl, op. cit., p. 413.
2. See above, pp. 129-31®
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Thus in 'The Analysis of M i n d w h e r e i n  he emphasises this 
characteristic most, he says:
'The characteristic is not wholly confined to living 
organisms. For example, magnetized steel^ looks just 
like steel which has not been magnetized, but its 
behaviour is in some ways different.'
He expresses the same view in his later works with much 
emphasis, and says that the 'mnemic' cannot be taken as a ground 
for erecting an "absolute barrier between mind and matter",^ be­
cause it is present in all living bodies as also in some forms of 
inanimate matter. Thus Feigl is wrong in suggesting that Russell 
accepts the 'mnemic' as an absolute criterion of the mental alone 
and faxls to recognise its presence in all organic matter and also 
in some forms of inorganic matter. But while this is said, we 
should also notice that Russell emphasises the prominent degree in 
which the characteristic is present in living organisms as against 
the rudimentary form in which it is present in dead matter. In
this sense the distinction of mind and matter is a difference of 
k
degree, and the difference is enormous but not absolute. Conse­
quently, Russell makes use of 'mnemic' phenomena in his explanation 
of mental phenomena, such as habit, learning, memory, etc. As the 
latter, according to Russell, are mainly 'mnemic' developments and 
as the 'mnemic' characteristic is prominently present in all living 
organisms, in various degrees, he gives a view of mind in which the
1. Op. cit., p. 780
2. This example appears in Feigl's work (op. cit. p.413); but 
the author seems unaware that Russell had already used it for 
the same purpose.
3 . An Outline of Philosophy, p.306. 4. Ibid., p.209.
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human mental life is conceived as being continuous with the animal
life^ and in which mind is "a matter of degree chiefly exemplified
2
in number and complexity of habits". Thus "an oyster is less 
mental than a man, but not wholly unmental".^
E» Purposiveness and Mechanism. Purposiveness is a character­
istic which is very much emphasised in the common-sense conception 
of mentality. In a general sense, it is characterised by actions 
directed towards the attainment of ends. But in a special sense, 
it includes only those cases which involve conscious ends with 
conscious ultilisation of means to such ends. Now, it is clear that 
in the general sense of 'purposiveness' or 'teleology', it is 
exhibited in all forms of organic life including plants; and 
accordingly it is difficult to draw any line to indicate where 
mentality begins within that realm. But taken in the sense of 
conscious aims, it is found only in the behaviour of higher animals, 
particularly human beings.
As Feigl points out, purposiveness taken in the wider 
sense of teleology does not help in the definition of the mental 
versus physical distinction; teleology in this sense is present 
even in the movements of some physical machines, and "the phrase 
'teleological mechanism' in our age of cybernetics is no longer a
2f
contradiction in terms". What needs consideration is, then, the 
special sense of purposiveness; and Russell's views in this 
respect are briefly as follows.
1, The Analysis of Mind, pp. 40, 4l ff.
2, Ibid., p.308; An Outline of Philosophy, pp. 209, 222, 297,
3# Ibid., p. 209* 4. H. Feigl, op. cit., p.413»
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Russell does not seem to accept purposiveness or teleo­
logy in the sense of a 'puli’ or 'attraction' towards a goal or 
object» Conscious aims or desires are a fact particularly of human 
life; but according to Russell it is a very complex phenomenon 
which is rather a late development in the life of the individual » 
Desire as a characteristic of behaviour begins very low in the 
scale of evolution;^ it remains in most cases 'blind' or uncon­
scious* Even in human life all desires are initially blind 
tendencies to certain kinds of activity; it is only experience,
memory and association which confer consciousness or knowledge of
2
the object to some of them*
According to Russell, the primitive condition out of 
which explicit conscious desire is evolved is non-cognitive; it 
is "a push, not a pull, an impulse away from the actual, rather 
than an attraction towards the i d e a l " C e r t a i n  sensations and 
other mental occurrences have a property which may be called dis­
comfort; these cause bodily movements ultimately leading to their 
cessation* When the discomfort ceases, we have sensations which 
are pleasant. Thus a hungry animal feels discomfort, makes various 
movements until it finds the food and eats it; his discomfort is 
over and his sensations are now pleasurable* It is a mistake, says 
Russell, to suppose that the animal has had the situation in mind 
throughout, when in fact it has been continually pushed by discom- 
fort which is initially aimless restlessness* In human life, as
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p. 229* 2* Ibid*, p* 251*
3* The Analysis of Mind, p* 68; An Outline of Philosophy, p* 230*
4. The Analysis of Mind, p. 68.
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in animals, desires are initially blind. It is only repeated 
experience which leads to the consciousness of the object and of 
means towards its realisation. But even when we reach the level
of conscious explicit desires, though we seem to be attracted to 
a goal we are in fact pushed from behind*^ Russell says:
'The attraction to the goal is a short-hand way of describing 
the effects of learning together with the fact that our 
efforts will continue till the goal is achieved, provided 
the time required is not too long* There are feelings of 
various kinds connected with desires, and in the case of 
familiar desires, such as hunger, these feelings become 
associated with what we know will cause the desire to cease*
But I see no reason in the case of desire than in the case 
of knowledge to admit an essentially relational occurrence 
such as many suppose desire to be*'^
Russell thus rejects the concept of desire as essentially 
relational occurrence, and the concept of purposiveness as basic
characteristic of mind*
F. Mind as the Qualitative, the Holistic, and the Emergent*
Of these, the first two criteria may be quickly disposed 
of, while the third needs some consideration* The contrast of the 
mental and the physical in terms of the qualitative and the quanti­
tative is described by Feigl as a "Time-honoured distinction"*^ 
Broadly speaking it consists in the idea that mental phenomena, 
unlike the physical, admit only of qualitative, but not quantita­
tive, distinction or description* Now, that Russell does not accept 
this idea is clear* We have said that he conceives mind as a matter
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p* 230*
2* Ibid*, pp* 23O-I*
3* H. Feigl, op* cit*, p* 409*
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of degree* And as this is basic in his theory of mind, the criter­
ion in question is simply unacceptable from his point of view.
The holistic as the criterion of mind is opposed to atomism*
It is suggested that while matter is atomic, mind is not* Now, 
it can hardly be exaggerated that Russell's theory of mind is 
a complete antithesis of this dualistic suggestion*
The notion of 'emergence' means that the laws and pro­
perties of complexes cannot be inferred from those of their 
constituents. Now, it is a familiar fact of history that the 
advocates of the concept of 'emergence' have not restricted it to 
mind, but have applied it to physical complexes as well.
Russell has at times disfavoured the idea of 'emergence'*
In 'The Analysis of Matter' he says that emergent properties 
represent merely scientific incompleteness* He however admits that 
it is difficult to advance any conclusive argument on either side
as to the ultimate nature of 'apparently emergent properties'*^ In
2
'An Outline of Philosophy' he considers at some length the notion 
of 'emergence' particularly as applied to mind* The question with 
which he is specifically concerned, is not that of 'emergence' as a 
dualistic criterion of mind; it is rather the question as to whether 
mind is an emergent from a material structure. C.D. Broad in 'The 
Mind and its Place in Nature' holds the view that mind is a material 
structure but that it has properties which cannot, even theoreti­
cally, be inferred from those of its material constituents. It is
1* The Analysis of Matter, p. 286 foot-note*
2. Op* cit*, pp. 293 ff«
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this particular view of mind which Russell considers. The argu­
ments he offers do not only repudiate Broad’s 'emergent materialism' 
but also the alleged dualistic idea that mind alone is emergent.
Ee, in fact, accepts both mind and matter as emergent from events, 
the ultimate stuff of the world; but for him, neither is emergent 
from the other. As this discussion is important and involves a 
definition of mind, its consideration should better be postponed 
for a later occasion.
2. Analysis of Mental Phenomena
Russell's theory of mind, on its positive side, consists 
in explaining mind in terras of sensations and images. His 
objective is to give an account of all mental phenomena such as 
memory, imagination, belief, emotion, desire, will etc., without 
introducing anywhere 'consciousness' as an entity, act or subject.
In respect of some points connected with the theory of 
mind, Russell‘s views have undergone fundamental change at the two 
stages of his neutralism. One of these concerns the neutrality of 
images: while in 'The Analysis of Mind' they are not neutral, in 
the later works they are. A second point relates to 'mnemic' 
causation. Russell first accepts it as involving action at a 
distance in time, but later on explains it in terms of permanent 
modifications of the structure of the brain due to past experience. 
A third point is the view that all our sensations and images are
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among the stuff of our brain; this is held at the later stage, but 
not at the earlier stage. We have already considered these. There 
are also other points of difference such as the acceptance of the 
notion of 'emergence' in respect of both mind and matter, the intro­
duction of the concept of 'noticing', etc* But these changes have 
not affected the basic idea that mental phenomena are complexes of 
sensations and images. The explanations of these phenomena as 
given in 'The Analysis of Mind', and in 'An Outline of Philosophy* 
are substantially the same. We shall therefore consider them 
generally without always distinguishing the stages, but always 
indicating the important developments that have been made at times* 
Russell's explanation of various mental phenomena are very 
well known; we need not therefore reproduce them in great detail. 
There are, I think, two problems of fundamental importance which 
are connected with his neutralistic theory of mind. The first 
is concerned with showing that in each case a mental phenomenon is 
a complex of sensations and images, and does not involve a special 
entity called 'consciousness'. The second problem is to explain 
how certain combinations of sensations and images come to possess 
consciousness in the sense of 'awareness' —  the only sense in 
which Russell accepts it. The two problems are, in fact, inter­
connected and cannot perhaps be satisfactorily explained one without 
the other; nevertheless they can be distinguished. The second 
problem arises from the nature of the ultimate constituents of 
mind* A single sensation or image, according to Russell, is not 
in itself cognitive. Now, in explaining a mental occurrence which
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is conscious, it would be necessary, besides analysing it into its 
non-cognitive constituents, to show what constitutes consciousness 
or awareness in it. We shall therefore consider Russell's explan­
ation of mental phenomena specially with reference to these two 
problems•
It has been said above that, according to Russell, 
there is mental continuity throughout organic evolution. The pro­
gress in experiemental studies of animal behaviour has thrown such 
light on the nature of the human mental life. Accordingly, Russell 
thinks that a part of the problem of mind can be dealt with by 
behaviourist methods. One of the differences between dead matter 
and living organism is that the response of the organism to a 
stimulus changes with frequent repetition of the stimulus, but the 
response of dead matter in general shows no such change. Thus, 'a 
burnt child dreads the fire', but a slot machine never learns to 
respond to the mere sight of the coin. Habit, which is one of the 
most fundamental characteristics of living organisms, particularly 
of higher forms of life, consists according to Russell essentially 
in what is known as 'conditioned reflex'. Conditioned reflex is in 
essence this. An animal responds in a certain way to a particular 
stimulus. Now, if this stimulus is frequently presented to it 
along with another stimulus, it tends in time to behave in pre­
sence of the second stimulus as it previously did in presence of the 
first. Thus the animal comes to use the second as a 'sign' for the 
first and behaves appropriately. Russell says that much the same 
thing happens to scaool-children trying to learn a multiplication
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table. Repeated attempts for a long period enable them to choose 
the right numbers. Thus repetition of behaviour in response to 
stimulus leads to the formation of habits which result in learning* 
The rat in the maze finds its way out after several attempts; and 
after repetition of this for a while it ceases to make any wrong 
turnings. It thus comes to 'learn' or 'know' its path in the maze. 
"It is by essentially similar processes that we learn speaking, 
writing, mathematics, or the government of an empire*"^
All these can, Russell points out, be studied objective­
ly by investigating bodily responses to bodily stimuli without 
postulating that the organism 'thinks' or has a 'consciousness'. 
Response to stimulus, also called 'sensitivity', is not a character­
istic of living organisms alone; galvanometers, thermometers and 
computers respond to appropriate stimuli* Russell says that what 
distinguishes animals is called 'learning' which consists in 
changing the response as a result of the acquisition of habits*
In this respect, there is a difference between different kinds of 
animals; and "a large part of the superiority of human beings to
other animals consists in their greater capacity for acquiring
2
numerous and complex habits,"
Now, although this principle is useful in explaining a 
considerable part of mental phenomena studied objectively by the 
behaviourist methods, this would not be sufficient to explain 
everything that is mental# We have seen that Russell accepts
1. The Analysis of Mind, p#52; An Outline of Philosophy, pp.36 ff; 
My Philosophical Development, pp. 137-8.
2. Ibid., p. 1380
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introspection or self-observation which gives us direct knowledge 
of our mental life which can only be indirectly known by other 
observers. Russell therefore recognises the importance of both 
the ways of studying mental phenomena,
A, Perception, As regards the analysis of cognitive phenomena, 
perception and memory demand consideration before anything else.
We have already considered Russell's views on many questions 
connected with perception: When we say "we see a table", what
happens in us is only indirectly related to 'the table' which is 
either a construction or an inference. What in fact we perceive, 
is a 'coloured pattern' which is a percept belonging to the per­
spective at the place where our brain is. It is not essential for 
the occurrence of the percept or sensation that there must be some 
external event or object as its cause, but in most cases there is 
such a cause. The sensation itself is not cognition or knowledge, 
but it gives rise to knowledge through its psychological effects, 
partly by being itself a 'sign' of things that are correlated with 
it, as for example sensations of sight and touch are correlated, 
and partly by causing images and memories after the sensation is 
faded.^ Thus perception is a complex phenomenon. When e.g., we 
say "we see a table", there is a coloured pattern which is a 
sensation or percept in our brain. The sensation causes the image 
or rather after-image of which the sensation is the "prototype".
It also gives rise to images of sensations that are correlated
1, The Analysis of Mind, p. l42,
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with it due to past experience. Thus besides the sensation (i.e., 
the visual coloured pattern), "there are tactual expectations or 
images: there is probably belief in an external object; and
afterwards there may be memory or other mnemic effects".^ All 
these may be taken as representing what naive realism takes to be 
the "subject-side" of perception, and the 'coloured pattern' as 
the "object-side" of it*^
The totality of all these constitutes perception, and
in it we can distinguish the 'sensational' part and the part which
is due to past experience. The two sides are on a level as regards
being mental; and the relation between them is not such that the 
existence of the one logically demands the existence of the other: 
the relation is causal, being dependent upon experience and the 
law of association. The part which is due to past experience con­
sists of images. Thus, perception is composed of sensation and 
images only.
But sensations and images are each in itself non- 
cognitive. So, the question is as to what constitutes 'conscious­
ness', 'awareness' or 'apprehension' in a combination of sensations 
and images, which is perception. On this point C.D. Broad,^ and
il
following him C.E.M. Joad, take Russell's theory to come to this: 
All the sensations of which it would be true to say that they are 
apprehended, belong to a certain sense-field or perspective; and 
of all sensations which belong to this sense-field it would be
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p. 221. 2. Ibid., p. 221.
3. The Mind and its Place in Nature, pp. 210 ff.
4. Op. cit., pp. 9 8,110-1 .
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true to say that they are apprehended. Hence, the properties of 
’being apprehended' and of 'belonging to a certain sense-field or 
perspective' are logically equivalent. In fact we have not two 
different properties but a single property with two different names. 
"In other words, the relation which the sense-datum has to some­
thing else when it is apprehended is precisely the same as its 
relation to the visual sense-field or perspective to which it be­
longs. In this event the 'something else' must not be a mind but 
a 'perspective or visual sense-field', to which the mind is from 
this point of view apparently equivalent."^
As against this Broad offers a criticism which, according to
Joad, is a conclusive refutation of Russell's theory. The argument
may be briefly put as follows. A sensation which is a part
of a visual perspective which is not experienced cannot itself
be experienced. Therefore to be apprehended and to belong to a
visual perspective could be equivalent only if it is logically
impossible for there to be a visual perspective which is not
experienced. Now, as a visual datum can exist without being
apprehended, there is no logical reason why a visual perspective
should not exist which is not experienced. It follows therefore
that 'to be apprehended' and 'to belong to a visual perspective'
2
cannot mean the same thing.
Broad offers the above interpretation and criticism as 
regards Russell's position in 'The Analysis of Kind'; and Joad 
applies them to the views expressed in 'An Outline of Philosophy'
1. C.E.M. Joad, op. cit., p. 98.
2. Ibid., pp. 110-1; C.D. Broad, op. cit., p. 211,
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as well. Now, the above interpretation, taken as that of the 
theory of either or both of the books seems to be at best a part­
ial representation. It is true that according to Russell a percept 
belongs to the perspective which is at the place where our brain is. 
But this perspective is not just a 'visual* perspective; it con­
sists of all the sensations, visual, tactual, auditory, etc., that 
we have at one moment. Even this complex perspective is not in 
itself "equivalent to mind". This perspective together with the 
'mnemic' phenomena that are connected with it constitutes mind.
In the particular case of perception, the 'mnemic' phenomena include 
the image which the sensation causes directly and other images 
which it gives rise to becuase of correlations due to past exper­
ience. The sensation becomes apprehended by virtue of not only 
its being in the perspective of which the "visual sense-field" is 
an aspect, but also the 'mnemic' phenomena to which the sensation 
gives rise. In fact, the 'mnemic' elements play a vital role in 
Russell's explanation of 'consciousness' or apprehension.
In 'The Analysis of Mind'^ Russell gives an explanation 
of consciousness or awareness. He says that consciousness must be 
of something and should therefore be defined in terms of that 
relation of images or words to an object which he calls 'meaning'. 
When an image or a word is a 'sign' of something else, this 'some­
thing else' is the meaning of the image or the word^. Now, when a 
sensation is followed by an image which is a 'copy' of it, "the 
existence of the image constitutes consciousness of the sensation.
1. Op. cit., pp. 288 ff.
2. Ibid., p. 209.
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provided it ie accompanied by that sort of belief which, when we 
reflect upon it, makes us feel that the image is a 'sign' of some­
thing other than itself"*^ The image itself does not constitute 
consciousness; it does so only when it is accompanied by a belief
of the sort that constitutes "objective reference, past or 
2
present". In memory it is the belief in the existence of the 
past object; in perception it is the belief in the qualities 
correlated with present sensations. "An image, together with a 
belief of this sort concerning it, constitutes, according to our 
definition, consciousness of the prototype of the image.
When we pass from the consciousness of sensation to 
that of the object of perception, an addition has to be made to the 
above definition. Perception consists of the sensation, together 
with associated images and a belief in the existence of the object 
to which the sensation and images are referred. The belief may be 
of the nature of the expectation of sensations correlated with the
if
present sensation. In perception, there is then the consciousness 
of the present sensation together with the consciousness of 
correlated but absent sensations. But as all the sensations and 
images are referred to the perceived object, the present sensation 
becomes a 'sign' of the object of perception much the same way as 
a memory-image is a sign of a remembered object.
But the consciousness of an image, as in 'thought', is 
to be explained differently from the consciousness of a sensation. 
The latter is constituted by the image which is a copy of the
1. The Analysis of Mind, p. 289.
2. Ibid., p.289. 3. Ibid., p.2 89. 4. Ibid., pp.289-90.
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sensation. But there is no image or copy of an image. So Russell 
says that the consciousness or knowledge of an image is not con­
stituted by a copy of it, but by another image of the same proto­
type, together with the appropriate belief. "There may be two 
images of the same prototype, such that one of them means the 
other, instead of meaning the prototype."^ In such a case, we 
think of an image A when we have a similar image B associated with 
recollections of circumstances connected with A but not with its 
prototype.
It follows that consciousness or cognition is a kind of 
‘mnemic’ effect, that it is always a case of remembering. Sensat­
ion itself is not a case of consciousness, but its ‘immediate 
memory' is. Russell says:
'A sensation which is remembered becomes an object of 
consciousness as soon as it begins to be remembered 
  The essential practical function of "conscious­
ness" and "thought" is that they enable us to act with
reference to what is distant in time or space ....
This reference to absent object is possible through 
association and habit. Actual sensations, in themselves, 
are not cases of consciousness, because they do not bring 
in this reference to what is a b s e n t . ^
Russell holds virtually the same view of consciousness 
in his later works as well. In 'An Outline of Philosophy'^ he 
states: "To say that I am 'conscious' of an event is to say that
I recollect it, at any rate for a short time after it has happened."
If
In 'An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth' he emphatically argues that 
we do not know our present percepts or experiences. He says that
1. The Analysis of Mind, p. 291#
2. Ibid., p.292. 3* Op. Cit., p.299# 4. Op* cit., pp.49 ff.
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’knowing* an event is a different occurrence from the event which 
is known, and that accordingly it is not possible to maintain that 
we know our present experiences. For, if an experience is one 
thing and knowing it is another, the supposition that we know our 
present experiences involves an ’infinite multiplication of every 
event'; thus, I feel hot; I know that I feel hot; I know that I 
know ..... etc., 'ad infinitum', which is absurd. Russell, there­
fore, maintains that as knowing is different from what is known, 
we do not know our present experiences or percepts. Even percept­
ual knowledge or consciousness involves memory;^ percepts are 
known only when they are remembered.
Throughout his neutral monism Russell has maintained 
that sensations or percepts are in themselves non-cognitive, and 
that there can be sensations that are not known. The above argu­
ment from the 'infinite regress' is an emphatic assertion of this. 
This reminds one of Leibniz who used a similar argument to estab­
lish 'unconscious' perceptions or mental states. Leibniz held that 
it is impossible always to reflect expressly upon our thoughts 
without falling into an infinite regress. Russell in his work on
Leibniz recognises this to be his "most conclusive argument" in 
2
this connection. According to Leibniz, vje are aware of only those 
perceptions which the mind reflects upon or 'apperceives'• Russell 
uses his argument not only to assert unconscious percepts, but also 
to assert that only those percepts are known which are remembered.
Now, two questions are pertinent here. The first is
1. The same is maintained in Portraits from Memory, p.143.
2. A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, p.1 5 6.
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the one which is the only valid part of the criticism of Broad and 
Joad. The question is why a sensation or percept is not sometimes 
known, in other words, why a sensation is not sometimes remembered 
and thus remains unknown. The second question, which is more 
important, is about why Russell thinks that an image (accompanied 
by a suitable belief) should constitute the knowledge or con­
sciousness of the sensation which is its prototype, in other words, 
why it is only memory (immediate or mediate) that constitutes 
knowledge.
Now, so far as the first question is concerned,
Russell does not seem to realise any such difficulty in 'The 
Analysis of Mind'. But he realises it in his later works and 
tries to solve it by introducing the notion of what he calls 
'noticing'. We shall shortly come to it. But let us consider 
the second question first.
As to the question why an image should constitute the
consciousness of the sensation of which it is a copy, there is,
as far as I can see, no straightforward answer to be found in
Russell's works. But it is possible to formulate an answer from
an analysis of his relevant ideas. Now, a sensation or percept is
in itself non-cognitive and does not have that objective reference
to absent objects which is characteristic of consciousness.
Sensation is the cause of knowledge, through its 'mnemic' effects;
knowledge consists not in a single sensation, but arises out of a
combination of sensations and images. Perception is knowledge;
but it is a complex in which the present sensation gives rise to 
images and expectations of correlated sensations with the belief
240
in the existence of an object to which the sensations and images 
refer. But this is a matter of association and habit due to past 
experience. For example, the sensations of sight and touch have 
become correlated due to repeated experience, and their images have 
become associated. The association, strictly speaking, is not be­
tween a sensation and an image of another sensation, but between 
either two or more sensations, or between two or more images. Row, 
when we have a sensation which results in perception of an object, 
the given sensation does not bring about the correlated sensations, 
because these can only arise through appropriate stimulation of the 
senses and the brain, which is absent. But in perception there is 
reference to these sensations which are absent. This is possible 
through their images which, in fact, are brought up in actual 
perception. But the present sensation is not itself associated 
with these images, but the image of which it is the prototype is.
This means that until the given sensation changes into its image 
which becomes assimilated to the image of the similar past sensa­
tions (i.e. the same prototype), the correlated images cannot be 
brought up* As, according to Russell, perceptual knowledge consists 
in this complex of correlated images, it follows that it is a case 
of remembering. Thus, for example, when I have the perceptual 
knowledge of an orange as I see it, what happens is something like 
this. I have a sensation of a certain coloured pattern. This 
itself is not the knowledge I have. The sensation changes into 
an image which brings up images of sensations of touch, smell, 
taste, etc. correlated with it due to past experience. All these
together make up my perceptual knowledge of an orange. It is
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'immediate memory' of the given sensation plus the memory of the 
correlated past sensations; but the latter is not subjectively 
distinguished from the former and therefore the object to which 
they refer is believed to be a present object.
This, I think, explains why Russell holds that to be 
conscious of an event is to recollect it, that images constitute 
the consciousness of their prototypes. Now, if this analysis is 
correct, it will be seen that according to Russell perceptual 
knowledge is apperceptive. Apperception, as it used to be defined 
in psychology, consists in a new experience being assimilated to, 
and transformed by, the residuum of past experience of an individ­
ual to form a new whole. In epistemology, Leibniz introduced the 
term 'apperception' as distinct from perception and meant by it the 
introspective or reflective apprehension by the mind of its inner 
states or perceptions. Russell maintains that all knowledge is in 
a sense introspective.^ This is an aspect of the Leibnizian schema 
which Russell accepts. But for Leibniz the mind is there to 
apperceive; for Russell mind is not there already given to perform 
apperception, but apperception must arise out of a complex of 
percepts and images. It is possible that Russell is trying to 
combine in a way the psychological and the Leibnizian epistemolog- 
ical^ senses of apperception in his explanation of consciousness. 
That he holds some such position may be seen from a consideration 
of his concept of 'noticing' which embodies his answer to the
1. See above,pp. 2l8-9.
2. Russell considers Leibniz's distinction of perception and 
apperception as a 'very important advance in psychology'. Cf. 
A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, p. 1 5 6*
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first of the two questions we have raised above.
In 'My Philosophical Development',^ Russell says that he
replaced 'acquaintance' by 'noticing' in his "Inquiry" in order
to give a re-interpretation of 'consciousness', 'knowledge', etc.,
necessitated by his earlier rejection of sense-data and adoption
of neutral monism. I should very much like to take his word for
it; but as far as I can see, he in fact introduced it in 'An
2
Outline of Philosophy' wherein he calls it 'attention', whereas in
the "Inquiry"^ he calls it both 'attention' and 'noticing'. In
these works he accepts 'noticing' as an undefined term; it is a
matter of degree and "seems to consist mainly in isolating from the
Ix
sensible environment". The contents of our mind at any given 
moment are according to Russell very complex. He says:
'Throughout our normal waking life we are always seeing, 
hearing, and touching, sometimes smelling and tasting, 
always having various bodily sensations, always feeling 
pleasant or unpleasant feelings (usually both), always 
having desires and aversions. We are not normally aware 
of all these items, but we can become aware of any of them 
by turning our attention in the right direction... ._j_. Cut 
of the whole multiplicity of objects of sense, it /attent­
ion/ enables us to single out a small selection ....'5
In the "Inquiry" Russell asks : "What must be done with an
experience in order that we may know it?"^ He recognises that
1. Op. cit., p. l40.
2. Op, cit., p. 213.
3. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, pp. 50 ff.
4. Ibid., p. 50. 5* An Outline of Philosophy, p. 213#
6, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. 50.
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many of our experiences are not noticed at the time when they 
happen, but are known retrospectively when, for example, we are 
questioned about them; and often we can be sure that the experience 
was there before we were questioned, that is, before our attention 
was called to it. So he says:
’It seems, then, that the most immediate knowing of which 
we have experience involves sensible presence plus some­
thing more, but that any very exact definition of the more 
that is needed is likely to mislead by its very exactness 
..... What is wanted may be called "attention"; this is 
partly a sharpening of the appropriate sense-organs, partly
an emotional reaction ....  Every empirical proposition is
based upon one or more sensible occurrences ....  Such
occurrences, we shall say, are "known" when they are 
noticed. The word "know" has many meanings, and this is 
only one of them; but for the purposes of our inquiry it is 
fundamental «'1
Russell thus explains knowledge or consciousness in terms of
"the relation of noticing". When anything happens to us we may
or may not notice it. If we notice it, we may be said to be
2
"conscious" of it*
Now, Russell's concept of 'noticing' may be said to be 
the same as Leibniz's 'apperception', Leibniz used the word 
"distinguées" (translated as "noticed")^ to explain apperception® 
Russell uses the same word, and maintains the Leibnizian position 
that we have at any time a multiplicity of sensations and images, 
and that those only are known which are noticed. This is a case 
of reflective apprehension; but it always takes place, according 
to Russell's analysis, in the form of 'remembering'* Introspection,
1, An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p® 31#
2. My Philosophical Development, p. l44*
3* A Critical Exposition of the Philosophy of Leibniz, p. 276®
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for Russell, is retrospection.
But does 'noticing' as Russell conceives it explain the 
problem which it is supposed to explain? We have asked why a per­
cept is sometimes known and sometimes not. Russell has a 'priraa- 
facie' answer, namely that we know it if we notice it. Here again 
one may ask why we notice when we do and why we do not notice when 
we do not. Russell does not give any very clear and detailed ex­
planation. Nevertheless, he suggests that 'noticing' is partly due
to the nature of the stimulus and partly due to the emotional 
significance of the percept. "Sudden loud noise is almost sure to
command attention, but so does a very faint sound that has emotion­
al significance."^ But emotional significance involves the concept 
of mind or person; something has emotional significance for only 
a person. 'Noticing' cannot therefore be explained without refer­
ence to a person who notices. In fact, attention, noticing, know­
ing etc., involve the distinction of subject and object. We said 
2
earlier that knowledge and thought involve this distinction and 
that Russell has to re-introduce it in his philosophy after he has 
removed it from sensation. He, in fact, re-introduces it through 
the concept of 'noticing' or 'attention', and acknowledges it later.^ 
But the subject, for him, is not a single simple thing or 'ego'; it 
is a complex consisting of a correlated group of sensations and 
images. We have seen above how he recognises a subject-side and an 
object-side of the perceptual situation. But, for him, both sides
1. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. 51; My Philosophical 
Development, p. l42.
2. See above, p. 93#
5# My Philosophical Development, p. 139#
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are on a level as regards being mental and, therefore, do not 
involve the subject-object distinction in the sense of ‘naive' 
realism.^ However, the definition of the 'subject' would require 
a precise formulation of such concepts as *1' and 'you' stand for, 
that is the concept of 'person'; and we shall come to it in a 
later section of this chapter.
2
B . Memory and Imagination. In his discussions of memory, 
Russell begins by showing that there is no logically necessary 
connection between our present 'remembering' and the past event 
'remembered'. The argument is as follows:
'....  everything constituting a memory-belief is happening
now, not in that past time to which the belief is said to 
refer. It is not logically necessary to the existence of 
a memory-belief that the event remembered should have 
occurred, or even that the past should have existed at all. 
There is no logical impossibility in the hypothesis that the 
world sprang into being five minutes ago, exactly as it then 
was, with a population that "remembered" a wholly unreal 
past. There is no logically necessary connection between 
events at different times; therefore nothing that is 
happening or will happen in the future can disprove the 
hypothesis that the world began five minutes ago. Hence 
the occurrences which are called knowledge of the past are 
logically independent of the past; they are wholly analys­
able into present contents, which might, theoretically, be 
just what they are even if no past had existed.'3
Russell goes on to say that the non-existence of the past
if
should not be entertained as a serious hypothesis. He even
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p. 221#
2. The Analysis of Mind, ch. IX; An Outline of Philosophy, 
chs. VI and XVIII; An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, 
pp . 154 ff; Human Knowledge, pp.205f*, 228f., 440f.
3. The Analysis of Mind, pp.159-60; An Outline of Philosophy, 
p.7; Human Knowledge, p.228.
4. The Analysis of Mind, p.l60.
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calls it a "silly"^ hypothesis, and admits that it is "psycholog­
ically"^ and "practically"^ impossible to doubt the existence of
if
past events. We may also add, as does Price, that the hypothesis, 
although logically possible, is "causally" impossible. The whole 
point of the argument is that though the hypothesis seems impro­
bable it is not logically refutable. As Ayer says, "Even the view 
that the earth and all its inhabitants had come into existence just 
at this moment would not be formally inconsistent with anything 
that one could now observe."^ But although the hypothesis is 
logically tenable, there is equally no reason for believing it.
But then vje have to acknowledge that we believe in the existence of 
past events not because the logical analysis of our present 'remem­
bering* reveals them, but because we find it psychologically or 
practically impossible to doubt them, and/or because the causal 
explanation of the present occurrences implies or assumes them. All 
this means that there is nothing to prove conclusively that our 
belief in the existence of past events is logically justified, and
1. 'The Relevance of Psychology to Logic', Proceedings of
Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. XVII, 1938, p.53#
2. Ibid., p.53#
3# The Analysis of Mind, p.l65#
4* H.H. Price, Thinking and Experience, p.85.
5* A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.l84.
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that this belief must always remain a hypothesis or assumption.
For any attempt to establish it would at some stage rely on memory, 
and thereby involve the belief that a past event is, as a rule, 
correlated with a present memory. We all believe that memory is 
fallible: that what we take to be a memory is not always corre­
lated with a past event. Nevertheless, we also believe that our 
memory is generally trustworthy. But even in the case when a memory 
is taken to be veridical, its veracity cannot be fully established 
without involving memory. It may be possible to verify a particul­
ar case of memory with the help of such evidences as written 
documents, records, testimonies, etc. But these in their turn 
must at some stage depend on memory* Thus, although particular 
cases of memory may be verified, memory in general cannot be 
verified^ without falling into 'petitio principii*. It follows 
that the general trustworthiness of memory is an assumption. As 
A.J, Ayer says, "one statement about the past is used to justify 
another; but still there is no independent means of justifying 
them all. There is not, because there could not be. To obtain
this justification one would have to be able to recapture the past
2
in a way that has been shown to be logically impossible." Accord­
ing to Russell, this fact that there is no independent means, other 
than memory, of arriving at all the facts that we know through 
memory, makes memory a source or premise of knowledge.^ It is only
1. An Outline of Philosophy, pp.207-8; An Inquiry into Meaning
and Truth, pp.156-7#
2. A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.163#
3# An Outline of Philosophy, pp.207-8; An Inquiry into Meaning
and Truth, p.157; Human Knowledge, pp.204-5, 440-1.
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by assuming that memory is in the main trustworthy that a present 
memory can be shown to refer to, and represent, a past event. And
it is this assumption of the general veracity of memory that 
implies that memory is causally connected with past events or 
experiences.
Russell thus maintains that memory-beliefs are "logic­
ally independent of the past" and are wholly analysable into present 
contents. But there is another theory of memory which is sometimes 
sdt against Russell's position as being opposed to i t T h i s  view 
is embodied, for example, in R.F. Holland's statement that 
"whatever I am supposed to have memory knowledge of now is neces­
sarily something I have had knowledge before".^ According to this 
view, memory, by definition or as a matter of logical necessity, 
involves the existence of past events. According to it, memory 
is infallible.
Now, the opposition between Russell and the supporters 
of this view seems more apparent than real and to be due to a 
confusion of the meaning or use of the word 'memory'. As a matter 
of logical definition of the word 'memory', it seems right to say 
that it implies the existence of the past event. In this sense,
'I remember R' implies that R existed, just as 'I know that P' 
implies that P is true. This means that given a case of memory- 
knowledge of R we have to accept the past existence of R. This 
definition of memory can be considered linguistically or concept-
A comparative study of the theories of memory of Russell and 
other philosophers, particularly G. Ryle, may be found in 
W. von Leyden, Remembering: a Philosophical Problem.
R.F. Holland, 'The Empiricist Theory of Memory', Mind, 1954, 
p.485.
249
ually without reference to the question if there are genuine cases 
of memory at all. In this sense the terra has application if there 
are such cases; but if there are no such cases, the definition is 
still valid, only that it does not apply to anything. This can be 
stated in the form of a hypothetical proposition, namely, "If I 
remember R, then R existed". Holland’s use of the word "supposed" 
in his statement is a clear indication of this.
But the word 'memory’ is not always used in this strict 
logical sense which demands that memory must be infallible. We all 
ordinarily use the word 'memory' in a sense in which memory is not 
infallible. In this sense, 'memory' stands not only for the veri­
dical cases of remembering but also for the non-veridical cases.
Of course, in the strict logical sense the non-veridical cases 
cannot be called 'memory*. But then the question arises as to what 
we speak about when we say that 'memory is fallible*. The answer 
seems to be that it is the memory-claim or memory-belief that is 
fallible. The confusion is between *memory-knowledge* and 'memory- 
belief, a special case of a wider distinction, namely that between 
knowledge and belief. It seems possible to maintain that belief is 
a state of mind or a psychological occurrence. But knowledge as 
distinct from belief is not just a psychological occurrence; it 
is something more, 'the more' being the truth condition built up 
in i t I t  is the psychological occurrence of memory-belief that 
is either veridical or non-veridical. It has to be distinguished
1. Cf. A.J. Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, pp.9 ff#
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from the concept of memory as truth condition built up in it, i.e. 
from the concept of memory-knowledge, which is infallible. To 
avoid confusion, it wvuld be well to use the word 'memory' for the 
latter and the word 'remembering' for the former, that is, for the 
psychological occurrence of meraory-belief•
Now, if I have a memory of R, then R existed. One may 
raise the sceptical question: Is there a case of memory? One may
argue that what in fact we have are some experiences we call 
'remembering' or 'memory experiences’. These are all in the pre­
sent and have nothing in them to assure us of the reality of past 
events. No amount of logic or logical analysis of the present 
experiences gives us the knowledge of the reality of past events 
or enables us to distinguish the veridical from the non-veridical 
cases. The veridical memory experiences "will not differ qualit­
atively from those that are delusive".^ Moreover, as Russell points 
out, it is logically possible that all memory experiences are non- 
veridical. This cannot be logically refuted. The experiences of 
remembering as psychological occurrences are logically independent 
of past events. There is nothing in the present memory experience 
which will justify the truth of the statement about the existence 
of the past event, and whatever the characteristic of the memory
experience, "it would always be logically consistent with it that
2
the statement in question should be false".
1. A.J, Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p.l69
2. Ibid., p.1 69.
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In Russell's theory, it is the memory-belief or the 
psychological occurrence called memory experience that is said to 
be logically independent of past events. This follows from a wider 
premise, namely that events at different times have no logically 
necessary connection between them. Russell is not so much con­
cerned with the linguistic or conceptual definition of the term 
'memory' as with the analysis of 'remembering', that is, of what 
happens in us when vie have memory-belief s.
Russell gives an analysis of 'remembering' in terms of
the particulars and qualities that constitute the present content 
of a memory-experience; and in this he uses the word 'memory' in 
the sense of 'remembering'. The existence of past events remember­
ed is taken by him as a matter of belief or assumption, and not as 
a matter of logical necessity. Following Bergson,^ he distinguish­
es two forms of memory, namely 'habit-memory' and 'recollection 
proper' (also called 'true' memory and knowledge memory). Habit- 
memory, according to Bergson, is involved in such cases as, for 
example, when we learn a lesson by heart; when we learn it by 
heart, we are said to 'remember' it, but this only means that we
have only acquired a habit. But remembering a unique event, as for
example when I remember what I ate for breakfast this morning, is 
different from learning a lesson by heart. This is a case of 
recollection proper# Russell accepts this distinction as a matter 
of theory; but he recognises that there are practical difficulties 
in drawing any sharp lines. For "habit is a very intrusive feature
1. H. Bergson, Matter and Memory, Ch. II, pp# 86 ff.
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of our mental life, and is often present where at first sight it 
seems not to be."^ There may be habits of remembering unique 
events, as for example when habits of words may fulfil the funct­
ion of recollection.
In regard to memory, there are, according to Russell, 
two distinct questions: (1) what is happening now when I recol­
lect? and (2) what is the relation of the present happening to
2
the past event that is remembered? Of these two questions, the 
first is a psychological one, while the second belongs to the 
theory of knowledge. Russell’s analysis of memory is an attempt 
at finding such an account of the present occurrence in remember­
ing as will make it not impossible for remembering to give us the 
knowledge of the past.
Russell carries out his analysis of recollection mainly 
with reference to those cases which depend on images. This does 
not mean that, according to him, memory always depends on images. 
Habit-memory does not usually require images. Even such cases as 
for example the recclltsction of what I ate for breakfast this 
morning may not always involve images: "Sometimes words may come
without the intermediary of images."^ For Russell, images are not 
essential for memory. "Sometimes there are memory-images, sometimes 
not; sometimes when images come in connection with memory, we may 
nevertheless know that the images are incorrect, showing that we
1, The Analysis of Mind, p. l66«
2. Ibid., p. 1 78; An Outline of Philosophy, pp. 205-6.
3* The Analysis of Mind, p. 175*
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have also some other and more reliable source of memory. Memory 
may depend upon images ..... But it may also be purely verbal."^ 
Russell even speaks of himself as a poor visualiser; he says that 
he can remember things more easily in the form of verbal des­
criptions than in the form of images. He does not think that
"there is anything in memory that absolutely demands images as
2
opposed to words". Nevertheless there are cases of memory which 
depend on images, and Russell's analysis of recollection in terms 
of images and their qualities concerns these cases only. In the 
case where words replace images, the same or similar analysis will 
apply; the characteristics present in image-meraory will also be 
there in word-memory.
Images, according to Russell, are vague copies of sensations. 
But images themselves cannot constitute memory, for they are 
equally present in dream, imagination, etc. So that images may 
give memory, they must be accompanied by a belief in past existence, 
that is by our confidence in them as copies or representations 
of past sensations. What is needed is some characteristics 
of memory-images, which will distinguish them from images in 
dreams and imaginations. Our belief or "confidence or lack
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p. 195*
2. Ibid.,_pp, 195-6. A.J, Ayer states: "Assuming, as they 
both jiume and Russel^ do, that the past event, or 
experience, which is remembered, cannot itself be present 
to the mind, they infer that something else must be; and
an image then seems to be the only candidate." (The Problem 
of Knowledge, p. I5 6). But in view of what we have said, 
it seems impossible to accept this statement in so far as it 
refers to Russell.
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of confidence in the accuracy of a memory-iraage must be based
upon a characteristic of the image itself, since we cannot evoke
the past bodily and compare it with the present image
Hume maintains that memory-images differ from impressions
by being fainter and from the images of imagination by being 
2
livelier. Russell realises the difficulty of distinguishing 
memory-images by their faintness and liveliness. He accordingly 
speaks of some other characteristics of memory-images. One of them 
is what he calls "feeling of familiarity’’.^  Some images, like some 
sensations, feel very familiar, while others feel strange. This 
is a matter of degree. In a complex image, some parts of it may 
feel more familiar than others; in this case we feel more confident 
in the accuracy of the familiar parts than in that of the unfamiliar
If
parts. Familiarity is a feeling, capable of existing without an 
object, but normally standing in a specific relation to some object * 
"The judgement that what is familiar has been experienced before is 
a product of reflection, and is no part of the feeling of familiar­
ity ..... Thus no knowledge as to the past is to be derived from 
the feeling of familiarity alone."^
Another important characteristic which memory-images
1. The Analysis of Mind, p. l6l.
2. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, Book I, Part I, Sec. III.
5* The Analysis of Mind, pp. l6l, 168-9; An Outline of 
Philosophy, pp. 203-4, 206*
4. The Analysis of Mind, p. l6l; An Outline of Philosophy, 
pp. 206-7»
5* The Analysis of Mind, p. I69.
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must have is what is called "reference to the past"®^ Even when 
recollection is purely verbal, this characteristic as well as the 
feeling of familiarity must be present. The reference to the past 
is due to more than one feature of recollection® When a present 
occurrence, sensation or image, suggests something by association, 
the suggested element is found to be different from present 
sensible occurrences. This difference, together with the inconsis­
tency of the suggested element with present facts if it were placed 
in the present, may be taken as a cause of our referring it to the 
past. But difficulty arises from the consideration that these dif­
ferences and inconsistencies might very well be the reason for regard­
ing the suggested elements as purely imaginary. Something more is 
therefore necessary to explain why we sometimes refer the 'suggest­
ion' to the past and sometimes take it as mere imagination.
This brings us to another feature of memory as opposed
to imagination. This concerns the order of the suggested elements
or images. In memory the several images appear in the same order
2
as their prototypes, whereas in imagination several "known 
elements" combine in a new order. Memory does not, like imagin­
ation, involve a re-arrangement of elements derived from past 
experience. Thus Russell says that "in imagination there is 'a 
novel' combination of known elements', ..... if nothing is novel, 
we have a case of memory, while if the elements, or any of them.
1. The Analysis of Mind, pp. l62 ff; An Outline of Philosophy, 
pp. 196 ff.
2, The Analysis of Mind, p. l62; An Outline of Philosophy, p.l99«
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are novel, we have a case of perception".^
Thus the inconsistency of the elements suggested by 
association with present sensible facts and the order in which 
they arrive give us a feeling that makes us refer our recollect­
ions to the past. The feeling of familiarity and the reference to 
the past are the characteristics of memory-images and memory- 
descriptions which, according to Russell, give us the confidence 
in the accuracy of their being copies or representations of past 
events. But it should be remarked that familiarity and reference 
to the past cannot be sharply distinguished; because the reference 
to the past cannot be fully independent of familiarity. The order 
in which the memory-images appear must be felt as familiar. Russell
realises this and accordingly suggests that familiarity is perhaps
2
enough to cause us to refer memory-images to the past.
Now, 'reference to the past* does not give us the idea 
of 'pastness', neither does the 'feeling of familiarity'. The 
reference of something to the past presupposes the idea of past­
ness, and 60 there must be some independent source from which we 
can derive the idea of pastness. Russell rightly thinks that we 
do not get the idea from recollection or memory proper®^ According 
to him, we derive it from 'immediate memory* involved in the 
perception of temporal succession within the 'specious present'.
We shall come to it shortly.
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p. 199»
2. Ibid., p. 206o
3. For the difficulties in deriving the idea of pastness from 
memory, see G.E.M. Anscombe, 'The Reality of the Past', 
Philosophical Analysis (ed. M. Black), pp. 4l ff.
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Between sensation and recollection, Russell recognises 
several stages^ which are on way to recollection. Thus 'true' 
recollection appears at the end of a series of gradual progress. 
These stages are images, familiarity, habit-memory, recognition and 
immediate memory. Of these, we have already considered the first 
three. We therefore need here very briefly to consider the last
two, and then say a final word on 'true' recollection.
2
Now, recognition , according to Russell, has two forms.
Firstly, when, for example, one sees a dog and says "there is a 
dog" without even recalling that one has seen a dog before, one 
has recognition. But this does not involve any knowledge about the 
past; it is only an associative habit. Secondly, one may know 
that one has seen this before, but one may not know where and when. 
In such a case there is some knowledge about the past; but this is 
not recollection. "This is about the minimum of knowledge about 
the past that actually occurs."^
'Immediate memory'^ is something which, according to 
Russell, is intermediate between sensation and memory proper. When 
a sense-organ is stimulated, it does not, on the cessation of the 
stimuli, return at once to its unstimulated condition. When we 
see a flash of lightning, our sensation lasts longer than the 
lightning as a physical occurrence. A sensation fades gradually, 
passing by continuous gradation to the status of an image. The
1. The Analysis of Mind, pp.l68 ff; An Outline of Philosophy, 
pp.203 ff.
2. Ibid., p. 204; The Analysis of Mind, pp. 169-72.
3. An Outline of Philosophy, p .204#
if. Ibid., pp.204-5; ïhe Analysis of Mind, pp.174-5; Human
Knowledge, p.Ill#
258
sensation, while it is fading, is called an "akoleuthic" sensation; 
and this retention and knowledge of the immediate past in a con­
dition intermediate between sensation and image is called 
'immediate memory*•
This fact of 'akoleuthic' sensation or immediate memory, 
according to Russell, is of great importance in connection with 
our knowledge of temporal succession. There is a short time during 
which the sensation is fading. Everything belonging to it is
sensibly present to us during this period. This short finite time
1 2is called "specious present*'. Russell, Broad, and some other 
philosophers derive the concept of pastness from the knowledge of 
temporal succession within the 'specious present'. 'Akoleuthic* 
sensations, according to Russell, enable us to perceive a movement 
as a whole, as for example when we see the second-hand of a watch 
moving or a finger -moving quickly from the right to the left. In 
this case the whole movement falls within the 'specious present'.
In it we can distinguish earlier and later parts by the felt degree 
of the fading of the sensation: the earliest parts are those that 
have faded most, whereas the latest parts are those that retain 
their full sensational character. Thus temporal succession falls 
within one experience; and the idea of pastness is derived from 
this.
1. The Analysis of Mind, pp. 174-5; An Outline of Philosophy, 
pp. 205, 204-5; An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p.l47; 
Human Knowledge, pp. 226-7»
2. Mind and its Place in Nature, p. 267.
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According to this view, the present for our awareness 
is not just an instant without perceptible duration, but has a 
perceptible duration within which we can recognise an earlier and 
a later part. Since we are aware of a temporal sequence in the 
'specious present', we can define the past as that which is earlier 
than the 'specious present'. Ayer who in fact supports this view 
does not use the terra 'specious present', but he asserts that the 
relation of temporal sequence is "given" to us in experience, that 
"As a matter of empirical fact, one can see or hear A-following-B, 
in the same immediate fashion as one can see A-to the left of-B"
He thinks that this relation of temporal precedence, coupled with 
the notion of the present, is all that is needed to yield the 
notions of both the past and the future. Woozley remarks that the 
technical title of the 'specious present' is "unfortunately apt", 
but that there is no reason for denying its occurrence.^ It is a 
matter of observation that we know temporal sequence in our 
experience, and therefore it seems reasonable to maintain that 
the idea of pastness is derived from it.
Now, in regard to the theory of pastness as being 
derived from the specious present, there is a point of historical 
interest which needs a little clarification. In 'An Outline of 
Philosophy'^ (192?) Russell says that the theory was suggested by
1. A.J, Ayer, The Problem of Knowledge, p. 170*
2. A.D. Woozley, The Theory of Knowledge, p. 49< 
5* Op. cit., p. 205»
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Broad in 'Mind and its Place in Nature'^ (1925). This might be 
taken to mean that Russell accepted it from Broad. But this could 
not be the case. For, Russell himself produced the very same
theory in 'The Analysis of Mind' (1921) as already referred to
2
above. In this earlier work he begins his account of the theory
by making a reference to V/illiara James whom he quotes as saying that
the apprehension of the immediate past in an experience intermediate
between sensation and image is "the original of our experience of
pastness, from whence we get the meaning of the term" (Psychology,
I, p.604). The term 'akoleuthic' sensation is taken from Semon.^
It seems clear from this that Russell has developed the conception
of 'specious present' and the theory of the idea of pastness by
following the suggestion made by James and by utilising a term
taken from Semon. His attribution of the theory to Broad cannot,
therefore, be accepted as such. The two philosophers may have
developed the idea independently of each other; but this seems
very unlikely. Russell's referring of it to Broad may be one of
those cases of his over-generosity in attributing ideas to other
4
philosophers which Allan Wood refers to , or a case of forgetful­
ness due to his habit of not re-reading his own books once they 
were published.^
1. Op. cit., p. 267,
2. The Analysis of Mind, p. 174. 5» Ibid., p.175 foot-note.
4. Cf. My Philosophical Development, p. 275»
5 . Ibid., p. 274.
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Coming back to ’true* recollection, we have to refer once 
again to the two questions involved, one about the present con­
tent of recollection, and the other about the relation of the 
present content to the past event remembered. We have already 
considered the first; Recollection consists of images (or verbal 
descriptions) and a belief that refers to the past. An image (or 
verbal description) does not constitute recollection unless it is 
believed to be a copy of a past event which is its prototype.
As to the relation of the present happening to the 
event remembered, Russell's explanation is briefly as follows. If 
we recollect correctly, the several images will have that kind of 
resemblance of quality that they can have to their prototypes; 
their structure and relations will be identical with those of 
their prototypes. It is the similarity of quality and identity 
of structure between the complex image and a past perception that 
the correctness of memory consists of
The causation of memory, according to Russell, is 
wholly associative.^ Something in the present is similar to 
something in the past, and calls up the past context in the form 
of images and words. When "attention" falls upon this context, we 
believe that it occurred in the past, and thus we have recollect­
ion. Recollection is a matter of associative reproduction due to 
past experience. It involves 'mnemic' phenomena. We have seen 
how Russell changes his explanation of 'mnemic' causation at the
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p.20?.
2. Ibid., p. 208.
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two stages of his neutralism* His concept of associative causat­
ion of memory has therefore to be understood accordingly. In his 
complete neutral monism, the causal explanation of memory would 
include a causal chain of events persisting in the brain due to 
past experience, and the association of events in the brain*^
We have seen that Russell introduces the notion of 
'noticing' or 'attention' at the later stage of his neutral 
monism* Memory, like perception, involves attention* As we have 
already considered the concept, it should not detain us here any 
longer. But what seems to demand attention is the fact of belief 
involved in memory* Memory-belief involves a specific feeling 
that makes the belief refer to the past* But then what is a 
belief?
2
C. Belief. In 'The Analysis of Mind' Russell gives an
analysis of 'belief which he seems to assume in his later v/orks*
In this he uses the 'act-content-object' schema in a modified form 
in which he substitutes 'feeling' for 'act'. He recognises three 
factors in a belief, namely (l) believing, (2) what is believed, 
and (3) the objective.^ When, for example, we believe that Colum­
bus crossed the Atlantic, there are two things that occur in us, 
namely the believing and what is believed. These are to be dis­
tinguished from the objective fact to which the belief refers, 
namely the actual crossing of the Atlantic by Columbus. It is this 
objective fact that makes the belief true or false. The truth or
1. See above, pp. 129-51*
2* Op. cit.. Lecture XII.
5# The Analysis of Mind, p. 255*
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falsehood does not depend upon the intrinsic nature of the belief,
but upon the nature of its relation to its objectiveAccordingly
the intrinsic nature of belief can be treated without reference to
2
what makes it true or false,
Russell says that we have to distinguish the "believing" 
from what is believed (i.e. the content of belief). What is 
believed is a complex of sensations or images or both; when
expressed in language it is a proposition. It may be different in
different cases, as in our beliefs that Columbus crossed the 
Atlantic, and that the Derby will take place to-morrow. But the 
'believing* in each case is the same
We may bring out this distinction in another way. We 
believe in many things. Thus, for example, I may believe in P, Q, 
and R. The content, or what is believed, is different in each case.
But as beliefs they must have something in common. This may be
called the 'attitude' I take towards P or Q or R. The mere pre­
sence of the idea of P is not belief, for I may or may not believe
1. There seems to be a further point about objective reference of 
belief irrespective of its truth or falsehood. This arises 
from a consideration of the fact that several people may have 
the same belief which may be either true or false. The 
question is as to what constitutes the inter-subjective 
objectivity of the belief. Russell seems to have left this 
out of account. But he has never meant his analysis to be 
complete in all respects. What he is concerned with is to 
give an analysis of the intrinsic nature of belief as a 
psychological occurrence, which can be treated apart from the 
question of both the objective that he recognises and the 
inter-subjective objectivity which he omits.
2, The Analysis of Mind, p. 252.
5. Ibid., pp. 252-5.
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in P. This means that I have to take a definite ’attitude' towards 
P; thus, the idea of P and the 'attitude' towards it together 
constitute the belief. What Russell calls 'believing' or 'belief- 
feeling ' may be taken as this 'attitude' towards the content of 
belief.
The 'believing', Russell says, must not be taken in the
sense of Meinong's mysterious 'act'; it is, in fact, "an actual
experienced feeling, not something postulated, like the a c t H e
recognises, among others, three main forms of belief, namely memory-
2
belief, belief of expectation, and belief of assent. These are 
exemplified in our beliefs in the following three propositions:
(a) it rained yesterday; (b) it will rain to-morrow; and (c) 
rains occur. In each case there is a specific feeling that attaches 
to the proposition believed. Russell calls it 'belief-feeling'.
He does not offer any special analysis of the belief-feeling. He 
says non-committally that it may be a sensation, or an image, or a 
complex of either or both.^
Now, when Russell calls believing a feeling, he is 
using the word 'feeling' in a special sense, and not in the ordin­
ary sense in which it means the feeling of pleasure and pain, or 
comfort and discomfort. He says that he does not know how to
1. The Analysis of Mind, p. 255*
2. Ibid., p. 244.
5. Ibid., p. 187»
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analyse the sensations and/or images that constitute the 'belief- 
feeling', but he is "not prepared to say that they cannot be 
analysed."^ This may be possible; but the possibility has not 
actualised in his philosophy. He calls the 'believing' an "actual 
experienced feeling"; he does not say that it feels as a sensation 
or an image or a complex of them. But if it does not feel so and 
if it is of a different kind from feelings which he analyses, one 
might argue, as does Laird, that it is just an "experienced feel­
ing" and not a sensation or image, and that Russell is therefore
"peopling the 'mind' with stowav/ays whose very existence he began 
2
by denying"•
But perhaps Russell is not really introducing some new 
elements into his philosophy under the name of 'belief-feeling' or 
'believing'. He may be right in suggesting that belief, though a 
very complex phenomenon, does not involve anything other than 
sensations and images, and their relations. He seems definitely 
right in his contention that believing is different from what is 
believed. The believing or belief-feeling cannot be a function or 
property of the content of belief alone; for the content may or 
may not be believed, and it may be sometimes believed and sometimes 
not. As we have said, the content and an 'attitude', or what 
Russell calls 'believing' or 'belief-feeling', together make the 
belief. The belief-feeling attaches to the content. To under­
stand 'believing' it is perhaps necessary to ask why some propos­
itions are believed while others are not, and why the same pro-
1. The Analysis of Mind, p. 250.
2. J. Laird, in The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p. 315*
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position is sometimes believed and sometimes not. Various replies 
may be possible. But one general answer would be to say that 
something is believed because it 'agrees' with our experiences 
(i.e. experiences other than those forming the content of a 
belief). These other experiences may include some or all of our 
present and past experiences, and/or their effects in the form of 
images and habits. The believing or belief-feeling would then 
consist in the relation of the content of belief to these other 
experiences; it would be a property that attaches to the content 
because of its relation to other experiences. These other exper­
iences consist of sensations and images, and may or may not be 
conscious. As, in belief, attention falls upon the content, it 
is the content that is consciously apprehended together with the 
belief-feeling that attaches to it because of its relation to 
other sensations and images which are not, haever, consciously 
apprehended. Or, it may be the case that, although these other 
sensations and images are not being individually apprehended, 
their presence together with their relation to the content of 
belief constitutes a sort of consciousness or feeling with refer­
ence to the content which is being consciously apprehended; and 
this feeling may be called believing or belief-feeling. Put in 
either way, the belief-feeling involves sensations and images 
other than those which form the content of belief, but not any­
thing other than sensations, images and their relations.
If one likes, one may say that in belief, as in per­
ception, there are two sides, subjective and objective. The con­
tent may be taken as forming the objective side, whereas all the
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other sensations and images may be said to form the subjective side 
of belief. But in this case, as in perception, there would not be 
a subject which is a single simple substance or ego or act.
Russell seems to imply some such explanation of belief- 
feeling as above in his reply^ to Laird’s criticism of his con­
ception of ’feeling' in general and 'belief-feeling' in particular. 
He still denies emphatically that there is an observable subject 
in the sense of a substance or Meinong's act. But he admits that 
it is necessary to provide an explanation of the difference between 
'you' and 'me'. He says that if we take remembering or believing 
(or being remembered by or being believed by) as a relation, 'I' 
is anything compresent with any member of the 'ancestry' of 'this' 
(i.e. the content of memory or belief). Here Russell's statement 
is very brief; but it is possible to analyse the full implications 
of the statement. This vie shall do in the next section. For the 
moment, it suffices to notice that here 'I* refers to all sensa­
tions and images which (along with the content 'this') are parts 
of one biography or 'mind'; and that believing consists in the 
relation of the content to other sensations and images that form 
parts of one mind.
D . Emotion, Desire and Will. Russell's discussions of these 
phenomena are often brief, and we can perhaps be briefer still; 
for, in so far as they are conscious processes, their explanation 
includes that of perception and memory which we have already 
considered. As regards emotions, Russell recognises the importance
1. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p. 699*
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of the physiological causation and constitution of them. He refers
in this connection to James-Lange theory and its criticism made
by Sherrington and Cannon.^ Without taking a definite side in
that debate, he accepts this much that bodily conditions are
involved in both the causation and the constitution of emotions.
An emotion involves knowledge of something; it is the perception,
of a bodily condition according to James, or of an external object
2
according to his opponents. In respect of causation, secretions 
from certain glands into the blood are essential conditions of 
emotions. These produce bodily changes which form parts of a full 
emotion; But these alone are not sufficient to account for 
emotions, because bodily changes appropriate to an emotion may be 
produced by administering drugs, but if there is no knowledge of 
the proper object of the emotion, it may fail. Only the object­
less emotions, for example melancholy, may be entirely due to 
physiological conditions. In other cases the knowledge of the 
object is necessary.^
Emotion, according to Russell, is a very complex pheno­
menon. It is "essentially a process", and in its entirety con­
tains perception or knowledge and "dynamic elements such as motor 
impulses, desires, pleasure and p a i n " D e s i r e s ,  pleasures and 
pains are characteristics of processes, "not separate ingred-
1. The Analysis of Mind, pp.280-5; An Outline of Philosophy,
p.226.
2. The Analysis of Mind, p. 284.
5» An Outline of Philosophy, pp. 226-7*
4. The Analysis of Mind, p. 284#
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ients". And perception or knowledge involves only sensations and
images. Therefore, "the ingredients of an emotion are only
sensations and images and bodily movements succeeding each other
in a certain pattern"
We have already given a short account of Russell's
conception of desires, and we have little to add here. For him,
all desires are initially 'blind'. Even when we reach the level
of conscious explicit desires, we are not in fact attracted to a
goal, but pushed from behind.
Like conscious desires, 'Will', according to Russell,
is a late development in our life. He rejects the idea of 'will*
as a faculty which is for him a metaphysical superstition. He
recognises it only as an observable phenomenon. In this sense it
concerns voluntary movements. A child's movements are not at
first voluntary, but are only reflexes. As a result of repetition
of a reflex movement, the child discovers that the movement is
either pleasurable or unpleasurable. It thus learns to think of
the movement first and then make it. "Obviously we cannot think
of a movement unless we have previously made it; it follows that
no movement can be voluntary unless it has previously been
involuntary."^ This view was suggested by William James, and is
4
accepted by Russell at all stages of his neutralism. A voluntary
1. The Analysis of Mind, p. 284.
2. See above, pp. 225-6.
5. An Outline of Philosophy, p. 251 »
4. The Analysis of Mind, pp. 284-6; An Outline of Philosophy,
p. 251 f.
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movement, for him, is one that is preceded by the thought of it 
and has the thought of it as an essential part of its cause.
Volition^, in the emphatic sense of decision after 
deliberation, involves voluntary movement as an essential part of 
it, but it also involves thoughts of conflicting forces, that is 
the thoughts of the pleasurable and the unpleasurable associations 
of the movement and/or the thoughts of alternative movements and 
their associations. There is thus a conflict of desires or 
thoughts, which produces a sort of tension until one or other 
thought proves stronger and decides the case. Here again, the 
thoughts involve nothing more than sensations and images. Russell 
therefore concludes that 'will* adds no new irreducible ingredients 
to the analysis of mind.
3« The Definition of Mind
Russell, we have seen, explains various mental phenomena 
in terms of sensations and images and their correlations. There 
is no entity or substance called ego or consciousness. Mind is 
not a simple thing over and above the mental phenomena. It is 
rather a complex structure consisting of the mental phenomena 
themselves which in their ultimate analysis are only complexes 
of sensations and images. The mind of an individual at a 
particular moment consists of all the sensations (or percepts)
1. The Analysis of Mind, pp. 285-6; An Outline of Philosophy,
p. 232.
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and images that he has at that moment; and the history or biography 
of the mind consists of all the sensations and images he has had 
during his life-time. Thus sensations and images are the 'ultimate'
constituents of mind. But they are also the constituents of matter.
As mind and matter are composed of the same neutral stuff, it is 
therefore necessary to define the characteristics that distinguish 
mind from matter. In other words, we need a definition of mind 
as distinct from matter.
Now, consciousness in the sense of awareness is not a universal 
characteristic of all that is mental* It is therefore "too narrow" 
to be able to offer a definition of mind. Again, 'mnemic* 
causation is "too wide", because it is present to some extent 
even in non-living matter. So is "subjectivity", being present 
in all perspectives, mental and physical. The other so-called 
dualistic criteria are all inadequate. The search for the 
special characteristics that would distinguish mind from matter 
and thus define it leads Russell ultimately to the causal character­
istics of mental phenomena as distinct from those of the physical 
phenomena. He recognises two kinds of causal laws, namely the 
psychological and the physical causal laws. Mind is a collection 
of neutral particulars grouped according to psychological causal 
laws, whereas matter is a collection according to physical causal 
laws.^ Thus causal laws, and for that matter causal character­
istics, form the fundamental basis of the distinction of mind and 
matter.
1. The Analysis of Mind, pp.93 ff$ 137, 301 ff; An Outline of
Philosophy, pp . 298 ff; Portraits from Memory, pp.148-9, 132,
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Russell is, therefore, a metaphysical monist and causal 
dualist. That causal dualism is ultimate has remained a basic idea
throughout his neutral monism, although at times he has wished to
become a causal materialist* Materialism has two types: First, the
ultimate stuff of the world is physical or non-mental; secondly,
all genuine ultimate laws are physical. That Russell rejects 
materialism in the first sense is obvious. The second sense of 
materialism concerns the questions as to whether psychological 
causal laws are reducible to or deducible from physical causal 1aws, 
whether the propositions of psychology are translatable into those 
of physics, and whether physical determinism is ultimate.
Now, as to the irreducibility of psychological laws to 
the laws of physics, Russell's views in several of his works^ are 
very straightforward. In them he maintains that psychological laws 
are genuine and cannot be reduced to or deduced from physical laws.
In 'The Analysis of Matter' and 'An Outline of Philosophy', he has 
sometimes said that physical laws are universal^ and that "physical 
causal laws are those that are fundamental".^ But in these two 
books he has also said the following:
'  physics .might be able to trace the physical
properties of the ....  events in the eye and the brain,
one of which is, in fact, a visual percept; but it could not 
itself give us the knowledge that one of them is a
visual percept. It is obvious that a man who can see knows
things which a blind man cannot know; but a blind man can
1. The Analysis of Mind, pp.93 ff, 137, 301 ff; Human Knowledge, 
pp.63f; Portraits from Memory, pp. 148-9, 152.
2. The Analysis of Matter, p. 393*
3* An Outline of Philosophy, p. 156.
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know the whole of physics. Thus the knowledge other men 
have and he has not is no part of physics.'1
'....  there certainly is knowledge in psychology which
cannot ever form part of p h y s i c s . '2
'No amount of physics can tell us all that we do in fact 
know about our own percepts.'3
Vie have seen that Russell has changed his explanation of
'mnemic' causation at different stages, and that his explanation
of it with reference to modifications of the structure of the brain
does not necessarily reduce it to physical causation. In view of
this and the statements quoted above, it is not possible to maintain
that Russell has ever succeeded in maintaining causal materialism.
The above statements bring out also what his attitude is towards
physicalism according to which all statements of scientific
4
knowledge can be translated into the language of physics.
As regards physical determinism, Russell maintains that 
modern quantum theory destroys any form of raind-body determinism.
He says that the minute phenomena in the brain which make all the 
difference to mental phenomena may belong to a region where physic­
al determinism does not hold. This, he says, is a mere specul­
ative possibility, "but it interposes a veto upon materialistic 
dogmatism"
We may, therefore, conclude that Russell is a causal 
dualist.^ Thus, according to him, 'being grouped according to
1* The Analysis of Matter, p. l89.
2* An Outline of Philosophy, pp. 300, l83* 3» Ibid., p. 293*
4. See for example, R. Carnap, Philosophy and Logical Syntax, p.89-
3* The Analysis of Matter, p. 393; Human Knowledge, pp. 33-6.
6. M. Weitz, op. cit., p. 78.
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psycbological causal laws' is the differentia of the collection of 
events that is a mind, and 'being grouped according to physical 
causal laws’ is the differentia of the collection called matter*
Now, it seems natural to ask: what is the basis of the
distinction of the psychological and the physical lav;s? We have
already hinted to what the answer would be. We have said^ that,
although Russell rejects the distinction of privacy and publicity
of events as a dualistic criterion of the mental and the physical,
he nevertheless recognises that in an important sense this
distinction is the source of our distinguishing what we call mental
and physical. In this connection we have also seen how Russell
thinks that introspection gives us knowledge which is no part of
physics. So, ultimately it is the introspective knowledge of what
is private to ourselves that forms the basis of our distinguishing
psychology from physics, the mental from the physical. When
someone has a thought or feels a pain, others may have an indirect
and inferential knowledge of it, but they do not have the same
knowledge as one has. So, Russell thinks that in an important
sense there are private events, i.e. events that are private to
ourselves. These events may be public, but their publicity is 
2
only inferential in the sense that they can be known by others 
only through inference. On a commonsense level, these events may 
be called 'mental events'.
But Russell recognises that, stated in terms of the private
1. See above, p. 220.
2. Human Knowledge, p. 6 7; See above, p. 220.
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and the public, the distinction is not good enough for theoretical 
purposes. As we have seen, every event is in some sense private 
and in some sense public. It is, therefore, necessary to disting­
uish between the events which are private to ourselves, and the 
events which, though private to the perspectives to which they 
belong, are somehow different from the former. This can be done, 
Russell suggests, by reference to the ways in which the events are 
known. The events that are private to ourselves are known by us 
directly without inference. But the events that belong to outside 
perspectives can be known by anyone only through inference.
Russell therefore comes to recognise that the distinction of the 
mental and the physical is basically epistemological, So he 
says:
'   the ’’mental” and the ’’physical” are not so disparate
as is generally thought. I should define a ’’mental” 
occurrence as one which some one knows otherwise than by 
inference; the distinction between ’’mental” and ’’physical” ^ 
therefore belongs to theory of knowledge, not to metaphysics.'
The distinction is not exclusive. The mental events can be, 
and in fact are, also physical. As Russell says:
’My own belief is that the distinction between what is mental 
and what is physical does not lie in any intrinsic character 
of either, but in the way in which we acquire knowledge of 
them. I should call an event "mental” if it is one that
somebody can notice ....  I should regard all events as
physical but I should regard as only physical those which 
no one knows except by i n f e r e n c e .
Russell does not, however, mean that the events which are 
here called ’only physical* cannot, in principle, be mental as
1. Human Knowledge, p. 224.
2, My Philosophical Development, p. 254.
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well. He suggests that we have no positive argument to prove that
they are not thoughts, except such as may be derived from observation
of the differences between living and dead matter together with
inferences based on analogy of its absence. Nor do we have any
evidence that they are mental. We may only suppose that it is
highly improbable that they are mental, but we are certainly wrong,
says Russell, if we say that it is impossible.^
Although there is no exclusive division of events into 'mental'
and 'physical', it is still possible to distinguish events that
are private to ourselves and known by us without inference. If
it is accepted that there are such private events, "there is no
2
reason why there should not be a science of them." Psychology is 
the science which deals with such "private data and with the private 
aspects of data which commonsense regards as public."^ In con­
trast, physics is the science of what are in this sense public 
events and of the public aspects of events in general. As 
sciences, they define different laws, psychology being concerned 
mainly with "laws that connect one mental event with another"^ 
thus forming the groups called minds, and physics with laws 
connecting events into physical groups including those called 
pieces of matter.
We should note that the distinction of the psychological and
1. Human Knowledge, pp. 246-7*
2. Ibid., p. 62. 3» Ibid*, p. 59*
4. Ibid., p. 63.
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the physical causal laws and its connection with that of the private 
(introspective) and the public, as explained above, have been always 
there in Russell's neutral monism; but this connection, particularly 
the epistemological basis of the distinction comes out more 
prominently and is explained more elaborately in 'Human Knowledge' 
than in the earlier works*
We should observe that this epistemological definition of the 
mental and the corresponding distinction of psychology and physics 
do not appear to be altogether satisfactory. We certainly include 
as mental events those which are 'unconscious', and we apply some 
mental characteristics to animals as well. Russell himself 
admits these and takes human mental life as being continuous with 
animal life. But the definition of the mental events as being 
those which people know introspectively is as such too narrow for 
all these. In order therefore to accommodate these mental events 
which are not introspective in any straightforward sense, the 
definition has to be interpreted and applied somewhat liberally.
Now, the unconscious mental events are such that they have been at 
some stage on the level of consciousness or introspection and may 
at times come up to this level. So, in a generalised sense they 
can be taken as introspective data. So far as attribution of 
mental characteristics to animals is concerned, this is done on 
analogy on the basis of the observation of their behaviour.
The events that constitute their mental life are such as are 
taken as somewhat analogical to our introspective data. In this 
way, the unconscious mental events and the mental events of animal 
life can be said to be connected with introspective data, and
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therefore introspection may be regarded as the basis of the
distinction of psychology and physics. We may remember in this
connection that in ontology Russell begins by accepting the truth
of science and physics and psychology as two fundamental sciences.
In introspection he finds an epistemological justification of the
distinction of physics and psychology.
Russell recognises that physics has attained a state of
precision in defining its laws, which psychology has not yet
achieved. Nevertheless psychology is a science distinct from
physics and physiology, and in part independent of them.^ "Although,
at present, it is difficult to give important examples of really
precise mental causal laws, it seems pretty certain ..... that
2
there are such laws." In many cases psychological knowledge is
based upon "unformulated mental causality" and is "pre-scientific,
but it could not exist unless there were scientific laws which
could be ascertained by sufficient study".^
In order to explain mind and its differences from matter,
Russell has utilised different other notions. Subjectivity
which mind shares with non-mental perspectives plays an important
4
role in 'The Analysis of Mind' , but not so much in the later works. 
In this early work, the explanation of mind as distinct from matter 
involves the distinction of 'active' and 'passive' places. This is
1. Human Knowledge, p. 6 5.
2 . Ibid., p. 6 5.
3 . Ibid., p. 64.
4. Op. cit., pp. 295^6.
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related to the distinction of perspective and physical object or 
piece of matter. Not every perspective or series of perspectives 
is a mind. The perspective or biography that falls under psycholo­
gical causal laws forms a mind; and this is found at the place of 
an organism with sense-organs, nerves and brain. Several things 
combine; a group of appearances forming a perspective at a 'passive* 
place and falling under psychological causal laws and being com­
bined with 'mnemic* phenomena make a mind. In this explanation, 
the distinction of 'active' and 'passive' places forms a basis of 
the two ways of grouping particulars. Thus Russell says that 
causal laws of physics "group together particulars having the same 
'active' place, while psychology groups together those having the 
same 'passive* p l a c e " B u t  we have already seen that the 
conception of 'active' and 'passive' places does not and cannot
offer a basis of the distinction of mind and matter in his complete 
2
neutral monism in which the events that constitute both a mind 
(or a perspective) and a piece of matter (viz. a brain) are at the 
same place.
At the later stage of the theory, the manner in which events 
fall into groups according to psychological and physical laws is 
given in the following passage;
'Even if a mind consists of all the events in a brain, it 
does not consist of bundles of these events grouped as 
physics groups them, i.e. it does not lump together all 
the events that make one piece of matter in the brain, _ 
and then all the events that make up another, and so on.'
1. The Analysis of Mind, p. 301.
2. See above, p. 196*
3* An Outline of Philosophy, p. 300.
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Russell seems to mean that between the events which make 
up one atom or electron in the brain and the events which 
make up another, there can be another sort of relations, namely 
relations according to the psychological causal laws of habits, 
association, memory, etc. These laws do not require events to 
be grouped into lumps, but into a different arrangement in which 
the elements of different physical lumps become related to each 
other. Thus the consideration of psychological relations of 
events requires a breaking up of the lumps into which physics 
groups the events,^ It is this different grouping that distinguish­
es mind from matter, and psychology from physics. The difference 
between mind and matter is a difference of arrangements of events 
in different contexts. Thus "the context of a visual sensation
for physics is physical, and outside the brain ..... The context
2
of the visual sensation for psychology is quite different." The 
context in the latter case is a "number of events (which) will 
take place in your mind in accordance with the laws of psycholo­
gical causation, and it may be quite a long time before there is 
any purely physical effect ....
In his complete neutral monism, Russell maintains that all 
the events that constitute a mind are also among the 'stuff* of 
matter, i.e. the brain. Accordingly these events are both 
mental and physical. In 'An Outline of Philosophy'^, he recognises
1. This idea has been expressed by Russell somewhat differently
in The Analysis of Mind, p. 301*
2. Portraits from Memory, p. l48.
3. Ibid., p. l48.
4. Op. cit., p. 297*
280
two marked characteristics of a mind, one physical and the other
psychological. First, it is connected with a body; secondly it has
the "unity of one experience". From the point of view of the
physical characteristic, "every mental event known to us is also
part of the history of a living body, and we define a 'mind' as the
group of mental events which form part of the history of a certain
living b o d y " ' M e n t a l  events' are those "that are in a region
combining sensitivity and the law of learned reactions to a marked 
2
degree". This means that mental events have causal properties 
which include "knowledge-reactions" and "mnemic effects".^
'In the psychological way of defining a mind, it consists of 
all the mental events connected with a given mental event
by "experience", i.e. by mnemic causation, ....  we shall
define the "experience" to which a given mental event 
belongs as all those mental events which can be reached 
from the given event by a mnemic causal chain, which may 
go backwards or forwards, or alternately first one and 
then the other. This may be conceived on the analogy 
of an engine shunting at a junction, or where there are 
many points; any line that can be reached, by however 2^
many shuntings, will count as part of the same experience.'
Russell recognises^ that all the mental events connected 
with one body may not be connected by links of mnemic causation 
with each other, so that the physical and the psychological 
definitions of mind may not amount to the same thing. This 
refers particularly to cases of 'multiple' personality where some
1. An Outline of Philosophy, pp. 297-8
2 . Ibid., p. 296.
3 . Ibid., p. 297.
4. Ibid., pp. 298-9 •
5 . Ibid., p. 299,
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mental events are present in the life of one personality and 
absent in the life of the other. But both personalities may have 
mnemic connections with events which had occurred before the dis­
sociation took place; and in that case there would be only one 
mind according to the present definition. There may be mental 
events in every cell of the body, and only a few of them, particular­
ly those in the brain, may constitute the "central personality".^'
The "unconscious" may be the mental lives of subordinate parts
of the body, having occasional mnemic effects upon the central 
2
mental life. These are, of course, speculative possibilities, 
and Russell does not seem to take them seriously. Generally, he 
places the mental events, and therefore mind, in the brain.
Now, the important thing about the above definition is 
that mind has "the unity of one experience". This means that the 
mental events, i.e. sensations and images, which constitute a mj_nd 
are so related to each other that they together make one whole 
'system', one single structure, that has the property of realising 
itself as one experience. The relations that obtain among the 
events making up the unity of one experience are those of mnemic 
causation. Given any mental event at one moment, it has direct and 
indirect mnemic relations to many other mental events which are 
compresent with the given event. These events together with the 
given event make one whole experience which is the mind at the
1. An Outline of Philosophy, pp. 297, 299*
2. Ibid., p. 299.
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moment* All the sensations and images which make this momentary
state of mind need not, and in fact are not, conscious.^ The
whole realises itself as one experience in being conscious in respect
of some aspects of it. When, for example, I am perceiving a cat,
a number of percepts and images are occurring in me of which the
cat-percept is one. They are not all conscious; but they
together constitute one experience which is 'me* at the moment,
2
and which realises itself as such as being "cat perceptive".
The momentary state of a mind is then a group of causally connected 
events. This group is preceded and succeeded by similar groups 
of mental events which are causally connected with the events of 
the present group* We need not suppose that between any two 
successive groups there will be no numerically common events. On 
the contrary, between two successive groups, some events will be 
numerically the same, others will be numerically different but 
qualitatively similar. The two groups as groups will be different, 
although some events will be common.^ Such successive groups of 
mental events constitute a series which extending over the life­
time of an individual is his mind or biography. Every event is
of a brief duration; but a series of groups of them has a sort of
4
quasi-permanence. The series which is a mind, like one which is 
a piece of matter, is a relatively persistent independent causal
1. An Outline of Philosophy, pp. 213, 299-500;
See above, p. 242.
2. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. Il4.
3. See above, pp. 209-11»
4. See above, pp. 204, 20? ff.
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line, or rather a complicated system of causal lines. This 
accounts for the quasi-permanence as well as the identity of one 
mind or person that consists in the semi-similarity of the events 
belonging to the different momentary states of a mind or person.
Not all the events of a state or momentary group will be similar 
to all the events of any other state. There will be new accret­
ions every now and then. But there will still be similar events 
between different states or momentary groups; and the closer 
the states in time, the greater will be the similarity*
Now, it will be noticed that in the above analysis of Russell's 
conception of mind I have made use of the account of quasi-perman- 
ence as I have given b e f o r e I  believe that quasi-permanence 
as applied to mind and person can only be conceived in this way; 
and I do not see how else we could account for the fact of our 
feeling or knowledge of continued existence from moment to moment* 
For, if my mind at one moment consists of events or experiences 
which are all numerically different from those forming my mind 
at the immediate earlier or later moment, it would never be possible 
for me at any moment to know that these momentary minds make one 
continuous series that is 'me* or my mind. Simple similarity 
between two or more discontinuous momentary complex experiences, 
each entirely succeeding or preceding another, would never give 
the knowledge of continuity; for there would be nothing in one 
momentary complex experience that would make it realise that
1. See above, pp. 209 ff *
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it has been preceded by a similar experience. It is only with 
relation to somethin^ ;- known to be common between two successive 
complex states of mind that other elements can be known to be 
successive; and it is the knowledge of the common element with 
relation to successive elements that can give the knowledge of 
continuity. Thus the experience that gives us the knowledge of 
temporal sequence (i.e. Russell's 'specious present') should also 
be taken to give us the knowledge of continuity. Russell says that 
v/e can know in one experience one whole movement in which we can 
recognise an earlier and a later part. But the movement of one 
thing can be known only with relation to what does not move or 
what moves differently. If everything in our environment including 
ourselves were to move at a time at the same speed and in the same 
direction, we would not know any movement at all. Thus, for 
example, when I perceive the movement of one's arm, I can do so 
because other things which I simultaneously know do not move at 
all or move differently. This means that wnile I am perceiving 
the movement of the arm, some parts of this experience are present 
with my experience of certain things, and other parts of this 
experience with those of some other things. Thus the same 
experience is compresent with experiences that are not compresent 
with themselves. This gives me knowledge not only of temporal 
succession but also of continued existence from moment to moment.
We have seen that, according to Russell, points and instants over­
lap. If I have the knowledge of continued existence, the instants
of my life must overlap. But they can overlap only by containing 
common events as their constituents. I, therefore, conclude that
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the series of groups of events which is ray mind, is so constituted 
that the events of one momentary group do not change all at once 
but differently, so that any two successive groups contain events 
some of which are numerically the same, others being different but 
similar and still others being some new accretions. In this 
analysis of quasi-permanence of mind, as in that of matter, I am 
not using any new idea, but only putting together several of 
Russell's ideas. I am combining the idea of quasi-permanence with 
those of 'compresence' and 'overlapping' of instants in order to 
give an account of an obvious fact, namely our knowledge of 
continued existence from moment to moment, which seems otherwise 
inexplicable from Russellian point of view.
We have said that in the later stage of his philosophy 
Russell admits that in knowledge there is a distinction of subject 
and object. In this connection he seems to make a distinction 
between 'I' as a person and 'I' as a subject. It is a peculiar 
thing to notice that, although most of his books contain index 
lists of subjects (sometimes quite elaborate), none of them 
mentions 'person' or 'personality'. Even in the texts these words
are used on a few occasions only. 'An Inquiry into Meaning and
1 2 Truth' , and 'Human Knowledge' , have each a chapter on "egocentric
particulars" such as I, now, this, that, etc. Here he tries to
give some definitions of these terms without reference to the
1. Chapter VII.
2. Part II, Chapter IV,
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concept of 'person' as a simple thing. The discussions are carried 
on from rather an epistemological and linguistic point of view, 
but they imply the same metaphysical views as we have been discussing 
so far. We need not go into the details of these discussions.
We may bring out the position in the following way.
Russell begins by taking; 'this' as the basic term, and offers 
the following definitions;
" 'I' means 'The biography to which this belongs';
'here' means 'The place of this*; 'now' means 'The time of this', 
and so on."^
He makes a distinction between 'I' and 'I-now' and 'I-then'.
This distinction is the same as that which we have already dis­
cussed, namely the distinction of mind as the series of groups of 
sensations and images making a biography, and the momentary groups 
of sensations and images making momentary states of mind. Thus 
" *I-now' denotes a set of occurrences, namely all those that are
happening to me at the moment. 'This' denotes some of these 
,,2occurrences
As regards 'this', Russell suggests that it could be used by 
a suitably designed m a c h i n e a n d  accordingly its use does not 
involve anything specifically mental. But this would not avoid 
the relation of a speaker to the object with which the word is 
concerned. In respect of the theory of knowledge the relation 
would be one of the subject and object of knowledge. 'This' would
1. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. 108.
2. Ibid., p. Il4; Human Knowledge, pp. 319» 322,
3. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, pp. Ill ff,
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then mean "what I-now n o t i c e " I n  'Human Knowledge' Russell 
expresses this idea as follows :
' "I-now" denotes the complete complex of compresence which 
contains the present contents of my mind. "This" denotes 
whatever parts of this complex I am specially n o t i c i n g .
Thus, according to Russell, 'I* as a person is the whole 
of my biography; 'I* as the subject is the 'I-now' or even a part 
of it. 'I-now' consists of all my present sensations and images 
making one total experience of which 'this' is a part. As 'I-now' 
notice 'this' which is the object, it follows that the subject- 
object relation is one of 'noticing' by the wnole (complex of 
compresence) of a part of it. But if we consider what Russell has 
said earlier^, the relation is between the part 'this' (one or more 
sensations or images) and the rest of the complex that is my 
present momentary mind. On one view, the subject is the whole of 
'I-now'; on the other, it is a part of 'I-now'. But on either 
view, the subject is a complex of sensations (or percepts) and 
images, and not a single simple thing or ego.
The subject or 'I-now' is a complete complex of compresence 
having a single structure composed of sensations and images; 
these include not only the 'external sensations of sight, touch, 
etc., but also organic sensations of various sorts, with the 
characteristic feelings of pain and pleasure, comfort and discomfort, 
as also the images of past sensations. Many of these are uncon­
scious; only those upon which attention falls are conscious.
1. An Inquiry into Meaning and Truth, p. Il4.
2. Human Knowledge, p. 322.
3« An Outline of Philosophy, p. 221; see above, p. 233#
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Russell says that 'this’ is one occurrence (a percept or image) 
which is "specially noticed". But he admits that noticing or 
attention is a matter of degree. We need not, therefore, suppose 
that only one 'occurrence is noticed at one time. On the contrary, 
while one percept or image is specially noticed, some others may 
also be simultaneously noticed in various lesser degrees and are, 
therefore, conscious in various degrees; while still others are 
not noticed at all and as such are unconscious. It may be that 
the last group forms the greater part of the complete complex of 
compresence that is a mind at the moment. In so far as Russell 
admits that noticing is a matter of degree and that much of our 
mental life is unconscious, this analysis of the complex which is 
the 'I-now' seems quite reasonable. In any case, it will be 
improper to say that Russell includes only cognitive elements,^
For Russell, no element is in itself cognitive; and even where 
cognition arises, it attaches only to some elements of the complex 
unity of experience that is a mind. The complex is not just an 
aggregate or 'bundle'; it is rather a highly integrated and 
organised whole, a single structure composed of causally related 
compresent events, and can be treated as a unit which has 
'emergent properties'.
The subject-object relation, then, is between the wnole 
(or part) of 'I-now' and a part 'this' which is specially noticed. 
Russell explains knowledge or consciousness with the help of the
1. This rejects J. Laird's suggestion to the contrary.
Cf. The Philosophy of Bertrand Russell, p. 301.
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notion of ’noticing', which he does not d e f i n e I t  may be an
"emergent" property appearing in the complex structure that is a
2
mind. In so far as Russell admits that mind is emergent, there 
seems to be no difficulty in supposing that 'noticing' or 'atten­
tion' is an emergent property of mind.
Now, as a person I am the wnole of my biography which is 
a series of groups of causally related events. Given any event
'this', 'I' may be defined as the wnole biography to which 'this'
belongs. But it is difficult, Russell admits, to give a definition 
of 'you' as distinct from 'I'. Here we have to take some inferred
event, corresponding to 'this'; and 'you' can be defined as the 
biography to which the inferred event (a percept or image) belongs.
According to Russell, there is thus a distinction between 
'I' as a person and 'I-now' and 'I-then' which are the momentary 
states of the person. The person persists for a certain period 
of time during which it retains a sort of identity of structure 
consisting in the similarity of events that compose it. Personal 
identity, according to Russell, is mainly a matter of memory.
But if our analysis is correct, it must also involve the 
knowledge of continued existence from moment to moment. Moreover,
3
personal identity involves the identity of the body# As, 
according to Russell, the events that constitute a mind also 
constitute a brain, and as a mind is always known to be connected
1. See above, pp. 242-4.
2. See below, p. 292.
3. A discussion of the criteria of personal identity may be found 
in B.A.O. Williams, 'Personal Identity and Individuation', 
Essays in Philosophical Psychology (D.F. Gustafson ed.).
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with a body, the connection of personal identity with bodily identity 
is undeniable. His postulates of quasi-permanence and independent 
causal lines are supposed to account for the iaentity of both 
persons and non-living things. We have considered these before.^
But the relation of mind and body, as conceived by Russell, is 
not one of logical necessity, but is only an empirical fact. We
shall discuss this and some other points about the mind-body 
relation and the concept of a person in the following chapter.
1. See above, pp. 204 ff.
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CHAPTER VI 
BODY, MIND AND PERSON.
According to Russell, mind and matter are, then, complexes 
composed of the same stuff, namely the neutral events. Minds 
and material thing's are each a 'single structure' , an organised 
whole. Their difference lies in the two ways of grouping of 
events under the two kinds of causal laws, namely the psychological 
and the physical laws, which are not reducible to one another.
Much that concerns the relation of mind and matter has already been 
considered above. There are, however, a few points that demand 
further consideration. These are some of the questions that 
have special reference to the mind-matter or mind-body situation 
which involves the concept of a person. In what follows these 
will be taken up in three separate sections.
1. Is Mind an Emergent from Matter?
We have referred to the question before. Russell considers 
this in connection .with C.D. Broad's contention that mind is a 
material structure, but that it has emergent properties which 
cannot, even theoretically, be derived from those of its material 
constituents. Broad is an emergent materialist, and Russell 
refutes this position in 'An Outline of Philosophy'.^
Russell takes up the question in several parts. He asks :
'Is matter emergent from events? Is mind emergent from 
events? If the former, is mind emergent from matter, or 
even deducible from the properties of matter, or neither?
1. Op. cit., pp. 293 ff*
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If the latter, is matter emergent from mind, or deducible from 
the properties of mind, or neither?
For the purpose of the consideration of these questions,
Russell coins a word, 'chrono-geography', for the science which 
begins with events having space-time relations but does not assume 
at the outset that certain streams of them can be treated as 
persistent material units or as minds. The question now is whether 
the sciences of matter and mind are completely reducible to 
chrono-geography. As regards matter, Russell says that the present 
state of science does not offer a decided answer. In so far as 
physics has not yet been able to reduce the laws of electrons, 
protons, photon, quantum, etc., into the laws of chrono-geography, 
"for the present materiality is practically, though perhaps not 
theoretically, an emergent characteristic of certain groups of 
events,"^
As regards mind, Russell maintains that the insufficiency 
of our knowledge of psychology makes it difficult to speak intel­
ligently. Nevertheless, the knowledge of events we have in 
psychology is very different from chrono-geography, and no amount 
of physics can give us the knowledge we have in psychology. Our 
knowledge of facts about mind "contains features of ^ qualitative 
sort which cannot be deduced from the merely mathematical features 
of the space-time events".^ Russell concludes that mind is 
emergent from events.
1. Ibid , , p , 294.
2. An Outline of Philosophy, p. 295
3. Ibid., p. 295.
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Coming to the question as to whether mind is an emer­
gent from matter, Russell answers in the negative and thus rejects 
emergent materialism.^ The argument is based on that of the two 
ways of grouping of events into mind and matter and the definition 
of mind that follows from this. In a passage already quoted 
Russell maintains that even if a mind consists of all the events
in a brain, the psychological and the physical ways of grouping of
2
events are still different. He also holds that events might fall 
under either group without falling under the o t h e r T h i s  is also 
connected with the irreducibility of the two kinds of causal laws 
into one another. Even if mnemic causation is not ultimate, there 
would still be knowledge in psychology which could never form part 
of physics.
In this connection Russell also mentions that it is possible
4
to maintain that matter is emergent frum mind. From a pheno- 
menalistic point of view, matter could be constructed out of 
percepts and auxiliary concepts, derived from percepts and assumed 
to have no reality but introduced to simplify the laws of percepts. 
But although he recognises some merits of such a theory, he in 
fact rejects it* Thus he maintains that both mind and matter are 
emergents from events, but neither is an emergent from the other.
1. An Outline of Philosophy, p. .500.
2. See above,pp. 278-9*
5. Portraits from Memory, p. 1^9; See below, jp. 297-8,
4. An Outline of Philosophy, p. 301.
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So, SuBsell's theory at the later stage turns out to be a 
kind of ’emergent neutral monism'; but not emergent materialism 
or emergent mentalism. Both mind and matter are emergent. 
Mentality and materiality are emergent properties belonging to 
differently arranged groups of events, but not to single events. 
Events in themselves are neither mental nor physical, but neutral.
The acceptance of the concept of 'emergence' is a very 
significant step in Russell's philosophy and needs emphasising. 
Without it his analytic philosophy would have remained incomplete 
in a very important sense. So long as he did not accept this con­
cept, the model of philosophical explanation for him was that of 
the physicist's analysis of water into oxygen and hydrogen.^ He 
then thought that the hydrolysis of water was all that Was there to
be done to explain water. He thought that the properties of the
2
complex could be inferred from those of the parts. But as Allan 
Wood remarks, a physicist is obviously wrong if he thinks that, 
after carrying out the hydrolysis of water, he can still get a 
cooling drink from the products of his analysis.^ Now, it is true 
that oxygen and hydrogen into which water is analysed do not 
separately give the cooling drink. Yet it remains a scientific 
fact that the cooling drink which is water is not anything over 
and above oxygen and hydrogen, —  there is no third element, a 
cooling ingredient or substance in it, —  but only oxygen and
1. For example, The Analysis of Matter, pp. 284 ff.
2, Ibid., p. 286.
3* My Philosophical Development, p. 271.
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hydrogen in a certain proportion combined in a certain way. 'Being 
a cooling drink' is not a substance, element or ingredient; it is 
only a property. But it is not a property of oxygen or of hydrogen. 
This could not be deduced from or reduced to the properties of 
oxygen and hydrogen. Yet it does not exist independently of oxygen 
and hydrogen. It arises as a quality of a certain combination of 
the two elements. It is thus an 'emergent' property. So long as 
this is not recognised, the physicist's statement remains 
incomplete. In the same manner, analytic philosophy remains 
incomplete so long as it is thought that the analysis of a complex 
into its elements is all that is to be done. This of course gives 
important knowledge, but not the whole knowledge. Thus the analy­
sis of mind and matter into particulars or events does not give 
all knowledge about them. It only shows that there is no further 
elements or substance called mind or matter. But this does not 
complete the picture : there always remains the question as to
how we get the properties of the complexes from those of the parts.
As for example, in the particular case of mind, it remains a 
problem as to how sensations and images which are in themselves 
non-cognitive can give cognition or consciousness in certain 
combinations of them. So long as it is maintained that conscious­
ness or cognition as a property of groups can be inferred from 
the properties of the constituents, it is imperative that the 
inference be demonstrated. But this is not possible; at any rate 
Russell did not do so. And in the absense of it, it was possible
to say that his explanation was incomplete and that it could not 
give a satisfactory account of mind and matter. But the accept­
296
ance of the concept of 'emergence' affords a sort of theoretical 
completeness to his philosophy. The properties of complexes are 
not now inferrable from the properties of the constituent elements; 
they are emergent properties arising in certain groups of elements. 
Thus 'consciousness', 'noticing', etc., in short mentality and 
materiality, are now 'emergent' properties not reducible to or 
inferrable from those of events. This, however, does not involve 
the introduction of any new element or substance over and above 
sensations (or percepts), images and unperceived events, which 
still remain the neutral constituents of the world. Thus, 
Russell's philosophy as it takes the ford of 'emergent neutralism' 
attains a greater plausibility and completeness than it had in its 
earlier form.
2. Mind-Bbdy Relation; The Identity Hypothesis,
In this connection what needs special consideration here
is the relation of mind and brain. Their difference, according
to Russell, consists not in the raw material of which they are
composed, but in the manner of grouping. We have seen how he
constructs the matter of the brain out of percepts and images,^
In fact all our experiences, according to this view, are parts of
the stuff of the brain. So he says that "the events that make a
living brain are actually identical with those that make the
2
corresponding mind,"
1. See above, pp* 191-2.
2. Portraits from Memory, p. 147.
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Thus the connection between brain and mind is obvious. 
Corresponding to every mental event there is "some physical modi­
fying of the brain, and mental life must be connected with 
physical properties of the brain t i s s u e " F o r ,  it is the same 
event that is at once a constituent of both the mind and the brain. 
As a part of the structure of the brain it is related to other 
parts according to physical causal laws; as a constituent of the
mind it is related to other events in the brain according to the
laws of psychology. Russell says,
'An event is not rendered either mental or material by any 
intrinsic quality, but only by its causal relations. It 
is perfectly possible for an event to have both the causal 
relations characteristic of physics and those character­
istic of psychology. In that case, the event is both mental 
and material at once. There is no more difficulty about 
this than there is about a man being at once a baker and 
a father.
Thus the same events can be, and in fact are, constituents of 
a brain and a mind. Every mental event is also a brain event.
But Russell does not think that this justifies the statement that
there can be no such thing as "disembodied mind". He says:
'There would be disembodied mind if there were groups of 
events connected according to the laws of psychology, but 
not according to the laws of physics. We readily believe
that dead matter consists of groups of events arranged
according to the laws of physics, but not according to the 
laws of psychology. And there seems no a priori reason why 
the opposite should not occur. We can say we have no 
empirical evidence of it, but more than this we cannot say.'^
This confirms the statement we made earlier, namely 
that events may fall under either group without falling under the
1. Portraits from Memory, p. l48
2. Ibid., pp. 152-3*
3* Ibid., p. 149.
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other also. This means that the relation of mind and body is only 
contingent. It is an empirical fact, but not of the nature of 
logical necessity. Events may or may not fall unaer both the 
groups at once. But as far as our knowledge goes, we always find 
a mental group connected with a brain. This idea is maintained by 
Russell not only in the above passage, it has been implied in his 
earlier works as well, particularly in 'An Outline of Philosophy*. 
In that book he qualifies his statement about the connection of 
body and mind with the phrase "known to us"^, suggesting thereby 
the idea that we find here. His denial of the emergence of mind 
from matter may be taken to support it. Thus, for him, the state­
ment that "the events that make a living brain are actually 
identical with those that make the corresponding mind" is as much 
contingent as the statement that "a man who is a baker is also a 
father".
Russell maintains that the old problem of the relations
of mind and matter, and of the dependence of mind on brain or of
brain on mind, arises through mistakenly treating them as simple
things. But if they are treated, as he suggests, as groups of
2
( events, the"whole problem vanishes".
It will have been noticed that as regards the relation of 
mind and brain Russell is maintaining a theory which in a 
somewhat modified form has, of late, come to be known as * the
1* An Outline of Philosophy, p. 297»
2. Portraits from Memory, p. 155»
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Identity Theory’, and has a good number of advocates now-a-days. 
Russell does not call his theory by this name; nevertheless he 
uses the expression ’’identical with” in the pssage quoted above.
John Beloff recognises^ that Russell has maintained 
the identity theory in ’Portraits from Memory’ (1956) and ’My 
Philosophical Development’ (1959)* But we have found that he has 
in fact been maintaining the same theory since 192? when he pub­
lished 'The Analysis of Matter’ and ’An Outline of Philosophy’ 
wherein he constructed the matter of the brain out of our experi­
ences, that is, percepts and images. Even on Beloff’s showing,
i.e. the bibliography he offers^, Russell appears to be the 
earliest exponent of the theory* My point is that the iaentity 
theory is not in fact as recent as it is supposed to be; it is, 
in one form, as old as Russell's complete neutral monism.
There are, however, important differences between Russell's 
identity theory and other versions of it. According to these other 
versions, mind and brain are one and the same, —  i.e. mental states
are identical with brain-states. This has been held by, among
4 *5 6 7others, H. Feigl, U.T, Place, J.J.C. Smart and A. Quinton .
1. J. Beloff, ’The Identity Hypothesis: a Critique’, Brain and
Mind (J.R, Smythies, ed.), p. 37 foot-note.
2. See above, pp. 189-90, 191-4*
3. J, Beloff, op. cit., pp. 37 foot-note, 38 foot-note.
4. Op. cit.
5. 'Is Consciousness a Brain Process?', British Journal of
Psychology, 1956.
6. Philosophy and Scientific Realism; also 'Sensations and Brain 
Processes’, The Philosophy of Mind (V.C, Chappel ed.).
7* Op. cit*
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The world, according to them, consists of only one kind of 
entities, namely physical events, some of which can be referred 
to by both mental and physical expressions. Now, one fundamental 
point of difference is that for Russell events in themselves 
are neutral, whereas for others they are all physical. Another 
important difference is that according to Russell mind and body, 
or mental states and brain states, as such are not identical, 
the identity being of the events composing them under different 
arrangements; whereas according to others mind and body, or mental 
states and brain states, are identical. A third point of differ­
ence concerns the question of disembodied mind. In Russell’s view, 
this is logically possible, but according to others this is not. 
While Russell is a neutral monist, others are physicalists or 
materialists.
In view of the above, we can call Russell’s theory a 'theory 
of identity of the constituents of mind and brain*, but we cannot 
call it a 'mind-body identity theory’#
The identity theory as Russell propounds it has certain 
advantages over the theory of others. Some objections which are 
perhaps rightly made against the latter are not effective against 
the former. For example, Russell’s position does not involve the 
sort of category mistakes that James Cornman mentions. Cornman 
says that the acceptance of the identity theory will force us into 
applying expressions like nagging, fading, false, true, etc., to 
physical processes, and such expressions as physical, swift, hard, 
etc., to mental processes. But this means attributing predicates, 
appropriate to one logical category, to expressions belonging to a
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different category; and this is a conceptual mistake*^ As G.N.A.
2
Vesey points out, the theory involves a "mixed-category” identity; 
the identity is not that of one physical thing apprehended in two 
different ways, or of a mind or anything else apprehended in two 
different ways, but of mental states with brain states. Vesey 
points out that the exponents of the theory do not supply the 
criteria of the identity. Now, Russell's position does not seem 
to suffer from these difficulties. In so far as mind and brain 
are different, there is no necessity of confusing the predicates 
belonging to different logical categories, namely mental and 
physical. Moreover, the iaentity is not that of a mental thing 
with a physical thing, but of the same neutral events arranged 
in two different ways.
One objection to the moaern physicalist or materialist 
identity theory is raised from the standpoint of 'parapsychology' 
Russell, of course, does not discuss the problem of parapsychology; 
and recent investigations in this field have not yet been able to 
offer any decided opinion on the subject. It seems, however, clear 
that paranormal cases like telepathy, clairvoyance, etc., are an 
obstacle in the way of reducing the mental to the physical, the 
psychological causation to physical causation. But Russell's 
position does not seem to be affected by this. We have seen that 
for him the two types of causation are irreducible, and that a
1. J. Cornman, 'The Identity of Mind and Body', Journal of 
Philosophy, Vol. 59 (19^2), pp. 4-90-1.
2. The Embodied Mind, p. 39*
3. J. Beloff, op, cit., pp. 50 ff*
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disembodied mind is logically possible. These ideas may be flex­
ible enough to accommodate paranormal cases in his neutral 
monistic philosophy.
There are further difficulties involved in the physicalist 
identity theory; and it is doubtful if a mind-body or mind-matter 
identity can be consistently maintained from the physicalist or 
materialist point of view. There is an ambiguity in the conception 
of the physicalist identity theory. The theory may be said to 
make two main assertions: The first statement is to the effect
that mind is identical with the brain or that mental states or 
events are identical with brain states or events which are physical. 
Here the mental and the physical are at par, i.e. of equal status, 
with one another; as terms of a relation of identity they stand on 
equal footings, they are, in other words, co-ordinate concepts or 
categories. The second statement is that all states of affairs 
or events are physical, that what is called mental (or what mental 
state expressions stand for) is only physical, for the physical is 
the only reality and the only real category. Here the mental 
does not stand on the same or equal footing with the physical as it 
does in the first statement. These two statements are not thus 
compatible with one another. Yet in the physicalist theory they 
are put together; and thus put, they involve the logical fallacy of 
'equivocation*. This can be brought out in terms of the typical 
analogical illustration that the supporters of the theory use.
"The Evening star and the Morning star are one and the same thing". 
This seems all right. But the difficulty arises if it is asserted 
in the same breath that what is there is only the Evening star (or
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only the Morning star). In the first statement Morning star 
atands as having an equal status with the Evening star; but in 
the second it does not; and hence the fallacy.
Thus to talk of mind-body or mind-matter identity and to 
talk of physicalism or materialism at the same time involve 
a conceptual confusion. According to the physicalist identity 
theory, some entities of the world can be referred to by two kinds 
of statements, namely the mental state statements and brain state 
statements. There are therefore two sets of statements or propo­
tions; and there is a one-one correlation between them such that 
for every proposition in one set we have a proposition in the 
other set. The correlation or co-ordination is established through 
the fact of their reference to a set of common objects. Thus, for 
example, two propositions, say P and Q, refer to one and the same 
object. P and Q become correlated or co-ordinated through the fact 
of their reference to the common object. So there is an identity 
of the object of réference of the two propositions. But the 
difficulty arises from the further assertion that the object 
referred to is in fact appropriate only to P and not to Q. The
physicalist identity theory asserts that there is a correlation 
between mental state statements and brain or physical state 
statements, and that they are co-ordinated through the common 
object to which they refer. But it declares at the same time 
that the common object is in fact a brain state, a physical 
object, and thereby gives supremacy to the physical side. The 
two co-ordinate sets of statements are no more co-ordinate, and 
hence the fallacy we have mentioned. Infect, according to this
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theory, one set, one side of the relatxon of co-ordination, or
in other words one term of the relation of identity, ' disapi: ears ’ .
The relation of mind-body identity is conceived to be "the sort
of relation which obtains between ....  existent entities and
non-existent entities"»^ But if this is true, if one term of the
relation is non-existent, there simply is no relation, no case
for identity. It is difficult to see how a 'non-existent entity’
is a term of a relation. If there is only one term, to talk of
a relation is to talk non-sense.
It does not therefore seem possible to maintain mind-body
2
or mind-matter identity and physicalism at the same time. For, 
if identity is true, mind and matter, the mental and the physical, 
must stand equal in status; and if physicalism is true, they cannot. 
For the same reasons, identity is not possible to maintain from a 
mentalistic or idealistic position.
It seems to follow that the identity theory is not compatible 
with either physicalism or mentalism. In this respect, neutral 
monism is in a better position. It is able to assert a sort of 
identity of events constituting mind and brain. This is possible
1. R. Rorty, *Mind-Body Identity, Privacy, and Categories*, 
Philosophy of Mind (S. Hampshire ed.), p. 33#
2. The arguments here do not seem to apply to the Identity 
Hypothesis produced by R.J. Hirst in The Problems of Perception, 
pp. 191 ff., in so far as he recognises two aspects (mental
and physical) of the same "whole event", or whole situation 
which he thinks can be referred to in a "neutral way". Our 
concern has been only to argue against the physicalist form of 
Identity Hypothesis.
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because neutral monism does not subsume or subordinate one of 
mind and matter under the other, because it gives equal status to 
both of them. The identity it asserts is not that of mind and 
brain as such, but of the constituent events grouped in two 
different ways. Thus the identity theory in its neutral monistic 
form seems to be more intelligible than it is in its physicalist 
form.
We have seen that the identity theory as propounded by 
Russell avoids certain objections that are usually raised against 
the theory in its physicalist form. And if what we have said above 
is correct, it seems to follow that the theory in its form as an 
aspect of neutral monism as we find in Russell's philosophy stands 
a better chance of being true than it does in its physicalist or 
materialist form. In this form, the theory, we have found, is as 
old as Russell's complete neutral monism.
3 . The Concept of a Person.
We already referred to the concept of a person while discussing 
the distinction of the subject and the object of knowledge.^ In 
a broad sense, 'Person' does not mean a mind alone or a body alone. 
It stands for an individual human being who is said to have both a 
mind and a body; perhaps more properly speaking, it is the 
characteristic of a person in this sense that it possesses various
1. See above, ppo^gy-^f.
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physical properties as well as different forms of consciousness*
The problems concerning the concept of a person are mainly 
those of the relation of mind and body, or the mental and the phy­
sical* Russell's neutral monism is an attempt at a solution of the 
mind-body problems that arise out of the dualistic conception of a 
person as a combination of a mind and a body* But there is a 
special problem connected with the question of the mind-body 
relation* This is the problem of personal identity, and it can 
be variously formulated from different standpoints* It may, 
therefore, be well to rehearse Russell's conception of a person 
and to consider if it explains the relevant problems of personal 
identity. This discussion seems important particularly in view of 
some recent views of the concept of a person,^ which seems to 
oppose the idea that the concept of a person admits of analysis*
The various forms of the problem of personsil identity may be 
2
summed up as follows* Any dualistic view, Cartesian or non- 
Cartesian, has to produce an account of the way in which a mind is 
lodged in a body* It must explain if there could be more than one 
mind in one body, if the same mind could be in different bodies 
at the same or different times, and how it is decided which mind 
goes with which body# If the mind-body relation is one of causal 
connection, this connection itself must be explained* Again, if a
1 * The reference is to the views developed by P.F. Strawson in his 
book 'Individuals'*
2* A.J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person and Other Essays, p. 84.
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mind is a substance, there is a question about how it is identified. 
On the other hand, if it is a collection of experiences, there is 
the problem of how the collection is formed, —  a problem to which 
Hume himself confessed perplexity and defeat. On such a view, there 
is the further problem of identifying the experiences themselves; 
we ordinarily identify experiences in terms of the persons whose 
experiences they are; but if we are to analyse and define persons 
in terms of experiences, there is then an apparent vicious circle.
We have to ask: Does Russell's neutral monism suffer from
these problems, or does it explain them? Now, we have seen that 
Russell defines a person as a 'biography'. A person, on his view, 
cannot be regarded as a 'compound' of two separate entities; nor 
can it be regarded as the compound or product of two sets of 
separate entities. The constituents of a mind are also the 
constituents of a body (i.e. the brain); there is thus an identity 
of the 'stuff with a difference of arrangements. We can, of 
course, talk of a mind as a complex set of entities (events) 
forming a biography, and of a body as a complex set of entities 
(events) forming also a biography* We may also call the former 
a 'mental biography' and the latter a 'physical biography'. But 
we cannot say that a person is a sum-total of two sets of separate 
entities. The two sets are in fact composed of the same neutral 
entities. There is only one collection of entities; all of them 
in one arrangement form the body, and some of them fall also under 
a different arrangement and make the mind. Thus, a person in the 
broad sense is a 'complex biography' consisting of all the events 
that make a complex mind-body situation*
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It may have been clear from our discussions so far that 
Russell's answer to the problems of how a mind is lodged in a body 
and how they are related lies in his contention that the mind of a 
person consists of the events which are among the constituents of 
his brain. There seems, therefore, no difficulty in deciding 
which mind goes with which body. The mind that goes with a body 
is the one that is constituted by the same events which (together 
with others) constitute that part of the body which is called the 
brain; and conversely, the body that goes with a mind is the one 
which has a brain composed, partially at least, of the events which 
constitute the mind. This shows that one mind cannot be in more 
than one body at the same time, in as much as one brain cannot be 
in more than one body at the saune time* The question whether 
there can be more than one mind in one body is the same as the 
question whether there can be more than one brain in one body*
We have already discussed how he explains the connection of events 
that form a mind. Each momentary total state of a mind is what 
he calls a 'complete complex of compresence' which has a 'single 
structure' and a 'unity of experience' consisting of events 
(sensations and images) connected by the relations of psychological 
causation* The series of such momentary states forming the mind 
or mental biography of a person (like the series of momentary 
states forming one physical thing or body) is explained by the 
notions of 'quasi-permanence' and the 'intrinsic causal laws' of 
spatio-temporal and structural continuity of separable causal lines.
The relation of one particular mind and one particular brain 
follows from the way in which Russell constructs mind and matter.
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The events that make one mind at one time are all compresent* They 
are in one region of space-time. The events that are in one 
particular region of space-time can be constituents of that piece 
of matter only which is at that region of space-time, and in this 
case, the particular piece of matter is a brain*
Thus far, the position seems to be one of a very clear and 
strong connection between mind and body (brain), yielding a 
straightforward criterion of personal identity. But the situation 
becomes confused if we take into consideration Russell's suggestion 
of the logical possibility of 'disembodied minds', which tends to 
reduce the mind-body relation to an empirical fact, or at best to 
an empirical necessity. Although this suggestion comes out openly 
at a very late stage in the history of Russell's thought, this 
could, as we said, be connected with his earlier views given 
particularly in 'An Outline of Philosophy'. But there is scope for 
alternative interpretations of his definition of mind as given in 
that book. We have seen^ that he offers therein a physical and a 
psychological definition of mind and mental events, and combines 
them to give a complete picture of the case. We quoted him saying 
that from the point of view of the physical characteristics of mind 
and mental events, "every mental event known to us is also part of 
the history of a living body, and we define a 'mind' as the group 
of mental events which form part of the history of a certain body,"
1. See above, pf>^
2. See above, p.
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Now, interpreted literally with emphasis on the expression "part 
of the history of a certain living body", this definition should 
mean a logical connection between a particular mind and a particular 
body, and this would hardly leave a scope for a 'disembodied mind'# 
But if the expression "known to us" as it occurs in this definition 
is emphasised, it would then be consistent with a 'disembodied mind', 
but the logical character of the definition and the logical criteria 
of personal identity would suffer a weakness. Thus, if we favour 
and emphasise the stronger interpretation, the introduction of the 
possibility of a 'disembodied mind', might be supposed to constitute 
a sort of inconsistency in Russell's thought in so far as the 
personal identity criteria are concerned.
But we need not perhaps take Russell's admission of the mere 
logical possibility of a 'disembodied mind' too seriously or even 
too literally. His intention seems only to be that he does not 
like to shut the conceivability of grouping of events according 
to psychological laws only. He only points out that there is no 
logical impossibility in thinking that events may fall into groups 
under psychological laws alone without falling under physical laws, 
just as it is not only logically possible but actually the case 
that events often fall into groups under physical laws alone forming 
physical objects including pieces of matter. But at a place where 
events fall under both kinds of laws they form one particular body 
and one particular mind. He does not discuss at all what would 
be the nature of the so-called 'disembodied mind', and he emphasises 
that we have no evidence that there are such things* And we must 
remark that it seems hardly possible to call such groups, if any.
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•minds* in the same sense in which Russell^ speaks of
minds of persons as explained above* Of the two ways of defining 
a mind, one, viz,, the physical way, would not apply to them at all, 
but this is an essential part of Russell's definition of minds of 
persons. Accordingly, 'mind' as applied to these supposed groups 
of events would be a 'misnomer' in the context of his neutral 
monistic thought. Taking into consideration the general trend of 
his approach to the problem of mind-body relation, I should think 
that the expression "disembodied mind" should always be used ,itp> m
within inverted commas to indicate its funda­
mental difference from the concept of mind as applied to persons*
We may, then, take Russell as advocating strongly that one 
particular mind is connected with one particular body (or brain) 
and that one mind cannot be in more than one body 'at the same time'* 
The last qualification seems important in view of the present day 
sensational achievements in 'transplant' surgery, which seem to 
make it logically possible that the brain of one person may be 
transplanted into the body of another. Now, as the mind of a 
person, according to Russell, is constituted by the events which also 
constitute his brain, a 'brain-transplant' would also be a 'mind- 
transplant'. If, for example, John's brain were transplanted into 
the body (head) of Albert, Albert's body would then have not only 
John's brain, but also John's mind, i.e. John's memories, mental 
habits, skills, etc. There is, of course, the possibility that, 
as a result of the 'transplant', 'Albert', with his new brain may
have a complete amnesia. But this is not the standard case under 
consideration. The standard case would be one in which after the
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successful operation 'Albert' had a past. Now, such a case is 
possible within the framework of Russell's theory; and it would 
be in a sense a test case for the idea that the constituents of the 
mind of a person are also the constituents of his brain. If after 
the transplant of John's brain into Albert's body, 'Albert' had a 
past and if this past did not fit with John's past life but with 
Albert's own past life, the theory would be definitely disproved.
If, on the other hand, 'Albert' had, after the transplant, a past 
which fitted completely with the past life of John, the theory would 
have some support from the case. Of course, this supposed case would 
lend support not only to Russell's theory in particular but also to 
other theories of mind-brain identity or correlation. Now, the 
Cartesian sort of mind-brain correlation has lost favour with most 
philosophers now-a-days; and we have seen in the last section that 
an identity theory from a physicalist or a mentalist point of view 
is not logically tenable. So, once these other theories have been 
rejected on other grounds, there would remain only the neutralist 
identity theory (such as Russell's) to be either supported or 
disproved by the supposed transplant cases. Until it is decided 
either way, it seems not unreasonable to suppose that the theory 
may be true.
The case of 'transplant' or interchange of 'brain and mind' 
would, however, raise certain problems of personal identity. It 
would be a question whether after the transplant of John's brain/ 
mind into Albert's body we should regard the person now with Albert's 
body and John's brain/mind as the same person as Albert (or John) 
had been before the operation. As, in this case, there would
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apparently be no outward difference in the body of Albert, there 
would be a motive for regarding this person as the same Albert 
with memories, mental habits, skills, etc. like those as John used 
to have. But let us suppose that the surgeons find it easier to 
transplant the head with the entire face and neck than to trans­
plant the brain alone* In this case, the temptation may be to 
the reverse of the former case. I should remark that I mention 
these cases only to point out the sort of difficulties that would 
arise from these cases, and not to offer a definite solution of them* 
But Russell's position seems clear. He thinks that even in ordinary 
cases a person at two different times is not just the same; his 
identity consists not in the numerical identity of the constituents 
but in what he calls quasi-permanence and spatio-temporal and 
structural continuity. As the complex mind-body situation, i.e. 
the complex personal structure after the 'transplant' would be so 
very different from the one before it, Russell would perhaps suggest 
a re-christening of the person with a newly transplanted brain/mind 
or head/mind.
The possibility of these 'transplant' cases has to be disting­
uished from certain other possibilities which would fall under para­
psychology. It may be supposed that someone, say David, undergoes 
sudden and violent change of character, that he claims to remember 
witnessing certain events and doing certain actions which he 
previously did not claim to remember, that he cannot now remember 
witnessing certain events and doing certain actions which he 
previously did remember, and that he now shows skills and habits 
which he previously did not possess. On scrutiny it may be found
314
that the memories, habits, skills, etc, which he now has, all point 
to the life history of some one person in the past, say Dr# Johnson# 
This obviously does not involve anything like a 'transplant' case# 
The question is: could we possibly regard it as a change of the
mind of the person and a change of personal identity? i#e# could we 
say that David had now Dr# Johnson's mind or that he was now 
Dr# Johnson?
This and similar other possible cases have been elaborately
discussed by B.A.O. Williams in his article referred to above#^
We need only to point out that this case is logically of a different
kind from the 'transplant' cases which we have discussed above#
The fundamental difference seems to lie in this; In the surgical
case one brain/mind can be transplanted at one time into one body
only. But the position is not the same in the para-normal case#
If it is logically possible that David should undergo the changes
described above, it is also logically possible that another man,
2
say Robert, should simultaneously undergo the same changes# This 
means that both David and Robert should at the same time have 
memories, skills, habits, etc. like those of Dr. Johnson# But 
we cannot say that the same mind (Dr. Johnson's mind) is at once in 
two different bodies, or that David and Robert are both Dr# Johnson# 
Therefore, the best description of David and Robert in their new 
conditions would be that they both had somehow become like
1# B.A.O. Williams, 'Personal Identity and Individuation', Essays 
in Philosophical Psychology (D#F, Gustafson ed*)#
2# Ibid, p# 541 f#
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Dr. Johnson, that they somehow knew all about him.^
We must note that the possibility of such changes arise from 
what is called clairvoyance. The only possible way to account 
for these changes is to suppose that David and Robert have come to 
know clairvoyantly all about Dr. Johnson, and that this new knowledge 
has been so obsessive that they have forgotten their own past life. 
This forgetfulness may last for the rest of their lives, but it can 
always be supposed that they may be cured of that; and it is only 
natural that they would be put under psychiatric treatment. But 
in the transplant case, one would not possibly think of psychiatric 
treatment of the person having a new brain/mind*
We may thus regard these cases as para-psychological involving 
clairvoyance. We have already observed that, as Russell accepts 
the irreducibility of psychological causation, his theory is not 
necessarily repudiated by para-psychology. Russell maintains that 
all our knowledge and experience consists of events in the brain*
So, if a person has clairvoyant or telepathic knowledge, such know­
ledge would consist of events which would be among the constituents 
of his brain also. Para-psychology is not yet decisive; but there
is nothing in it which proves that para-normal cases do not require
2
the functioning of a brain or do not involve events in the brain.
Now, on Russell's view, the concept of a person may be said to 
be derivative in the sense that it can be analysed in terms of 
simpler elements. Russell shares this idea with many others, the
1. B.A.O, Williams, 'Personal Identity and Individuation', Essays 
in Philosophical Psychology (D.F. Gustafson ed.), p. 333#
2. Cf. R.J. Hirst, The Problems of Perception, p. 207*
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difference lying in their conception of the nature of the simpler
elements and the manner of their combination. For him, these are
the neutral entities which are events; and those among them which,
besides being constituents of the body, are also the constituents
of the mind are known as sensations (or percepts) and images.
This might be supposed to invite the problem of identifying the
events which are the constituents of persons. It is in connection
with the question of the identification of persons and whatever may
be thought of as being their constituents that the concept of a
person as derivative has, of late, been questioned. In his book
called 'Individuals', P.F. Strawson claims that the concept of a
1person is a primitive concept, and by this he means that it is not 
analysable in terms of such elements as mind and body or sets of 
simpler elements, one of which is the subject of consciousness and 
the other is the subject of physical properties. He holds that the 
subject to which we ascribe states of consciousness is literally 
identical with that to which we also ascribe physical properties.
If we ask what this subject is, the only correct answer is that it 
is just a person.
Now, Strawson's theory of persons, if it is true, would solve 
many of the difficulties of the mind-body problem. Its importance 
with reference to Russell's position lies in that it might be 
considered as forming a basis of criticism of the latter. So, a 
comparative study of them would be instructive and could form the
Strawson first produced this idea in an article on 'Persons' 
which appeared in the Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of 
Science, Vol. II, 1958 (H. Feigl & Others edl), and then revised 
and elaborated it in the book 'Individuals'. My references
are therefore to the pages of the latter.
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subject-matter of an independent research project. For obvious 
reasons we cannot undertake here a fullscale study of this nature; 
nor can we produce an overall review of Strawson's position. We 
shall, therefore, consider below some of his claims in order to see 
if these can be accepted as tenable, and if his position can really 
be said to over-rule Russell's neutral monism.
Strawson’s discussions on the concept of a person are funda­
mentally based on his views on the notion of the identification of 
particulars and a classification of particulars on the basis of this. 
In his own words, "In the discussion of this topic, the notion of 
identification of particulars is once more crucial: primarily in the
sense of distinguishing one particular from others in thought, or 
observation; but also in the original speaker-hearer senses."^
Strawson first introduces the notion of the identification of
particulars in the context of a speaker-hearer situation, and then
extends it to cover the identification of particulars in thought,
i,e. to cover the cases where the thinker picks out a particular
for himself. He discusses "the conceptual scheme in terms of which
2
we think about particular things". He does not define particulars; 
but for him, sense-data, states of consciousness, physical particles 
like electrons and protons, things like chairs and tables, events 
like bangs, flashes, the last smile of my beloved and the battle of 
Waterloo, and persons are all particulars. We can identify them 
directly or indirectly by means of proper names, demonstrative
1, P.F. Strawson, Individuals, p. 8?,
2, Ibid*, p. 1 5,
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pronouns and descriptions. "That it should be possible to identify 
particulars of a given type seems a necessary condition of the 
inclusion of that type in our ontology."^ The idea is that what 
'exists* is directly or indirectly identified or located in space­
time. Some particulars are systematically identified indirectly 
through their relations to particulars of some other type which 
are directly identified. There is thus a distinction of dependent 
and independent identification of particulars; and this forms the 
basis of an order of ontological priority and posteriority. 
Strawson’s fundamental aim is to find, on the basis of this 
distinction, if there are types of particulars which are basic 
among the types of particulars which we include in our conceptual 
scheme.
We identify particulars indirectly by means of definite
descriptions. If necessary we multiply the descriptions till we
arrive at the level of material bodies which fall within the
speaker-hearer situation, where we necessarily succeed. This
makes material bodies 'basic* among particulars. The argument is
this: one of the fundamental requirements of our method of
identification is that there is a unique and unified spatio-temporal
2
system with ourselves as the point of origin. For Strawson, it 
is the one single spatio-temporal structure that is the framework 
of our actual thought of particulars; and the only category of
1. P.F. Strawson, Individuals, p. l6,
2. Ibid., pp. 29 f.
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particulars which can build up this framework are three-dimensional
objects which persist in time, that is material bodies and things
possessing material bodies,^ It is because we can recognise a
category of material objects that we can have the spatio-temporal
system for identification and re-identification of all kinds of
particulars. Private particulars (i.e. experiences) and the
particles of physics are only dependently identifiable as the
experiences of this or that person, and as the physical constituents
of (or as the particles explaining some observable phenomena related
to) this or that material body, and as such cannot be regarded as
2
basic particulars. Material bodies are thus basic in our particu­
lar identification; and Strawson regards it as a necessary truth 
that in an all-inclusive world of spatio-temporal relations material 
bodies should be so. He therefore concludes that, in our conceptual 
scheme as it is, "things that are, or possess, material bodies
must be the basic particulars".^ As persons are things that
4
possess material bodies, it follows that material bodies and 
persons are the basic particulars.
Strawson declares that basic particulars are "ontologically 
prior" to other types of particulars*^ By this, he s a y s h e  does 
not claim any sort of existential priority for them to others*
1. P.F. Strawson, Individuals, p. 39»
2. Ibid *, pp. 4l f.
3" Ibid., p. 39»
4* Ibid., p. 580
5 . Ibid., p. 59*
6 . Ibid., p. 59*
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And yet inconsistently enough he claims in the closing paragraph
of his book that he has "found some reason in the idea that persons
and material bodies are what primarily exist"
It is on the basis of this general theory of the identification
of particulars that Strawson claims that the concept of a person is
a primitive concept. Persons are not only basic particulars and are
therefore 'ontologically prior*, but they are also primary concepts
2
and "logically prior", to the concept of mind or experiences#
By primitiveness of the concept of a person, he means "that it is 
not to be analysed in a certain way or ways* We are not, for 
example, to think of it as a secondary kind of entity in relation 
to two primary kinds, viz., a particular consciousness and a 
particular human body."^
Strawson rejects Cartesian dualism according to which states 
of consciousness and physical characteristics are appropriately 
ascribed to two different subjects. He argues that as experiences 
are only contingently related to bodies, we never can, on Cartesian 
view, have adequate means of identifying persons. "One can ascribe 
states of consciousness to oneself only if one can ascribe them to 
others. One can ascribe them to others only if one can identify 
other subjects of experience. And one cannot identify others if 
one can identify them only as subjects of experience, possessors of 
states of consciousness."^ He argues that it becomes impossible
1. P.F. Strawson, Individuals, p. 59*
2. Ibid., p. 105*
3* Ibid., pp. 104-5.
4. Ibid., p. 100.
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to have the idea of different, distinguishable and identifiable 
subjects of experiences, if this idea is to be regarded as a primary 
idea* "So the concept of the pure individual consciousness —  the 
pure ego —  is a concept that cannot exist; or, at least cannot 
exist as a primary concept in terms of which the concept of a person 
can be explained or analysed* It can exist only, if at all, as a 
secondary, non-primitive concept which itself is to be explained, 
analysed, in terms of the concept of a person*"^
Strawson also rejects what he calls the * no-ownership' or 
•no-subject' theory of the self, and tentatively attributes to 
Schlick and Wittgenstein»^ According to this theory, states of 
consciousness do not in fact have any subjects; but there is only 
the contingent fact that different sets of experiences are causally 
dependent on different bodies* Strawson's objection to this theory 
is that it is incoherent, because it cannot be stated without pre­
supposing the proposition which the theory proposes to deny* It 
cannot explain and identify what set of experiences are mine*
If the answer is that they are just those experiences which are 
causally dependent on my body, the proposition that all my exper­
iences are causally dependent upon this body becomes analytic; but 
according to the theory it should be contingent. Again, if the 
answer is that they are 'my' experiences, it then re-introduces the 
notion of ownership which the theory proposes to deny»
Strawson argues^ that the no-ownership theory is wrong in
1* P.F. Strawson, Individuals, pp# 102-5»
2. Ibid., pp. 95 f.
5* Ibid., pp. 97-8.
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denying what prima facie is the case: that is, that one does
genuinely ascribe states of consciousness to something, viz., 
oneself. Experiences or states of consciousness are genuinely 
owned by the persons whose experiences they are; and this is a 
"logically non-transferable kind of ownership"^ which has a definite 
place in our conceptual scheme. For if we think of the require­
ments of identifying reference to particular experiences, "we see 
that such particulars cannot be thus identifyingly referred to 
except as the states or experiences o^ some identified person. 
States, or experiences, one might say, owe their identity as
particulars to the iaentity of the person whose states or exper-
2
iences they are".
Strawson holds that, in order to free ourselves from the 
difficulties of these theories, we have to acknowledge the primit­
iveness of the concept of a person, that is to recognise the con­
cept of an entity such that both predicates ascribing states of 
consciousness and predicates ascribing physical characteristics 
are equally applicable to it* He says that it is a necessary 
condition of states of consciousness being ascribed at all that 
"they should be ascribed to the very same things as certain 
corporœl characteristics, a certain physical situation etc."^
The argument is as follows:
'There would be no question of ascribing one's own states 
of consciousness, or experiences, to anything, unless 
one also ascribed, or were ready and able to ascribe, states
1* P.Fo Strawson, Individuals, p. 97*
2. Ibid., p. 97*
3* Ibid., p. 102.
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of consciousness, or experiences, to other individual 
entities of the same logical type as that thing to which one 
ascribes one's own states of consciousness. The condition of 
reckoning oneself as a subject of such predicates is that 
one should also reckon others as subjects of such predicates* 
The condition, in turn, of this being possible, is that one 
should be able to distinguish from one another, to pick out 
or identify, different subjects of such predicates, i.e. 
different individuals of the type concerned* The condition, 
in turn, of this being possible, is that the individuals 
concerned, including oneself, should be of a certain unique 
type: of a type, namely, such that to each individual of
that type there must be ascribed, or ascribable, both states 
of consciousness and corporeal characteristics.'!
Strawson brings out the implications of this characterisation 
of the type of things called 'persons' by distinguishing two kinds 
of predicates* He calls them M predicates and P predicates* The 
former are predicates which are properly applied to material bodies 
also. The latter are predicates which could not possibly be applied 
to material objects, and include actions and intentions, thoughts 
and feelings, perceptions, memories and sensations. Some of the 
P predicates are such that their ascription to an individual 
constitutes the ascription of states of consciousness to the 
individuals. We have to acknowledge that we ascribe such P predic­
ates (as ascribing states of consciousness) to ourselves on grounds 
different from those on which we ascribe them to others. We 
ascribe them to others on the basis of observation of their behaviour, 
and to ourselves without such observation. Nevertheless, the 
behaviour criteria, according to Strawson, are logically adequate
criteria for ascribing these predicates to others in the same sense
2
as we ascribe them to ourselves without such criteria.
1. P.F. Strawson, Individuals, p. 104,
2. Ibid*, pp. 106 ff*
224
Thus, in claiming the primitiveness of the concept of a person, 
Strawson declares that persons are a logically irreducible category 
of things to which both states of consciousness and physical 
characteristics (both M predicates and P predicates) are equally 
ascribable, and to which states of consciousness are applied in the 
same sense on grounds of behaviour criteria (the case of other 
ascription) or without such grounds (the case of self-ascription).
Now, in the theory roughly outlined above, there are many 
points which invite discussion. Fortunately, quite a few standard 
reviews and critical discussions of Strawson's position are already 
available, and these may be profitably referred to for detailed 
comments and criticism.^ In what follows we shall only try to 
focus attention to some of the points which seem crucial in the 
theory.
The notion of identification of particulars as the basis of 
a classification of them is fundamental to Strawson's position.
A necessary condition is that there is a unique and unified spatio- 
temporal system which is the framework of particular identification. 
As regards the nature of the spatio-temporal system there is a 
fundamental difference between Russell and Strawson o# more than 
one count. For Strawson, there are only one space and one time; 
for Russell, these may be many both in kind and number. Again,
G. Bergmann, 'Strawson's Ontology', Journal of Philosophy, 
I96O; B.A.O. Williams, 'Mr* Strawson on Individuals', 
Philosophy, 19^1; D.F. Pears, 'Critical Study of Strawson's 
Individuals', Philosophical Quarterly, I96I; J.O. Urmson, 
'Critical Notice of Strawson's Individuals', Mind, I96I;
A.J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person and Other Essays.
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for Strawson, the space-time structure is constituted by material 
bodies and persons; for Russell, it is constituted by events* Now, 
it is not logically necessary that there should be only one space 
and one time; and Strawson has no arguments to show that those 
who hold that there may be more than one space and one time are 
necessarily wrong. As regards the point about what constitute the 
space-time structure, it will perhaps be clear from the following 
that Strawson's claims cannot be maintained without difficulties.
Strawson holds that the spatio-temporal system which is the 
framework of particular identification is constituted by "things 
that are, or possess, material bodies". Only the "three dimen­
sional objects with some endurance through time", accessible to 
ordinary means of observation, are competent to constitute the 
space-time structure. "Material bodies constitute the framework".^ 
And the basicness of material bodies (and things possessing them) 
follows from their being the constituents of the space-time structure* 
But according to Strawson, we identify particulars including material 
bodies, by locating them in the spatio-temporal system* So, the 
space-time structure is constituted by material bodies, and 
material bodies are identified by their location in space-time*
There is thus a circularity in Strawson's position. For the 
basicness of material bodies (and persons) is based on the argument 
that "it is a conceptual truth ..... that places are defined by the
relations of material bodies; and ..... that persons have material 
2
bodies." So, places are identified in terms of material bodies.
1. P.F. Strawson, Individuals, pp. 39» 2^#
2. Ibid., p. 580
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and material bodies are identified in terms of places.^ Of course,
Strawson recognises this circularity and remarks that there is no
mystery about this mutual dependence, that to exhibit its details
is only to describe the criteria by which we criticise, amend and
2
extend our ascription of identity of things and places. He does 
not exhibit the details, and lets the circularity remain as part of 
the basis of determining the basicness, and ontological and logical 
priority and primitiveness of certain types of particulars to 
others. But this is unsatisfactory, since it is the dependence 
or independence in identification that for Strawson, determines 
the status of different types of particulars, "since an important 
part of his aim is precisely to show what parts of our identificatory 
conceptual system depend on or presuppose what".^ One thing, 
however, seems clear. It is his admission that there are genuine 
cases of mutual identificatory dependence. And if we accept this 
as a principle, there seems no reason to suppose that the relation 
of material bodies and the space-time structure is the only case of 
this.
As regards the connection of 'basicness in identification' 
and 'ontological priority', we may observe the following.
Ontological priority is an order of being or existence, and not an 
order of knowing. Philosophers have tried to explain the order 
of being on the basis of the order of knowing. But Strawson isss
1. B.A.O. V/illiams discusses this and some other circles; 
c.f. Philosophy, I96I, pp. 319-20, 326.
2. P.F. Strawson, Individuals, p. 37#
3. B.A.O. Williams, 'Mr. Strawson on Individuals', Philosophy,
1961, p. 320,
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is further removed, for his explanation is in terms of an order
of identification in communication. Although he originally proposes
to mean by 'ontological priority' nothing more than basicness in
identification, he nevertheless claims at the end existential
priority of material bodies and persons. These particulars are
said to exist primarily; and this conclusion is derived from the
basicness of these things in particular identification. The idea
seems to be that the independehtly identifiable categories of
particulars have a sort of independent existence and reality which
the dependently identifiable particulars do not have. That is to
say, if X's are a category of particulars such that they cannot be
identified except by their relations to another category of
particulars, say Y's, and not vice versa, Y's then have a primary
existence, whereas X's have only a secondary existence, the existence
of X's being dependent on the existence of Y's but not vice versa.
This could mean that Y's can exist without X's, but X's cannot exist
without Y's. But Strawson cannot hold such a position; for this
would mean that material bodies could exist without the physical
particles (which for him are dependent for their identification on
material bodies), but that the physical particles could not exist
without macroscopic material bodies. This is obviously false,
and the contrary is rather the case. It is possible to think that
the world could contain only a highly rarefied gas, i.e. physical
particle could exist without there being any macroscopic material
bodies. And this possibility seems to frustrate any attempts to
attach some meaning to the expression 'primarily exist' in the
context of Strawson's arguments concerning identification of 
particulars.
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Certain conclusions seem to follow immediately from a consider­
ation of material bodies and their relations to physical particles#
It seems clear that physical particles do not depend for their 
existence on material bodies, but that material bodies do depend 
for their existence on physical particles. As it is possible to 
imagine the world to be in a gaseous state without containing 
macroscopic bodies, it follows that material bodies could not be 
the basic particulars. For, would the gaseous world be in space 
and time? It seems absurd to suggest that it would not. But, 
then, the space-time in which it would be, would not be constituted 
by "things that are, or possess, material bodies". It follows that 
material bodies are not the bricks and stones that constitute the 
space-time structure. So, material bodies cannot be basic in 
particular identification,for according to Strawson their basicness 
follows from their being the bricks and stones of the space-time 
structure.^ If we ask whether identification of particulars (e.g. 
physical particles) or events in the gaseous world would be possible, 
the answer 'yes' or 'no' is once more crucial against Strawson's 
claims. If the answer is 'yes', his theory of basicness of 
material bodies falls to the ground. A further consequence of 
this is that the way a certain particular or event is identified 
has no bearing on its identity and existence; a particular may be 
variously identified» but its identity and existence cannot be said 
to be various® But perhaps the answer should be 'no'. The obvious
1. J.O. Urmson in his review of Strawson's position produces an
argument to show that material bodies are not identificatorily 
basic even in the world we live in; c.f. Mind, I961,
pp. 259-60.
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result would then be that the notion of identification had no 
direct relation with the conception of identity and existence at all, 
One more result that follows from a consideration of material 
bodies and their relation to physical particles is this. Even if 
we admit, with Strawson, that physical particles are identified only 
by their relations to material bodies, it remains a fact that 
material bodies are composed of, or constituted by, physical 
particles. Strawson admits t h i s T h e  principle that follows 
is that basic particulars, which he claims to be primary existants, 
can in fact be composed of the non-basic particulars which have 
only a secondary existence depending on the primary particulars 
which they compose. The oddity in the use of the words 'basic* 
and 'non-basic', 'primary' and 'secondary', in this principle is 
obvious; but that is the principle we get from Strawson.
The doubts and difficulties noted above and the results obtain­
ed apply not only to Strawson's conception of material bodies, 
but also to his thesis about persons, for both are, for him, basic 
particulars and primary existants. This will, I hope, be clear 
as we proceed; but we may first refer to certain points in his 
discussions of the concept of a person, which seem to involve such 
difficulties as may be regarded sufficient for rejecting his claims* 
In respect of the concept of a person, Russell and Strawson 
differ in more than one way. One important difference concerns 
our knowledge of other minds. Russell bases this on analogy; but
1. P.F. Strawson, Individuals, p. 44,
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Strawson rejects analogy and says that we can ascribe states of 
consciousness to ourselves only if we can ascribe them to others, 
that there are logically adequate criteria for ascribing them to 
others in the same sense as v;e ascribe them to ourselves without 
such criteria. We do not wish to go into this controversy. Ayer's 
instructive discussions may be referred to in this connection#^
But Strawson's argument in favour of these criteria is not free 
from defects. He connects this argument with his claim of the 
primitiveness of the concept of a person# It is this latter point 
in which Russell and Strawson differ most fundamentally. We shall 
be mainly concerned here with this controversy about the primitive­
ness or derivativeness of the concept of a person; but some of what 
we shall say may be said to have reflections on the former contro­
versy as well#
Persons, according to Strawson, are a category of logically 
irreducible things to which both states of consciousness and 
physical properties are equally ascribable, and to which states of 
consciousness are applied in the same sense on grounds of behaviour 
criteria (other-ascription) and without such criteria (self­
ascription) » The distinction of persons that we have can there 
be only if there are predicates which we can apply either (to others) 
on observation of behaviour or (to ourselves) without such obser­
vation; and therefore there are such predicates# Now, there is 
in this argument an inconsistency which, according to Urmson, is
1. A.J. Ayer, The Concept of a Person and Other Essays,
pp. 87 f., 95 ff.
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alone sufficient for rejecting the primitiveness of the concept of 
a person. To quote him:
'hut it surely is intuitively obvious that there cannot be 
predicates P such that 0 (observation) can be a sufficient 
condition of ascribing P and E (one's own unobserved 
experience) a sufficient condition of ascribing P but 0 is 
not in any way equivalent to E, except in an incoherent 
conceptual scheme.
Urmson directs this argument against the claim of primitiveness of
the concept of a person; but this must also affect Strawson's
rejection of analogy, for this rejection is precisely based on the
arguments about the criteria which are here in question*
We may now ask how persons are identified. Strawson's
immediate answer might be that they are identified in the same way
as material bodies, for persons possess material bodies, and "things
that are, or possess, material bodies" are independently identifiable
particulars. But this would be unsatisfactory because what would
be identified in this way would only be a body; it would not be
possible to say that this is a person, unless one takes a physicalist
position such that a person is a body. Even the physicalist will
have to distinguish a body which is a person from the one which is
not, and this will not be very easy. There are difficulties in
2
the physicalist position ; and Strawson does not accept it. So 
he needs something more to make the identification of persons 
possible. The something more is in fact the states of conscious­
ness or experiences which are ascribed to the same thing as certain
1. J.O. Urmson, 'Critical Notice of Strawson's Individuals', 
Mind, 1961, p. 261.
2. See above, g). 301 f « ; c.f. also A.J. Ayer, The Concept of 
a Person and Other Essays, pp. 101 ff*
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physical properties (i.e. a body). It follows from this that 
the identification of persons requires, among other things, ascript­
ion of states of consciousness.
Strawson connects identificatory primitiveness with the notion 
of 'logical priority'. Persons are 'logically prior' to minds 
and experiences because the latter are dependent for their identi­
fication on the former. Strawson does not specify the meaning of 
'logical priority' except in terras of identification; and there­
fore this expression may be taken as synonymous with 'identificatory 
priority'. In that case, what we have said in the last paragraph 
makes it impossible to stick the label of 'logical priority' on 
either side. But there is a sense in which 'logical priority' 
might mean conceptual priority such that, if A was logically prior 
to B, the logical conception of A did not involve the concept of B, 
but the logical conception of B involved the concept of A. In 
this sense, the logical priority of persons to minds and experiences 
would mean that the idea of a person did not involve that of a mind 
or experiences, but that the idea of a mind or experiences involved 
that offperson. But this does not seem to be the case; it seems 
impossible to think of a person except as a subject of experiences 
or states of consciousness. If we cite the case of an unconscious 
person, we are still thinking in terms of absence or presence of 
consciousness; i.e. in terms of an individual who is a proper 
subject of consciousness or experiences. (And this may be the 
reason why Strawson requires the ascription of states of conscious­
ness for identification of persons.) The position seems to be that 
we cannot think of persons except as subjects or owners of
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experiences. The converse of this seems doubtful; and this
becomes clear when we consider another connection of Strawson's
arguments, viz. the notion of existence. He claims that person
(and material bodies) are primary existants. We have already seen
that it is difficult to attach any special significance to this
claim. In any case, Strawson cannot consistently hold that
experiences (and minds) cannot exist without belonging to persons
in his sense, i.e. in the sense in which persons are things to
which both states of consciousness and physical properties are
equally applicable. For, he admits that a disembodied ego or mind
can exist^ and can have various experiences except "perceptions of
2
a body related to one's experience as one's own body is”. The 
disembodied ego or mind is not a person in its primary sense; and 
if there is a question of existential priority or independence, 
experiences (as well as minds) seem to be the better candidates for 
it than persons in the primary sense —  a result quite contrary to 
what Strawson wishes to maintain.
It follows that Strawson's claim of primitiveness of persons 
cannot stand in any of the senses mentioned above. In respect of 
identification, persons and experiences appear to be mutually 
dependent; as concepts they first appear to be mutually dependent, 
but the relation changes when it comes to the question of existence; 
we can think of experiences and minds as existing independently of 
persons, i.e. without the persons (in the primary sense) existing.
1. P.F, Strawson, Individuals, pp. 115-6,
2. Ibid., p. 115.
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This last change must reflect on the notion of identification.
It seems strange to suppose that experiences can exist, and can be 
thought of as existing, without persons, and yet cannot be identified 
without persons. We must therefore doubt that the v/ay a particular 
is identified has a direct relation to its identity and existence, 
or that there is only one way of identifying particulars; and 
these are the doubts we were mentioning in connection with the 
concept of the ontological priority of material bodies. Since 
Strawson admits that a disembodied mind could perceive from a point 
of view, there seems no reason why this mind and its experiences 
could not be identified by this point of view.^
If, then, the primitiveness of the concept of a person cannot 
stand, the claim that the concept cannot be analysed or explained in 
a certain way or ways (and particularly in terms of mind or exper­
iences and body) must also go, for this claim is what precisely 
Strawson wishes to mean by the primitiveness of the concept. He 
seems to think that for the analysis of something to be possible 
the terms of the analysis must be identifiable independently 
particularly of the thing to be analysed. As minds and experiences 
cannot, according to him, be identified independently of persons, 
the latter cannot be analysed in terms of the former but the former 
are to be analysed in terms of the latter. But we have already 
seen that the iaentificatory primitiveness of persons cannot be 
maintained; hence the claim in respect of their unanalysability 
also cannot stand. In any case, Strawson cannot consistently
1» Cf. B.A.O. Williams, 'Mr. Strawson on Individuals', 
Philosophy, I96I , p. 132.
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maintain that, just because experiences (or some other particulars) 
are not identified independently of persons, persons cannot therefore 
consist of, or be constituted by, experiences (or some other 
particulars). We have seen that he admits the principle involved 
in this. What he seems to object to is that the definition of 
the composition of a thing or person is an analysis of the thing 
or person* But, as Urmson remarks, "if in ordinary life we give 
a meaning to the word 'water* ostensively by reference to rivers, 
lakes, seas, etc., we also in the laboratory may regard its 
chemical composition definitive".^ Composition or constitution of 
complexes is a fact; and if someone holds that explaining the 
composition of a thing is an analysis of it, Strawson should have 
hardly anything to object to.
Strawson cannot then hold that persons cannot consist of
particulars (experiences and others) which are identified by their
relations to persons. He says that 'person' is not a compound
idea. But he cannot surely mean by this that it is the idea
of a simple particular; for that would contradict the view he holds
in the second part of his book wherein he maintains that every
particular 'unfolds* itself in some simple facts which are the
2
ultimate metaphysical entities. The position is not easy to 
follow: the ultimate metaphysical entities, the ultimate simples,
are not primary concepts or primary existants; their existence and
1. J.O. Urmson, 'Critical Notice of Strawson's Individuals', 
Mind, 1 9 6 1, p. 261.
2. P.F. Strawson, Individuals, pp. 210-12.
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identification depend on the particulars which 'unfold' themselves 
into them (simples) and to which they (simples) 'fold up'. The 
obvious oddity of this position does not disturb Strawson. However, 
his position comes to that particulars including persons and bodies 
are complexes.^ But whatever is a complex is a complex of some 
simple elements; it consists of the simple elements* Strawson's 
words are 'folding' and 'unfolding'; and he uses the word 'regress' 
for what others might call 'analysis'* But whatever gains he may 
have achieved from using these words, he has not produced anything 
which could reject the idea that persons (and material bodies) 
consisted of simpler elements and were in this sense derivative.
Strawson explains the relation of persons and their experiences 
as one of logically non-transferable ownership. He is certainly 
right in supposing that there is such a relation* But how are we 
to unaerstand this relation? Strawson seems to think that a person 
is something over and above his experiences (and body)* He is the 
possessor, and the experiences (and the body) are what he possesses*
A person is not only distinguishable from what he possesses, but 
has a separate individuality of its own. If we ask what he is 
or in what this separate individuality consists, we get the tauto­
logical answer that he is a person* A person is thus a substance­
like thing that has just this logical function of possessing the 
experiences (and the body); that is, it is a concept which is 
introduced only to give a meaning to the concept of the non-trans- 
ferable ownership of experiences* But it is not necessary that
1. Cf. D.F. Pears, op. cit.. Philosophical Quarterly, I96I,
p. 271*
337
the notion of this ownership must be explained in terms of a 
sub6tance-like unanalysable concept whose nature remains for ever 
indefinable and as such a sort of a mystery* There is a perfectly 
legitimate sense of ownership which does not require a substance­
like owner over and above what is owned. This is the sense in 
which we speak of a complex whole as possessing its parts or 
constituents. Thus, for example, we say that the jury has three 
members; or that a human body has two legs, two hands, etc., or 
that a table has four legs, a top, etc., and so on. To suppose 
that a table or a human body is something over and above its legs 
and other parts is to fall into a mysterious realm of substance 
philosophy which Russell and many others have tried to get rid of. 
(That Strawson's position involves the notion of substance may be 
noticed in his view of particulars and their predicates. Partic­
ulars, for him, are the subjects to which predicates are ascribed; 
and a person is the subject of M. and P. predicates. A particular 
is a sort of a peg on which the predicates hang. As Russell points 
out, such a notion of a particular involves the notion of substance; 
the particular cannot be defined or known; it is something serving 
the merely grammatical purpose of providing a subject in a subject- 
predicate sentence. "And to allow grammar to dictate our meta­
physic is now generally recognised to be dangerous".^ Russell, 
therefore, abandons the idea of a particular over and above predicates 
and relations. He holds the Berkeleyian view that what we 
ordinarily call particulars are only groups of predicates and
1. Human Knowledge, p. 311#
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relations.^ Now, whether this is true is still an open question; 
we cannot, therefore, say that it is not.)
If, instead of taking a table or a body or a person as something 
over and above its constituents, we take it to be a complex whole 
consisting of its constituents, we can still have the sense of 
ownership that Strawson mentions. If we raise the question of 
identification, it seems clear that a leg can be properly identified 
as that of a body or a table, and a top as that of a table, and so
on* But it does not follow from this that the body does not
consist of the legs, hands and other parts which it possesses, or 
that a table does not consist of the legs and other parts which it 
possesses. In the same way, it seems possible to suppose that 
persons consist of, among other things, the experiences they possess*
It may be objected that this way of treating the concept of a 
person is not proper. For, it may be said that the legs of tables 
or human bodies can be identified independently, but experiences 
cannot. But the objection cannot stand; because a leg cannot be
identified except as a leg of some body. What can be identified
independently is not a leg but a piece of matter (perhaps wood) which 
in its relation to some other pieces of that kind is called a leg. 
'Leg', 'top', and in short 'part' or any other words with that 
implication are relational terms; and things denoted by them are 
properly identified by the relations they imply, i.e. their relations 
to the other parts which together with themselves make a complex 
thing. When we say that a part is identified by its relation to
1 .  See above,pp. 70, 104,
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the whole of which it is a part, the proper meaning is that it is 
identified by its relation to the other parts of the complex whole* 
'Experience' is such a relational term, and it is because of this 
that we properly identify it by its relation to the complex thing 
to which it belongs, i.e. the person. And this only means that an 
experience is identified by its relation to other experiences and 
events that constitute the person. Strawson says that experiences 
are identified by their relations to persons. But this is not 
enough. We cannot simply identify an experience by saying that 
it is an experience of a person P. P has had a lot of experiences 
during his lifetime, and is having a lot of them at this moment.
We have to specify exactly which experience it is. The way this 
can possibly be done is to locate it in terms of its relations to 
other experiences and events that P has possessed and possesses; and 
the experiences and events P possesses are those which constitute P. 
This brings us to Russell's conception of a person as a complex 
biography.
It seems clear from the above that the problem of the 
circularity involved in defining persons in terms of experiences 
and identifying experiences in terms of persons does not remain*
For an experience is identified by its relations to other experiences 
(and events) which together with itself constitute the person, and 
not by its relation to a ’•person' which is something over and 
above the experiences (and events). To my mind, the circularity 
arises only if we suppose that, in the complex situation as the 
personal situation is, a 'person' is one item in just the same 
sense as the experiences (and other events) are items in the
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situation. In other words, the circularity arises out of a 
category-mistake, i.e. the mistake involved in supposing that a 
'person' is just one item in the situation, which is defined in 
terms of the other items, and that the other items are identified 
in terras of this one item. But if we suppose that this one item 
is not there in the situation, the circularity in respect of it 
seems to vanish.
But perhaps we have not yet answered the objection that exper­
iences cannot be independently identified whereas legs, hands and 
tops can. We have so far said that 'legs', 'hands', 'tops' and 
'parts' are relational terms and so is 'experience', and that they 
are properly identified by the relations they imply. We have also 
said that a piece of matter which can be a leg or a hand can be 
identified independently in Strav/son's sense. In other words, we 
seem to have a use for both relational and non-relational names of 
things which can be legs or hands or tops, and therefore a case of 
both dependent and independent identification. The question 
is whether we have a similar case in respect of experiences.
The answer, on Russell's view, seems to be that we have. 'Ex­
perience' is a relational term; but 'event' does not seem to 
be so. If we say 'X is an experience', the question 'whose 
experience?' is in order; but if we say 'X is an event', the 
question 'whose event?' does not arise. Russell's terms of 
analysis of body, mind and person are events. Although in 
his explanation he uses the terms 'sensations' and 'images', 
the ultimate analysis is in terms of events. 'Sensations' (or
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'percepts') and 'images' are the sort of relational terms vie have 
discussed above. But they have a non-relational name: they are
events.
Strawson thinks that, although some kinds of events such as 
bangs and flashes could themselves form a limited system of their 
own and could be independently identified by their position in this 
system without reference to other kinds of particulars, most events 
cannot be so identified. On his view, the vast majority of events 
are states, processes, undergoings, actions or experiences of things 
and persons, and therefore dependent for their identification on 
these things and persons. He in fact argues that events in general 
are dependently identifiable*^ Now, there are indeed events which 
are states, processes, unaergoings, actions or experiences of 
material bodies or persons,though it is doubtful that they are 
the majority of events. Here again, we should notice that states, 
actions, etc. are relational terms; and what we have so far said 
about experiences apply equally to these also. These may be treated 
either relationally or non-relationally simply as events. Thus, 
as Russell thinks, the world may be considered as a complex net­
work of events or chains of events; and in this world every event 
could be identified by its position in the net-work, i.e. by its re­
lation to other events. We have seen that Russell constructs 
space-time out of events. Every event has a place in the space­
time structure and is therefore directly locatable in the structure. 
Strawson's argument abuut states, processes, actions, etc., should 
not detain us here; but we shall have something to say about
1. P.F, Strawson, Individuals, pp. 46 ff.
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actions of persons later on.
We have seen that Strawson cannot, on grounds of identification, 
maintain that things and persons cannot consist of experiences, 
events or other categories of what he calls dependently identifiable 
particulars. On this count, therefore, his views cannot possibly 
be regarded as forming a basis of a criticism of Russell's position; 
for what the latter requires is only that body, mind and person 
consist of simpler elements, viz. events. But Strawson has a very 
brief argument^ which he directs against the sort of eventism that 
Russell holds. This argument opposes the view that things and 
persons are each a series of events, a biography, i.e. against the 
theory of what Strawson calls "process-things". He summarily 
dismisses this theory by saying that "the category of process- 
things is one we neither have nor need", and that "we do in fact 
distinguish between a thing and its history, or the phases of its 
history"*^ The reason for this quick disposal is that as a 
'descriptive metaphysician', he is concerned with the available 
major categories of common sense things and concepts. But it is 
the inconsistencies and inadequacies of common-sense concepts and 
common-sense philosophy that have led many philosophers to what 
Strawson calls the 'revisionary' metaphysies; and in their attempts 
to remove these difficulties and supply these inadequacies they 
have found it useful to introduce new ideas and new methods of 
interpretation. The need for such concepts as Strawson objects to.
lo P.F. Strawson, Individuals, pp. 56-7. 
2# Ibid., p. 57*
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arises precisely out of the difficulties many of which are to be 
found in his own system; some of these we have already mentioned, 
and many others have been pointed out by the commentators referred 
to above. As regards things and their history, Strawson says that 
we do distinguish them. But simply to assert this common-sense 
idea is not a reply to those who think that things are their 
'biographies'. For, that we ordinarily make the distinction is 
not in dispute; what is in dispute is whether we are right in doing 
so. Those who identify things with their biographies think, perhaps 
rightly, that to assume permanent things over and above the states, 
processes or events which constitute their biographies is to accept 
the existence of unknown and unknowable permanent substances. 
Strawson's brief statements in this connection do not show that 
these thinkers are not right in defining things and persons as 
biographies.
Does Strawson's position over-rule neutral monism? We have 
seen that his position does not affect Russell's views; and as such 
it cannot also affect his neutral monism. In fact, his position 
ultimately turns out to be one like Cartesian dualism in such a way 
as he himself does not perhaps realise, and it involves most of the 
difficulties characteristic of this kind of philosophy. The way he 
distinguishes between M predicates and P predicates, between states 
of consciousness and bodies, and the way he conceives of the subjects 
of perceptual experiences and disembodied minds as well as the 
contingent nature of their relation to bodies, create a wide gulf 
between what we call mind and body. Neutral monism is an attempt 
to bridge over this gulf. For a fuller discussion of these topics
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of Strawson's system, Bernard Williams' article may be referred to
We may only mention the following* Strawson takes states of
consciousness to be of a completely different kind from matter or
bodily states. He divorces " 'states of consciousness' from bodily
states in a way that invites the Cartesian spectre in at the back
2
door while Strawson is wheedling it out of the front". He has a 
fantastic idea that a subject of perceptual experience may contin­
gently depend for a visual perception on the open eyes of one body, 
the direction of the head of another body, and the position of a 
third body*^ He admits also the existence of disembodied minds.
He has an idea that some particulars may be only in time and not 
4
in space. Presumably these are mental or private particulars such 
as states of consciousness « But if mind and body, or states of 
consciousness and bodily states are conceived to be so divergent, 
there are then difficulties in understanding their relations.
An attempt at closing this gap in order to remove these difficulties 
is therefore in order. Strawson's position does not therefore over­
rule neutral monism; on the contrary, the difficulties of Cartesian 
dualism into which Strawson's position falls seems to justify such 
attempts as Russell's neutral monism is. Russell's position, his 
neutral monism, may be wrong; but there is nothing in Strawson's 
philosophy which proves that this is the case.
1. Philosophy, 19^1, pp. 529-32.
2. B.A.O. Williams, 'Mr. Strawson on Individuals', Philosophy,
1961, p. 331.
3. P.F. Strawson, Individuals, pp. 90 ff.
4. Cf. Ibid., pp. 22-3, 25.
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As regards persons, there is one more point about which we 
should say a few words. The question is whether Russell's neutral 
monism, as it finally stands, allows for the concept of a person as 
a free active agent. It is ultimately the question about the 
possibility of freedom of will and action. A person, according to 
Russell, is a complex of events organised into a single structure 
according to psychological and physical causal laws. All actions 
are events or series of events, and all events are causal events. 
Could we not, then, say that his position did not allow for 
freedom of will and action, that it is determinist and had no room 
for morality and ethics?
We have already seen how Russell explains will and voluntary 
action. He thinks that volition with deliberate choice is a 
later development in human life, that an infant's actions are not at 
first voluntary, that as he grows in age and acquires more and more 
knowledge and skill, he becomes more and more free. In other 
words, as the mind of a person becomes more and more complex, he has 
more and more freedom of will and action.
In respect of Russell's views on the possibility of freedom 
of will in a world governed by, and explained in terms of, causal 
laws, we may notice the following. First, there are, for him, 
psychological laws which cannot be reduced to physical laws. So, 
physical determinism would not entail psychological determinism. 
Accordingly, although human volitions could be partially conditioned 
by physical laws, they would, at least partially, be subject to 
psychological causation. But mental causation is an internal 
affair of a person's life. The mental causation of volitions does
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not involve external determination; it involves such conditions only 
as are factors of a person's inner life. In this sense, a person's 
volitions may be said to be a matter of 'self-determinism*.
Secondly, in modern science, particularly in quantum physics, 
physical laws are no more thought to be deterministic as they pre­
viously used to have been. We cannot predict when a discontinuous 
change in an atom or a quantum transaction will take place ; and 
the laws of physics cannot determine which of several possible 
transactions a given atom will unaergo. Russell derives the 
possibility of human freedom of will from this. He suggests that 
we may even fancy that an atom has a limited freewill. He thinks 
that mind-brain inter-relations involve very minute phenomena, that 
very minute cerebral differences must be connected with noticeable 
mental events, so that mind-brain correlations may be regarded as 
belonging to a region where causal determinism does not hold. He 
recognises that the unpredictability of quantum transactions may be 
due to insufficiency of our knowledge, but that we cannot be sure 
that this is the case. So, he thinks that it is not necessary 
for us to deny the possibility of human freedom of will»^
The argument for human freewill from the indeterminist nature
of scientific laws has good following. Some philosophers, for
2
example, K.R. Popper, have argued that not only quantum physics 
but even 'classical mechanics' is not deterministic. So, there 
seems no sound scientific grounds for denying the freedom of wâââT
1. The Analysis of Matter, p. 393; An Outline of Philosophy,
pp. 3 0 5, 309; Human Knowledge, pp. $4 ff.
2* British Journal for Philosophy of Science, 1950» PP* 117 ff * »
173 ff.
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will and action.
Now, to derive human freewill from the indeterminacy ^ quantum 
transactions seem to be a philosophical muddle. There is a funda­
mental difference between quantum indeterminacy and human freewill. 
The unpredictable quantum transactions are random changes; but 
human freewill is not a matter of random transactions, it involves 
deliberate choice of ends and means. So, Russell's attempt to 
derive freewill from the indeterminist nature of quantum physics is 
a confusion of issues. All that the supposed indeterminism of 
scientific laws, particularly quantum physics, can lead to is the 
negative conclusion that determinism is not absolute.
Russell's position concerning the problem of freedom of will 
has to be considered from a different point of view. We have al­
ready argued that the final version of Russell's complete neutral 
monism is a kind of 'emergent' neutralism in so far as he admits 
that body and mind have emergent properties. We have tried to 
emphasise the importance of this in Russell's theory. An organised 
complex whole consisting of simpler elements must have properties 
which are not to be found in the elements themselves. To deny this 
is to commit what R.J. Hirst calls the 'fallacy of Composition’.^  
Russell admits that there are such emergent propcrties and that body, 
mind and persons are complexes having emergent properties. Accord­
ingly, quite apart from the question of whether scientific laws of 
events are rigid and determinist, it is quite possible to maintain
1. R.J. Hirst, The Problems of Perception, p. 217#
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that deliberate, intelligent and purposive activity, and freedom 
of will and action are the emergent properties of persons*
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